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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
by
Francisco A. Marcet Orellana
Doctor of Business Administration
Washington University in St. Louis, 2016
Radhakrishnan Gopalan (Co-Chair)
Armando Gomes (Co-Chair)
Mark Leary
This dissertation presents three essays in empirical corporate finance. In the first two
essays, I examine the effect of analyst coverage network on US firms’ corporate decisions and
stock return comovement in emerging markets. The third essay discusses the importance
of performance pay and CEO functional background in explaining firm performance in the
short- and long-run.
In the first chapter, which is a joint work with Armando Gomes, Radha Gopalan and
Mark Leary, we show that sell-side analysts play an important role in propagating corpo-
rate financial policy choices, such as leverage and equity issuance decisions across firms.
Using exogenous characteristics of analyst network peers as well as the “friends-of-friends”
approach from the network effects literature to identify peer effects, we find that exogenous
changes to financial policies of firms covered by an analyst leads other firms covered by the
same analyst to implement similar policy choices. We find that a one standard deviation
increase in peer firm average leverage is associated with a 0.35 standard deviation increase
in a firm’s leverage, and a one standard deviation increase in the frequency of peers’ equity
issuance leads to a 29.6% increase in the likelihood of issuing equity. We show evidence
that these analyst network peer effects are distinct from industry peer effects and are more
pronounced among peers connected by analysts that are more experienced and from more
influential brokerage houses.
In the second chapter, I provide evidence that sell-side analyst coverage networks (ACN)
viii
play an important role explaining the comovement and excess comovement of stock return
across Latin American countries. The study tests empirically the Coverage-Specific Informa-
tion Spillover Hypothesis (Muslu et al. 2014) of the information generated and disseminated
by analysts. Using the pair model for the sample period 2000-2014 and more than 75,000
firm-pair-year observations, I provide evidence that firms connected by analysts in common
have higher comovement and excess comovement. In addition, I perform cross-sectional
tests to show that firms easily traded by foreign investors are more affected by shared cov-
erage. Also, I find that an important source of across-country excess comovement is the
shared coverage by international analysts. Then, I test whether firms followed by the same
brokerage houses also face higher stock return comovement. The results suggest that both
analysts and brokerage houses matter, but I find the strongest effects associated with the
ACN. Finally, I exploit exogenous changes in the ACN around the MSCI Latin American
Index reviews to address endogeneity concerns about the effect of ACN on commonalities.
In my last chapter, I use a comprehensive dataset based on the accounting performance
goals employed by firms to provide evidence that boards of directors design executive com-
pensation to cater to investor demand. I show that they tie the compensation to accounting
metrics (performance pay) preferred by investors in order to improve firm performance and
boost the current stock price. Moreover, the results suggest that both performance pay and
functional background are important determinants of firm performance. However, func-
tional background has a long lasting impact as compared to performance pay. In addition,
the study shows that the effectiveness of linking CEO compensation to accounting met-
rics depends on CEO tenure. Performance pay is more important for recently appointed
CEOs and its effect is also important to improve long-term performance. Finally, I provide
evidence that firms obtain better performance when boards of directors hire new leaders
and design compensation plans consistent with the functional background of the incoming
CEOs.
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Chapter 1
Analyst Coverage Network and Corporate Financial Policies
1.1 Introduction
Sell-side analysts are important players in financial markets. Their role in acquiring, ana-
lyzing, and disseminating information for investors has been much studied (Frankel et al.
(2006), Kadan et al. (2012); Muslu et al. (2014); Chang et al. (2006); Piotroski and Roul-
stone (2004)). In addition to their role as information intermediaries between firms and
investors, there is growing evidence that analysts may also influence the policies of the
firms they cover (Kaustia and Rantala (2015); Degeorge et al. (2013); Becher et al. (2015)).
Analysts can communicate their preferred financial policy to management through confer-
ence calls, analyst reports, etc. Management in turn will be willing to adopt those policies
either if they are perceived to be value enhancing or if management wishes to cater to the
analyst (Degeorge et al. (2013)). An indirect channel of analyst influence is when managers,
in their effort to meet analyst forecasts, alter firm financial and investment policies (Bhojraj
et al. (2009); Gunny (2010); Hribar et al. (2006)).1 In this paper, we argue that analysts
may affect corporate financial policies by transmitting information across portfolio firms.
Analysts cover a portfolio of firms often spread across multiple industries. Apart from
regularly communicating with the firms, analysts also employ common models to value the
1Managers sometimes engage in real activities manipulation. For instance, reducing R&D when actual
earnings may be lower than the analyst consensus.
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firms and benchmark them with one another. During the course of their communication
and valuation, analysts may come across information that can effectively be transferred
from one firm to another. Such information can be about the state of financial markets,
growth opportunities, or about the suitability of a particular financial policy. If analysts
communicate such intelligence to management and if the firms follow the analysts’ recom-
mendation, then we expect financial policies to be correlated among firms with common
analysts. Note that although the policies of peer firms may be public knowledge, we believe
analysts may still play an important role in communicating the suitability of the policy
for a particular firm. We use the latest identification techniques from the social networks
literature to document the causal effect of analyst peer firm financial policies on a firm’s
financial policy.
We identify “exogenous” changes to financial policies of firms covered by an analyst and
test to see if other firms covered by the same analyst experience similar changes in policy.
We focus on financial policies such as leverage, debt issuance, and equity issuance. We
classify all firms that share a common analyst with a firm as its “analyst peers” and relate
the firm’s financial policy to the weighted average financial policy of its analyst peers. We
use the number of common analysts between the firm and its peer firms as the weights. This
methodology gives rise to a network, which we refer to as the analyst coverage network–i.e.,
the graph where the firms are the nodes and the weighted edges between two firms are the
number of common analysts between the firms.
We use empirical methods from the social networks literature to identify peer effects
in the analyst coverage network. As discussed by Manski (1993), a positive association
between a firm’s financial policy and that of its peers can arise from one of three sources.
First, there can be one or more unobserved common characteristic between the firm and its
peers. This is what Manski (1993) calls “correlated effects”. For example, firms in the same
analyst network are likely to operate in similar product markets and thus share common
characteristics. These common characteristics can result in the firms choosing similar finan-
cial policies. To the extent analysts have “exogenous” preferences about financial policies
and directly influence their portfolio firms to implement those policies, it can also generate
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correlated effects.
Second, firms may change their financial policy in response to changes in some peer
firm characteristic. For example if a peer firm gets a new investment opportunity, a firm
may respond by possibly changing its investment and financial policy. This is referred to
as “exogenous peer effects”. The word exogenous refers to the change in the “exogenous”
characteristic driving the change in financial policy. Finally, changes to peer firm financial
policy may causally influence a firm’s financial policy. This is referred to as “endogenous
peer effect” and is the one that we wish to document. Our objective is to establish the
presence of endogenous peer effects among firms covered by common analysts. Distinguish-
ing between exogenous and endogenous effects is important since, for example, there are
policy interventions such as targeted industry tax subsidies for debt financing, which may
influence the financial policy of peers while leaving their fundamentals unchanged. These
policies may still generate multiplier effects through endogenous peer effects (Glaeser et al.
(2003)).
We follow two methodologies to establish the existence of endogenous peer effects. First,
to isolate correlated effects from endogenous and exogenous peer effects (we refer to these
as social effects from now), we follow Leary and Roberts (2014) and use idiosyncratic equity
return shocks as an exogenous source of variation in peer firm financial policy (and possibly
characteristics). A large prior literature in finance shows that firms change their leverage,
debt and equity issuance decision in response to changes to their stock price (Baker and
Wurgler (2002); Leary and Roberts (2005)). To the extent we are able to isolate idiosyn-
cratic shocks to peer firm’s equity value, the shocks are unlikely to be correlated with the
characteristics of the firm in question and thus any peer effects we document are unlikely
to include correlated effects. Note that idiosyncratic changes to peer firms’ stock price can
influence a firm’s policies either because the return shocks affect the peers’ financial poli-
cies or because the return shocks reflect changes in one or more of peers’ characteristics.2
To this extent this methodology will not allow us to distinguish between endogenous and
2Or perhaps both. For example, a shock to a peer firm’s investment opportunities that generates a
positive return shock may affect the peer’s investment behavior and also elicit an equity issuance to fund
the investment.
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exogenous peer effects.
To distinguish endogenous peer effects from exogenous peer effects we exploit the fact
that analyst networks partially overlap. Thus we can observe firm triads i, j and k, such that
firms i & j and firms j & k have common analysts while firms i & k do not have any. This is
a key property of the analyst coverage network that allows for identification.3 Following the
“friends of friends” approach outlined in Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) and Goldsmith-Pinkham
and Imbens (2013), we use the exogenous characteristic of firm k, namely idiosyncratic
equity shock as an instrument for the financial policy of firm j to document its influence
on firm i ’s financial policy. The exclusion restriction for this approach is that firm k ’s
equity shock should influence firm i ’s financial policy only through its influence on firm
j ’s financial policy and not otherwise. Given our interest in controlling for exogenous peer
effects another way to state this is, firm k ’s equity shock should not be correlated with
either firm j or firm i ’s characteristic. To the extent we are able to isolate “idiosyncratic
shocks” to equity values, this assumption is reasonable. It follows the same logic as outlined
in Leary and Roberts (2014).
We begin by documenting a positive association between a firm’s financial policy and
that of its analyst peers. We find that this association extends to all the outcome variables
we model and to analyst peers not from the same industry. Next we implement reduced-
form regressions that documents a robust association between a firm’s financial policy and
the idiosyncratic return shocks of its analyst network peers. We find that this association is
robust to controlling for the financial policies and characteristics of the firm’s industry peers,
as well as the characteristics of the firm and its analyst peers. The positive association exists
for leverage, changes in leverage, equity issues and share repurchases. Thus our results
are consistent with the existence of “social effects” for leverage, equity issues and share
repurchases.
Next, we use the idiosyncratic shock to peer firms’ stock prices (Equity shock) as an
3 Note that this is in contrast to, for example, peer effects arising due to industry membership. If firms
i & j and j & k belong to the same industry, then i & k must also belong to the same industry.
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instrument for peer firm financial policies in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification
and find that we obtain consistent results. To the extent this 2SLS does not isolate endoge-
nous peer effects, we will not be able to interpret the estimates as the causal effect of peer
firm financial policy on a firm’s financial policy.
We take several steps to establish that our results capture the role of analyst networks
and not other common factors such as industry. First, as mentioned before, in all our tests,
we control for industry average policies, either directly or through industry average return
shocks. Second, we find similar results when we focus on the firms in the analyst network
that are not from the same industry as the firm in question. Third, we estimate a placebo
test in which we define pseudo peer groups as firms in the same industry as a firm’s direct
analyst peers but that do not have a common analyst with the firm in question. We find
no relation between the return shocks of the pseudo peers and the firm’s financial policy.
We further document cross-sectional variation in our estimated effects that are consistent
with information propagating through the analyst network. First, we find that smaller and
less successful firms are influenced by the larger and more successful (“leader”) firms in their
analyst network, but not vice versa. Second, we test to see if analysts that are expected to
be more influential are more effective at transmitting information across firms. Consistent
with this idea, we find stronger peer effects among firms connected by more experienced
analysts and by analysts from brokerage houses with more “all-star” rated analysts.
Finally using the friends of friend methodology from the social network literature, we
document the presence of endogenous peer effects among firms covered by analysts. Using
the equity shock of indirect peer firms as an instrument for peer firm financial policies, we
document an economically significant endogenous peer effect. A one standard deviation
increase in peer firm average leverage is associated with a 0.35 standard deviation increase
in a firm’s leverage. Peer effects are also present in a firm’s decision to issue equity. A one
standard deviation increase in peer firm’s average equity issuance leads to a 29.6% increase
in the likelihood of a firm issuing equity. Overall, after controlling for the endogeneity in
the network formation we find that peer firms in the same analyst coverage network affect
each other.
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We make a number of important contributions. First, we document the important role
of analysts in propagating financial policies across firms. An important question that we
do not answer is whether such propagation is efficient or results in inefficient mimicking.
Future research should explore this important question. Our second contribution is method-
ological. We are the first in the finance literature to use the “friends of friends” approach
to document the existence of endogenous peer effects. This approach can be productively
used to document endogenous peer effects in other networks that partially overlap such as
board networks and supply chain networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the related literature.
Section 1.3 discusses our data and empirical methodology. Section 1.4 provides the summary
statistics and section 1.5 discusses the empirical evidence. Finally, section 1.6 concludes.
Definitions of empirical variables are in Appendix A.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper is related to two main streams of literature. The first is related to the role of
analysts in the financial markets and the second explores the effect of social networks in
corporate finance. Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that analysts are an
important mechanism underlying peer effects in financial policy and that analysts influence
the way firms interact with one another.
A large literature studies the role of analysts as information intermediaries between firms
and outside investors. Prior studies indicate that analysts acquire, analyze, and dissemi-
nate useful information to investors.4 Evidence from Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) suggests
this information production of analysts is effective in reducing information asymmetry in
financial markets. Additionally, a number of recent studies have shown evidence that an-
alysts can impact the decisions of the firms they follow. For example, Chen et al. (2015)
4Examples include Womack (1996); Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); Frankel et al. (2006); Kadan et al.
(2012); Muslu et al. (2014), among others.
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show that the monitoring activities of analysts help align managerial behavior with investor
interests. Other studies show that analysts’ information production impacts firms’ cost of
capital (Derrien and Kecske´s (2013b); Fracassi et al. (2014)), security issuance decisions
(Chang et al. (2006)) and merger completion probability (Becher et al. (2015)). Degeorge
et al. (2013) show evidence that analysts have preferred financial policies, which they in-
fluence firms to follow. Relative to these earlier studies, our study highlights a previously
unexplored role of analysts that also impacts firm policies, namely that they facilitate peer
effects by transmitting information among firms.
The second stream of the literature explores how peer effects, or the interaction among
agents, can affect outcomes. There is a vast economics literature along this line and a
growing literature in corporate finance analyzing the role of social networks on firm financial
policy decisions. Shue (2013) shows that executive compensation and acquisitions strategies
are significantly more similar among graduates from the same (randomly assigned) MBA
section than among graduates from different sections. Fracassi (2016) studies the impact
of social ties among managers from past employment and education and their corporate
policy decisions. He finds that more connections two companies share with each other,
more similar their capital investments are. Cai and Sevilir (2012) show that performance in
M&A transaction of acquirers is better when the acquirer and the target share a common
director. In the asset management area, Cohen et al. (2008) focus on the education network
between mutual fund managers and corporate board members. They find that mutual fund
managers invest more and perform significantly better on stock holdings for which the board
members went to school together with the mutual fund managers. Matvos and Ostrovsky
(2010) document peer effects among mutual fund managers in proxy voting.
Our paper differs from these earlier ones in our focus on the role of analyst networks as
a mechanism behind corporate peer effects. Kaustia and Rantala (2013, 2015) also examine
peer effects within the context of analyst coverage networks. However, their focus is on
stock split decisions and they use analyst networks to identify groups of related firms rather
than studying the role of analysts in transmitting information among firms.
Our paper also differs methodologically from earlier studies of peer effects in corpo-
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rate finance. We use recent econometric methodologies developed to identify peer effects
(endogenous versus exogenous effects) in social networks. Our main model is an extended
version of the Manski-type linear-in-means model studied in Goldsmith-Pinkham and Im-
bens (2013) and Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) (see also the survey by Blume et al. (2010)). A key
property of the analyst coverage network that allows for identification of peer effects is that
there exist many firms that are not directly connected to a firm through a common analyst,
but that do share a common analyst with other firms in the analyst network. We refer to
these as indirect analyst peers. We use the characteristics of the indirect analyst peers, in-
cluding idiosyncratic equity shocks to indirect peers, as instruments for the financial policy
of firm’s direct peers to estimate peer effects in financial policy.
1.3 Data and Empirical Methodology
1.3.1 Data and Key Variables
We obtain our data from standard sources: financial information from Compustat, stock
price information from CRSP, and analyst coverage information from IBES. From the overall
CRSP-Compustat merged sample, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and
6999), utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4949) and government companies (SIC codes
greater than or equal to 9000). We then match the CRSP-Compustat sample to IBES and
identify all firms that are connected to at least one other firm in the sample through a
common analyst. We identify an analyst as following a firm in a fiscal year if she makes
at least one earnings forecast during the year and the forecast is made at most six months
before the end of the fiscal period and at least three months after the end of the fiscal
period. We also require the analyst to follow the pair of firms for at least two years in the
entire sample for us to consider them to be connected through the analyst. Our sample
spans the period 1993-2013 and includes 37,745 firm-year observations.
We begin by documenting the extent to which financial policies of analyst peers are
associated with a firm’s financial policy. We do that by estimating the following regression:
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yijt = α+ β1y
ACN
−it + β2y
IND
−ijt + γ
′
1X
ACN
−it−1 + γ
′
2X
IND
−ijt−1 + γ
′
3Xijt−1 + δ
′
ui + φ
′
vt + ijt (1.1)
where the indices i, j and t refer to firm, industry and year respectively. The dependent
variables that we model are, Market leverage, Net debt issuance (1%), Net equity issuance
(1%) and Gross equity issuance (1%). Specifically, we employ the level and change in
leverage. When we consider debt and equity issuances we use an indicator equal to one
if the firm issues debt (equity) in excess of 1% of total assets, and zero otherwise.5 All
variables we use in our analysis are defined in the Appendix A. Xijt−1 is the set of firm-
specific controls. Following Leary and Roberts (2014), we include lagged (one period) values
of Log(Sales), Market-to-book, Tangibility and Profitability as our controls. yACN−it represents
the weighted average value of the outcome variable for all the firms that are connected to
firm i through common analysts (analyst network from now). The weights for each firm l
in the analyst network represents the number of common analysts between firm l and firm
i. Specifically:
yACN−it =
∑I
(i 6=l)niltylt∑I
(i 6=l)nilt
(1.2)
where nilt represents the number of common analysts between firm i and firm l. Note that
in calculating yACN−it we use the financial policies of peer firms in the current year along with
the current network structure. We use a weighted average instead of a simple average to
give more weight to peer firms with more analysts in common with a firm. Such peers may
have a stronger influence on a firm’s financial policy because there is a greater likelihood
that one or more analysts will transmit information across the firms. Our coefficient of
interest is β1. We also include a set of weighted average peer firm characteristics (X
ACN
−it−1)
as controls. These are the same set of characteristics included in Xijt−1 and discussed
above. In calculating XACN−it−1, we use the current network structure along with lagged peer
5In all the regressions we use the 1% threshold for the gross and net equity (debt) issuances to define the
indicator variable. We explicitly identify the cases in which we use a different threshold.
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firm characteristics.
To distinguish the effect of analyst network peers from that of industry peers (Leary
and Roberts (2014)), we also control for the average value of the outcome variable for all
other firms in the same industry (based on three-digit SIC code), yIND−ijt (excluding the firm
i) and their average characteristics, XIND−ijt−1, as additional controls.
6 In all the regressions,
except for those with changes in Leverage as the outcome variable, we include firm- and
year-fixed effects. For the regressions with change in leverage as the outcome variable, we
include industry- and year-fixed effects. The standard errors we estimate are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm-level.
As shown in Manski (1993), a significant β1 can arise from one of three sources. First,
it can reflect the fact that there are some unobserved similarities among firms in the same
analyst network (correlated effects). These similarities may result in the firms choosing
similar financial policies. Alternatively it can arise from firms responding to either the be-
havior (endogenous peer effects) or characteristics (exogenous peer effects) of the peer firms.
To control for correlated effects, following Leary and Roberts (2014), we use idiosyncratic
shocks to the value of the peer firm’s equity as an instrument for their financial policy (or
characteristic). We define expected returns based on a one-factor market model augmented
to include the excess return on the analyst network portfolio. We use the equally-weighted
portfolio returns of all firms that share a common analyst with a firm to calculate the excess
returns. While the excess return on the analyst network firms does not necessarily represent
a priced risk factor, we include it to absorb any common shocks that may affect firms in the
same analyst network.7 For example, Muslu et al. (2014) and Israelsen (2014) show that
shared coverage explains comovement and excess comovement between pairs of stock with
common analysts. Thus, we model the firm’s stock return as:
6 We also create an alternative measure of industry average outcomes that includes only firms that are
in the same industry as firm i, but they are not in the same analyst network as firm i. In other words, we
exclude the set of firms that overlap across the analyst coverage network and industry of firm i.
7Leary and Roberts (2014) show evidence that this strategy produces idiosyncratic return estimates that
are uncorrelated, both serially and cross-sectionally, within networks.
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rit = αit + β
M
it (rmt − rft) + βACNit (r¯ACN−it − rft) + ηit
where the subscript t refers to time in months, rmt and rft are the monthly return on
the market and risk free asset respectively, r¯ACN−it is the equally weighted average return
of all firms in the analyst network of firm i. We estimate this regression individually for
each firm-year using a five year rolling window.8 We then calculate, Equity shock for firm
i in year t as the difference between the return on the firm’s stock in year t and the
predicted return based on the market and peer portfolio excess returns during the year and
the loadings estimated using the data from the prior five years. We require firms to have at
least 24 months of historical data to estimate the above model. Equity shock represents the
idiosyncratic shock to a firm’s stock return. We then calculate the weighted average equity
shock for the analyst network, Equity shockACN−it , using the number of common analysts as
the weights and the industry average equity shock, Equity shock IND−ijt , as the simple average
equity shock for all firms in the same industry as firm i.
We use Equity shockACN−it as an instrument for yACN−it and employ a reduced form model
and 2SLS to estimate its effect on firm i ’s financial policy after controlling for industry
corporate policy and industry characteristics. To the extent Equity shockACN−it captures
idiosyncratic shocks to the stock price and consequently leverage of analyst peer firms,
it is unlikely to be correlated with firm i ’s characteristics. To this extent the reduced
form model and the 2SLS will isolate the social effects and exclude correlated effects. The
specific identifying assumptions that we make for this are the following. First, for instrument
relevance we assume that Equity shockACN−it is correlated with the peer firm’s financial policy
either directly or indirectly through one or more characteristic. A large prior literature
documents the important effect stock prices can have on firm financial policies (Baker and
Wurgler (2002); Leary and Roberts (2005)) and stock price changes often reflect changes in
firm characteristics such as investment opportunities, expected profitability or risk, which in
turn have been shown to be important determinants of firm financial policies. This ensures
8In each year we calculate monthly peer returns using the firm’s analyst network in that year. In order to
calculate r¯ACNit , we require that a firm has at least one peer firm with valid returns during the time period
in which we estimate the loadings.
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the relevance assumption is satisfied in our setting. Furthermore as we make clear later, the
instrument is strongly correlated with firm financial policies in the first stage with a high F-
statistic. The second assumption we make to isolate social effects is that Equity shockACN−it
is uncorrelated with firm i ’s characteristics but through its effect on firm i ’s policies (or
characteristics). To the extent our procedure for defining Equity shockACN−it isolates truly
idiosyncratic shocks, this assumption is likely to be valid.
Note that our tests employing Equity shockACN−it as an instrument will not be able to
isolate endogenous peer effects from exogenous peer effects because the idiosyncratic shock
to equity values can change, or reflect changes in (some unobserved) peer firm characteristic
and firms may respond to the changes to peer firm characteristic as opposed to the changes
in peer firm behavior. To isolate the endogenous peer effects from exogenous peer effects,
we exploit the fact that analyst networks partially overlap with each other. In other words,
we can observe firm triads i, j and k, such that firms i & j and firms j & k have common
analysts while firms i & k do not have any common analyst. Following the “friends-of-
friends” approach outlined in Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), we use the characteristic of firm k
(namely Equity shock) as an instrument for the financial policy of firm j to identify its
influence on firm i ’s financial policy. In our subsequent discussion we refer to firm k as an
indirect peer of firm i. Note that we use a slightly modified and in some senses a stricter
version of the friends-of-friends approach proposed by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009). To identify
endogenous peer effects, Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) only require that some of the indirect peers
not be direct peers of the firm in question. If that is true then one can use the characteristics
of all the indirect peers as instruments for peer firm behavior. In our tests we use the Equity
shock of only the indirect peers that are not direct peers of the firm in question to instrument
for peer firm behavior. In the example above if there was another firm m which is a peer of
both firms i and j, Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) will allow one to use the average characteristics
of both firms m and k as instruments for firm j ’s behavior. In our tests, we only use the
characteristics of firm k as an instrument for the behavior of firm j. We exclude firm m
because it is a direct peer of firm i. By construction, there are no analysts in common
between firms i and k. The specific instrument we employ is the simple average Equity
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shock. The identifying assumptions necessary for us to isolate the endogenous peer effects
are the following:
First we require that the Equity shock of firm k be correlated with the behavior of firm
j. This will happen as long as there are some social effects. Our earlier results show that
there are some social effects in our sample. Our second assumption is that firm k’s equity
shock should not be correlated with firm i’s (and firm j ’s) characteristic. We believe this
is a reasonable assumption because the firm and indirect peers do not have any analysts in
common, and they are often not even from the same industry.9 Furthermore Equity shock
by construction identifies idiosyncratic shocks to a firm’s equity value. Finally, since we
focus on indirect peers we use a simple average of indirect peer equity shock instead of a
weighted average.
1.4 Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics for the analysts’ network. On average,
a firm is connected to 41.3 other firms through common analysts. Interestingly, only 10.46
(28%) of these connections are from the same three digit-SIC code industry as the firm.
The low percentage of within industry connections helps us independently estimate peer
effects arising from both industry and analyst networks. Note that we exclude from our
analysis firms that are not connected to any other firm through common analysts. The
variable Connected Firms identifies the percentage of firms that are connected to at least
one other firm each year in the overall CRSP-Compustat-IBES sample. We find that about
94% of the firms in the overall sample are connected to at least one other firm. Thus the
unconnected firms, which we exclude, constitute only 6% of the CRSP-Compustat-IBES
merged sample. The average (median) number of indirect connections–defined as the pairs
i & k, such that firms i & j and firms j & k have common analysts while firms i & k do not
have any– are 405.54 (373) and the 25th percentile of the number of indirect connections
9In a robustness test, we use only those indirect peers not in the same industry as firm i.
13
is 218 while the 75th percentile is 563. Most of the indirect connections are to firms in
different three-digit-SIC code industries. The mean (median) number of across industry
indirect connections is 385 (352)).
Our next set of variables measure the number of common analysts between two firms.
We find that on average, two connected firms in our sample have 1.89 analysts in common.
Surprisingly this number does not vary much in the sample. The 25th percentile of the
number of common analysts is 1.1 while the 75th percentile is 2.34. We find that firms
within an industry are likely to have more common analysts as compared to firms across
industries. Two firms within the same industry have on average 3.11 common analysts
whereas this number is only 1.54 for two firms from different industries.
Panel B reports the average value of the outcome variables we use in our analysis. We
find that the average Market leverage in first difference (level) for the firms in our sample
is 1% (21%). In comparison, the industry average Market leverage in first difference (level)
and the peer average Market leverage in first difference (level) are 1% (23%) and 1% (20%)
respectively. When we identify debt issuances as instances when there is a more than 1%
increase in the book value of total debt relative to the book value of total assets, we find
that firms issue debt during 36% of the sample period. We use two variables to identify
equity issuances. Our first variable defines equity issuances as instances when the difference
between cash flow from equity issues less cash flow from equity repurchases is greater than
1% of the book value of total assets. Based on this definition, firms issue equity 23% of the
sample period. When we define gross equity issuances as years when the cash flow from
equity issues is more than 1% of the book value of total assets, we find that equity issuances
occur 36% of the firm-years.
In Panel C we provide the summary information for Equity shock. While the average
value of Equity shock in our sample is close to zero at -.03, it has sufficient dispersion with
a standard deviation of 0.50. Not surprisingly, Equity shock becomes much less dispersed
when averaged over either the industry or analyst peer firms.
Finally in panel D we provide the summary information for all the control variables in our
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sample. The summary values are similar to those for the the full CRSP-Compustat-IBES
merged sample. We winsorize all our variables of interest at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 Baseline Regressions
In this section we discuss our empirical results. The discussion is divided into four parts.
First, we document a positive association between a firm’s financial policy and that of its
analyst peers. We then employ Equity shock as an exogenous peer firm characteristic to
establish the existence of social effects distinct from correlated effects. We also provide a
series of robustness and placebo tests to distinguish peer effects operating through analyst
networks from those operating within industries. We further perform several cross-sectional
tests to investigate the hypothesis that more influential analysts are more effective in trans-
mitting information about financial policies between firms. In our final set of tests, we
employ the friends-of-friends approach to isolate endogenous peer effects from exogenous
peer effects.
In Table 1.2, we provide the results of estimating equation (1) in our full sample. The
outcome variable in columns (1) and (3) is Market Leverage in first difference and level,
respectively. The positive and significant coefficient on Industry average highlights the pos-
itive association between a firm’s leverage and average leverage of other firms in its industry
(Welch (2004), Frank and Goyal (2008)). Coefficients on the firm-specific control variables
are consistent with prior studies (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995)). From the coefficients
on the industry average characteristics we find that only industry average Profitability is
significantly related to firm leverage. Consistent with the findings in Leary and Roberts
(2014), firms from more profitable industries have higher leverage.
In columns (2) and (4) we augment the model with Peer average, the weighted average
leverage (in first difference and level) of all firms in the analyst network. We also include the
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weighted average characteristics of the analyst peer firms in the regressions. We find that
the coefficient on Peer average is positive and significant. The coefficient on Peer average is
significantly larger than that on Industry average and inclusion of the Peer average reduces
the size of the coefficient on Industry average in first difference (level) from .461 (.405) to
.253 (.286). This is consistent with analyst peer firm leverage having a large effect on a
firm’s leverage. Focusing on the peer firm characteristics, we find that only the coefficients
on peer firm average Log(Sales) and Market to book are significant in both columns.
In columns (5)-(6) we repeat our tests with Net debt issuance as the dependent variable
and from column (6) we find that there is a positive association between the probability
of debt issuances by a firm in a year and debt issuances of analyst-connected peer firms.
Here again we find that the coefficient on Peer average is larger than that on Industry
average. Interestingly we find that none of the industry or analyst peer characteristics are
significantly related to a firm’s decision to issue debt. In columns (7) - (10) we focus on
equity issuances and irrespective of our measure of equity issuance, we find that there is
a positive association between equity issuances by a firm and equity issuances by analyst
peer firms in the same year. The coefficients on both Peer average and Industry average
are of similar magnitude. Overall our results in Table 1.2 show that firm financial policies
are positively related to the financial policies of firms that are connected through common
analysts. The magnitude of the association is greater than that between firm financial
policy and industry average financial policies.
In Table 1.3 we differentiate between within and across industry analyst peers to see if
these two groups have a similar effect on firm financial decisions. We do this by replacing
Peer average with two variables Peer average (within industry) and Peer average (across
industry). These are the weighted averages of the outcome variable for within and across
industry analyst peers. We calculate the weighted average using the methodology outlined in
Section 3. From columns (1)-(2) of Table 1.3 we find that the coefficients on both within and
across industry peer averages are positive and significant. The coefficients are also of similar
size. This indicates that both within and across industry analyst peers appear to exert a
similar level of influence on firm leverage. Specifically, in unreported tests we find that the
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two coefficients in column (2) are not statistically distinguishable. The significant coefficient
on Peer average (across industry) further reinforces the conclusion that the analyst network
may have an independent effect on firm leverage apart from the industry effect documented
in Leary and Roberts (2014). From columns (4)-(5) we find that within and across industry
peer financial policies in terms of net debt issuance, net and gross equity issuance have a
statistically significant association with a firm’s respective financial policy. It is noteworthy
that the across industry analyst peers have a larger influence on a firm’s decision to issue
equity as compared to within industry analyst peers.
1.5.2 Reduced Form and Structural Regression
Having established a positive association between peer firm financial policy and own firm’s
financial policy, we now go to our next set of tests wherein we employ Equity Shock as an
exogenous peer firm characteristic in an effort to control for correlated effects.10 In Table 1.4
we report the results of a reduced form estimation wherein we include Peer Equity Shock and
Industry Equity Shock instead of peer and industry average financial policy and repeat our
tests. We perform the reduced form analysis to provide evidence of social effects (endogenous
or exogenous). However, at this point we cannot identify which one of these effects drives
the results. In this table we also include Industry Equity Shock to highlight that the effect
of Peer Equity Shock is robust to controlling for industry characteristics, suggesting that
our peer effects results are not only due to peer firms from the same industry. We explore
this issue further in subsequent tests.
From columns (1)-(2) we find that all three equity shock variables (lagged one period),
Own Equity Shock, Industry Equity Shock and Peer Equity Shock are negatively associated
with a firm’s market leverage (first difference and level). To the extent that equity shock
provides an exogenous shock to a firm’s financial policy and characteristic, the negative and
significant coefficient on Peer Equity Shock is consistent with the presence of social effects
within the analyst network. When we model leverage (column 2), our coefficient estimates
10Following Leary and Roberts (2014), we use the Equity Shock instrument lagged one period.
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on Industry Equity Shock and Own Equity Shock are similar to those reported in Leary and
Roberts (2014) (see Table IV). In the change specification, however, the industry average
shock becomes statistically insignificant once we control for Peer Equity Shock.
In column (3) our dependent variable is Net debt issuances and we find that while Own
Equity Shock is negatively associated with Net debt issuances, both Peer Equity Shock and
Industry Equity Shock are not significantly associated with Net debt issuances. By contrast,
columns (4) - (5) indicate a strong positive association between Peer Equity Shock in a year
and the probability of a firm making equity issues the next year. This suggests the presence
of social effects in equity issuance decisions within analyst networks. Summarizing, our
evidence in Table 1.4 shows that there appears to be strong social effects within analyst
networks when it comes to leverage and equity issuance decision.
In Table 1.5, we use alternate thresholds to define the equity issuance dummy (1%, 3%
and 5% of total assets) and also separately look at net and gross equity issuance along
with equity repurchases. From columns (1)-(3) we find that our results are robust to using
different thresholds to identify equity issuance. In all three columns, the coefficients on
Peer Equity Shock and Peer average are positive and statistically significant. Moreover,
from column (4) we also find some evidence for peer effects in equity repurchases.11
In Table 1.6 we provide the results of the two-staged least squares estimation that uses
Peer Equity Shock as an instrument for the average financial policies of peer firms. In
all the specifications we also include the average financial policies of firms in the same
industry as an additional control. On the top of Table 1.6, we provide the coefficients on
the instruments from the first stage regression. Estimating the 2SLS has advantages and
disadvantages relative to the reduced form. The advantage is that it allows us to estimate
the magnitude of the impact of analyst peer firm policies on firms’ financial decisions. The
limitation, though, is that interpreting the magnitude in this way requires us to assume that
the peer firms’ equity shocks influence firm i through their effect on peers’ financial policies.
As discussed earlier, it is possible that peers’ equity shock influences firm i ’s policies because
11The lack of statistical significance in columns 5 – 6 is understandable in light of the rarity of equity
repurchases in excess of 3% (5%) of assets.
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it is a shock to the peers’ characteristic, such as investment opportunities or competitive
position. This would represent an exogenous peer effect, in which case we would be wrong
to attribute the entire magnitude to endogenous peer effects i.e., the effect of peers’ policies
on firm i’s policies.
Despite this caveat, the results in Table 1.6 are instructive. The first stage results
indicate that Peer Equity Shock is significantly related to peer firm leverage (columns 1 –
2) and equity issuance (columns 3 – 4) decisions. Further, the F-values for weak instrument
tests shown at the bottom of the table are all large and greater than the threshold of 10.
Focusing on the results of the second stage, we find that the coefficient on the instru-
mented peer average leverage is positive and significant in columns (1)-(2). This is consistent
with the presence of peer effects in leverage decisions that propagate through analyst net-
work. Our estimates are also economically significant. The coefficient on Peer average in
column (2) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in peer firm weighted average
leverage is associated with a 0.788 standard deviation increase in the firm’s leverage (0.788
= 1.575 * (0.11 / 0.22)).
From columns (3)-(4) we find that the decision of peer firms to issue equity in a year is
associated with the own firm’s decision to issue equity. We find that the effect of analyst
peers is greater than the effect of industry peers. Our estimates are also economically signif-
icant. The coefficient estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase in peer firm
average net (gross) equity issuance results in a 12.51% (16.78%) increase in the likelihood
of a firm issuing equity as identified by changes in net (gross) equity. In comparison a one
standard deviation increase in industry average gross equity issuance (the only coefficient
statistically significant) results in a 2.4% increase in the likelihood of a firm making a gross
equity issue.
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1.5.3 Robustness Tests
Our results thus far suggest that the peer group generated through shared analysts has a
direct influence on corporate policy decisions. However, many firms in an analyst network
are in the same industry as the firm in question. Leary and Roberts (2014) document the
existence of peer effects in leverage among industry competitors. Although we control for
industry averages in all our tests, this still raises the question of whether analyst network
effects that we document are simply capturing industry peer effects. Our control for industry
averages may prove inadequate because the number of analysts in common (which we use
to form our weighted average peer equity shock) between pairs of firms in the same industry
is higher in comparison to pairs of firms across industries. To the extent that firms in both
the same industry and analyst network are more similar and more influential, our analyst
peer weighted average may still not be able to fully disentangle industry effects from analyst
network effects. We therefore perform several additional tests to address this issue.
In Table 1.7 we re-estimate the reduced form model employing three averages instead
of two. These are the weighted average of Equity Shock for firms that are both in the same
industry and in the analyst network of a firm (Industry=Yes, ACN=Yes), the weighted
average of Equity Shock for firms which are in the analyst network and not in the same
industry (Industry=No, ACN=Yes) and the simple average of Equity Shock for firms that
are in the same industry but not in the analyst network (Industry=Yes, ACN=No). The
construction of these variables can be illustrated with reference to Figure 1. In the figure
the numbered shapes represent firms with each shape (triangle, circle, etc) representing an
industry. The lines connecting the shapes represent common analysts. Thus the firm star-0
is connected to six other firms (star-1, star-2, circle-1, pentagon-1, square-1 and triangle-1 )
through common analysts. Of these, star-1 and start-2 are in the same industry as star-0
while the others are in a different industry. Furthermore there are six other firms in the
same industry as firm star-0. Our first peer average (Industry=Yes, ACN=Yes), for the firm
star-0 is the weighted average of Equity Shock for the firms star-1 and star-2. Our second
weighted average (Industry=No, ACN=Yes) is calculated across firms circle-1, pentagon-1,
square-1 and triangle-1. Finally our third average (Industry=Yes, ACN=No) is calculated
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across firms start-3 to star-6.
In panel A, we report the results using the average Equity Shock of firms in the same
industry as firm i, but not in the same analyst network. Results for leverage and equity is-
suances are directionally consistent with those in Table 1.4 and in Leary and Roberts (2014),
but statistically and economically weaker. Similarly, Panel B shows that leverage and eq-
uity issuance decisions are, respectively, negatively and positively related to Equity Shock
of industry peers in the same analyst network, though these relations are only marginally
statistically significant. By contrast, the relations in panel C, where the peer group includes
only firms in the same analyst network, but not the same industry, are highly significant
and of much larger magnitude. Similar results are found in Panel D, in which all three
averages are included in the same specification. Overall, these results suggest that the peer
effects operating through analyst networks do not simply reflect industry peer effects.
1.5.4 Placebo Tests.
A potential limitation with the previous analysis is that analysts may choose firms to cover
that are economically connected, even if not in the same industry. Thus, firms that are in
the same analyst network, but in different industries, may exert influence on one another
as a result of their product market connections rather than the analyst connection. In
other words, the connection that an analyst creates between firms may proxy for economic
linkages between those firms that as researchers we cannot perfectly observe.
We address this concern in Table 1.8 by performing a placebo test. Instead of using
the average Equity Shock of firms in the same analyst network, we define a set of pseudo
peers that are in the same industry as the firms in the analyst network, but do not share
a common analyst with firm i. Referring to Figure 1, circle-1, pentagon-1, square-1 and
triangle-1 represent firms that are connected to star-0 through common analyst but are
in a different industry. To conduct our placebo test, we focus on the firms in the same
industry as these firms but that do not have a common analyst with star-0. These are
21
firms pentagon-2 to pentagon-4, square-2 to square-4 and triangle-2 to triangle-4. We refer
to this average as the Pseudo-peer average and repeat our tests with this average. If the
analyst network captures links across firms in different industries then we should expect
the Pseudo-peer average Equity Shock to be significantly related to the corporate policies
of the firm in question.
The results in Table 1.8 show that there is no significant relationship between Pseudo-
peer average and a firm’s financial policy. This suggests that firms respond to other firms in
their analyst network not simply because they are in the same industry or in economically
connected industries.
1.5.5 Cross-Sectional Tests
In this section, we perform cross-sectional tests to better illustrate the mechanism under-
lying the peer effects we document. In these tests, we focus on the level and change in
leverage and net and gross equity issuances, as these are the outcome variables for which
we find significant peer effects in the previous analysis.
1.5.5.1 Leader vs. Followers
We first examine which firms within an analyst network are most influential. If firms are
mimicking one another, we posit that the policy choices of industry leaders will be more
influential than those of other firms. In Table 1.9 we identify leader and follower firms
within an industry using four alternate criteria. We use Market share, Profitability, Return
and EPS growth as the alternate metrics to identify leader and follower firms. We classify
a firm as a leader if either its Market share and Return (only equity issuances) is above
sample median or it is in the top quartile in terms of Profitability, Return (only leverage)
or EPS growth.12 We classify all other firms as follower firms. In Panel A we evaluate the
12In addition, we use the firms’ stock returns (Return) in the previous year to identify leaders and follower
firms when the dependent variable is either net or gross equity issuances. For the case of leverage, we employ
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influence of leader firms on follower firms. That is, the model is estimated on the subsample
of firms classified as followers and the independent variable of interest is the average Equity
Shock of peer leader firms. In panel B we perform the opposite analysis, i.e., we test for
the influence of peer follower firms on leader firms.
The results in Panel A of Table 1.9 are similar to those in Leary and Roberts (2014); from
columns (1)-(4) we find that irrespective of the criteria used, Equity Shock of leader firms in
an industry are correlated with market leverage decisions of follower firms.13 Similar results
are obtained for net and gross equity issuances. In Panel B we flip the analysis and test to
see if Equity Shock of follower firms affect the financial decisions of leader firms. Irrespective
of the criteria used, we do not find any significant effect. Thus there is no evidence of social
effects from follower firms to leader firms. These results further reinforce our interpretation
that the peer effects we document is a result of firms learning from (mimicking) the decisions
of the analyst peer firms. In the next set of tests, we differentiate between analysts to better
highlight their role in transmitting information across firms.
1.5.5.2 All-star Analysts, Brokerage houses and Analyst Experience
Our paper argues that analyst networks are important in transmitting corporate policy
decisions from one firm to another. If this is the case, the characteristics of the analyst herself
may be important for the strength of these peer effects. More influential analysts should be
more effective at transmitting policy-relevant information across firms. We construct two
measures that capture the potential influence of analysts. Specifically, from Institutional
Investor magazine we collect the information of the top four ranked analysts (first, second,
third, and runner-up) for each industry during 1990-2013. We classify an analyst as being
influential from the first year she appears in the Institutional Investor ranking. We classify
brokerage houses that employ two or more influential analysts as All-star brokerage houses.
stock returns in the current period.
13 For brevity we only report the results of leverage in level.
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These roughly represent about 10% of all brokerage houses in our sample. We differentiate
between all-star brokerage houses and non-all-star brokerage houses to see if there is any
difference in the extent of peer effects within their networks. Next we differentiate analysts
based on their level of experience. For every year, we calculate the number of years since
an analyst first appears on IBES. We then define analysts to have more (less) experience
if they are above (below) sample median in terms of the number of years since they first
appeared on IBES.
Table 1.10 examines the impact of all-star brokerage houses (Panel A) and analyst ex-
perience (Panel B) on the strength of the analyst network peer effect. In Panel A, we use
two separate peer averages as independent variables. The first, Peer Average (All-Star),
uses only peers that share at least one analyst from an all-star brokerage house. For the
second, we use only those peers connected by analysts not from all-star brokerage houses.
For each dependent variable (change and level of leverage, net and gross equity issuance), we
estimate the model in two ways: a baseline OLS regression in which the peer firm average
is the average financial policy of each group of peers, and the reduced form regression in
which we employ two weighted average for the Equity Shock (All-Star and No All-Star). In
all specifications, we find a larger coefficient on peer averages for peers connected through
analysts from all-star brokerage houses relative to peers connected through non-all-star bro-
kerage houses. For the OLS regressions, the coefficients are statistically different across the
two peer averages. In the case of reduced form regressions, the coefficients are statistically
different only for leverage and net equity issuances.
Similar, but stronger, results are obtained in Panel B where we differentiate analysts
based on their experience. Here we again form two peer averages, based on firms con-
nected through more (less) experienced analysts. In all specifications, we find stronger peer
effects among firms that are connected through more experienced analysts. All of these
differences are statistically significant, with the exception of the reduced form model for
net equity issuances. Interestingly, in the reduced form models, the peer effect is never
statistically different from zero for firms connected through less experienced analysts, but
always significant for firms connected through more experienced ones.
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1.5.6 Indirect Peer Approach
Finally in Table 1.11 we attempt to isolate the exogenous peer effects from endogenous peer
effects by using the friends-of-friends methodology. Specifically, we identify indirect peer
firms for every firm. These are firms that are not directly connected to a firm through analyst
networks but are connected to one or more of its analyst network peers. We then estimate
a two-stage least squares model in which we use the equity shock of these “indirect peers”
as an instrument for the financial policies of a firm’s direct peers to identify endogenous
peer effects in financial policy.
There are several reasons for the equity shock of indirect peers to be exogenous to the
financial characteristics of both the firm in question and the direct peer firm. First, the
asset pricing model we employ includes market and industry network return factors that
are likely to remove common variation due to shocks to the economy or to related groups of
firms. Importantly though, not only are the indirect peers in different analyst networks but
the vast majority are also in a different industry from the firm in question. Thus, even if
the asset pricing model does not completely remove common return shocks, what remains
is unlikely to be correlated with the fundamentals of the firm in question. Furthermore,
since the indirect peers are in different analyst networks, we can control for the average
stock return in each firm’s analyst network to further rule out any correlation between
the indirect peers’ return shocks and the fundamentals of the firm in question. In order
to separate contextual from endogenous peer effects, the key identification assumption is
that the characteristics of the indirect peers used as instruments are uncorrelated with the
characteristics of the direct peers. This is likely to be true for idiosyncratic return shocks
as they isolate value-relevant events that are unique to the indirect peers.
The first row of Table 1.11 presents the coefficients on the indirect peer average Equity
Shock from the first stage. We find that Equity Shock of indirect peer firms is significantly
related to the level and change in leverage and net and gross equity issuances of direct peers.
Further, the F-values indicate that for these policy variables the instrument easily passes
the weak instrument test. In the second stage, we find a significant relation between firms’
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financial policies and those of their direct peers for the level of leverage and both net and
gross equity issuances. The positive and significant coefficients on Peer average for those
corporate policies suggest the average outcome variable of analyst peer firms has a causal
effect on a firm’s outcome variable. Our results are also economically significant. From the
coefficient in column (2) we find that a one standard deviation increase in peer firm average
leverage is associated with a 0.352 standard deviation increase in a firm’s leverage (0.352 =
0.704 * (0.11 / 0.22)). For equity issuances, we find that a one standard deviation increase
in peer firm simple average net and gross equity issuances leads to 13.1% and 29.6% increase
in the likelihood of a firm issuing equity, respectively.
It is important to remark that the coefficients associated with industry averages of
the outcome variables are also positive and statistically significant but they are smaller in
comparison to peer firm endogenous variables. Our results suggest that analyst networks
are likely an important source for industry peer effects.
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1.6 Conclusion
Sell-side analysts are an important information intermediary in financial markets. There is
growing evidence that they may influence the financial policies of firms that they cover. In
this paper we provide evidence consistent with sell-side analysts being an important mech-
anism underpinning peer effects in financial policy choices. Building on recent empirical
methods from the network effects literature to identify peer effects, we find that exogenous
changes to financial policies of firms covered by an analyst, such as leverage, equity issuance
and repurchases, lead other firms covered by the same analyst to make similar changes in
policy.
We use an extended Manski-type linear-in-means model, and use the characteristic of
indirect analyst peer firms and idiosyncratic equity shocks to peer firms as instruments
for analyst peer firm financial policy. We find that firms’ leverage and equity issuance
decisions are significantly impacted by the peer firms in their analyst network. We show
that these network effects are distinct from industry peer effects and that these effects are
more pronounced among peers connected by analysts that are more experienced and from
more influential brokerage houses. Moreover, less successful firms are more influenced by
the financial policies of their more successful analyst peers, but not the other way around.
Research analysts are intermediaries connecting firms to each other. However, firms are
also connected by other channels such as social ties or commonality of board of directors,
executives, commercial/investment bankers or other professional advisors, and institutional
or active investors. The methodology developed in this paper can also be used to identify
peer effects in these other settings, and we hope future research will further explore these
issues.
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1.8 Appendix A: Variable Definitions
 Book Value of Total Assets: Book value of Assets (Compustat item: at).
 Equity Repurchase Indicator: Dummy variable that takes the value of one if equity
repurchases normalized by book assets at the beginning of the year is greater than
1% (3%) (5%) (Compustat items: prstkc/at(t-1)>1%,3%,5%).
 Equity Shock: Idiosyncratic returns defined as the difference between effective and
expected returns based on the methodology provided by Leary and Roberts (2014).
 Gross Equity Issuance Indicator: Dummy variable that takes the value of one if gross
equity issuances normalized by book assets at the beginning of the year is greater
than 1% (3%) (5%) (Compustat items: sstk/at(t-1)>1%,3%,5%).
 Leverage: The ratio of the sum of total long-term debt plus total debt in current liabili-
ties scaled by the market value of assets (Compustat items:(dltt+dlc)/(prcc f*cshpri+dlc+dltt+pstkl-
txditc)).
 Log(Sales): Natural logarithmic of sales (Compustat items: log(sale)).
 Market-to-Book: The ratio of the sum of the total book value of debt plus market value
of equity divided by book value of total assets (Compustat items: (prcc f*cshpri+dlc+dltt+pstkl-
txditc)/at).
 Market Value of Assets: The sum of the market value of equity equity plus total long-
term debt plus current liabilities (Compustat items: prcc f*cshpri+dlc+dltt+pstkl-
txditc).
 Net Debt Issuances: The sum of the total long-term debt plus total debt in current
liabilities for the contemporaneous fiscal year minus the sum of the total long-term
debt plus total debt in current liabilities in the previous fiscal year (Compustat items:
(dltt+dlc-( dltt(t-1)+dlc(t-1)))).
 Net Debt Issuance Indicator: Dummy variable that takes the value of one if net debt
issuances normalized by book assets at the beginning of the year is greater than 1%.
(Compustat items: (dltt+dlc-( dltt(t-1)+dlc(t-1)))/at(t-1)>1%).
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 Net Equity Issuances: Difference between equity issuances minus equity repurchases
(Compustat items: sstk-prstkc).
 Net Equity Issuance Indicator: Dummy variable that takes the value of one if net
equity issuances normalized by book assets at the beginning of the year is greater
than 1% (3%) (5%). (Compustat items: (sstk-prstkc)/at(t-1)>1%,3%,5%).
 Profitability: The ratio of the EBITDA divided by book value of total assets (Com-
pustat items: oibdp/at).
 Stock Return: Annual return for the firm’s stock over the current fiscal year (Com-
pustat items: ((prcc f/ajex+dvpsx f/ajex)/(prcc f(t-1)/ajex(t-1)))-1).
 Tangibility: The ratio of the book value of Net Property Plant and Equipment divided
by book value of total assets (Compustat items: ppent/at).
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Figure 1: Analyst Coverage Network
0
1.9 Figure
34
1.10 Tables
35
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics. Analyst Coverage Network and Equity Shock
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the analyst coverage network and the variables used in the regressions analysis. Panel
A shows the characteristics of analyst networks in terms of number of connections of direct and indirect peers. Panel B reports the
statistics for the outcome variables. Panel C and D show the statistics of the equity shock instrument (lagged one period) and control
variables (lagged one period), respectively, used in the regression analysis. All variables used in the regression analysis are winsorized at
the 1st and 99th percentile.
Panel A: Analysts Network
Number of Connections
Direct Peers N Mean Std P25 P50 P75
Overall 37745 41.30 26.86 20.00 37.00 57.00
Within industry 37745 10.46 12.56 2.00 5.00 15.00
Across industries 37745 30.84 25.36 11.00 25.00 45.00
Within industry connection (%) 37745 0.28 0.30 0.05 0.16 0.46
Connected Firms (%) 21 0.94 0.02 0.92 0.94 0.96
Indirect Peers
Overall 37745 405.54 232.08 218 373 563
Within industry 37745 20.27 32.22 1 5 25
Across industries 37745 385.27 233.1 199 352 541
Number of analysts in common (Direct Peers)
Overall 37745 1.89 1.04 1.10 1.50 2.34
Within industry 32326 3.11 2.73 1.18 2.00 4.00
Across industries 36581 1.54 0.72 1.00 1.26 1.78
Panel B: Outcome Variables
Firm specific Industry average Industry average (No Overlap) Peer firm simple avg.
N Mean SD Median Mean SD Median Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
∆Market leverage 37745 0.01 0.1 0 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00
Market leverage 37745 0.21 0.22 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.19
Net debt issuance (1%) 37745 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.33 0.16 0.30 0.32 0.26 0.29 0.37 0.16 0.36
Net equity issuance (1%) 37745 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.23 0.15 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.17 0.19
Gross equity issuance (1%) 37745 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.31 0.18 0.30 0.32 0.27 0.31 0.39 0.23 0.35
Peer firm weighted average
Full sample Within industry Accross industry
∆Market leverage 37745 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00
Market leverage 37745 0.20 0.11 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.18
Net debt issuance (1%) 37745 0.37 0.18 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.35 0.20 0.35
Net equity issuance (1%) 37745 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.26 0.08 0.21 0.20 0.15
Gross equity issuance (1%) 37745 0.39 0.24 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.26 0.36 0.25 0.33
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Panel C: Equity Shock N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Own equity shock 37745 -0.03 0.50 -0.32 -0.10 0.15
Industry equity shock 37745 -0.03 0.16 -0.12 -0.05 0.04
Industry equity shock (no overlap) 37745 -0.03 0.21 -0.14 -0.04 0.04
Peer equity shock (weighted average) 37745 -0.04 0.12 -0.11 -0.04 0.02
Indirect Peer equity shock (simple average) 37745 -0.03 0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.00
Panel D: Control Variables
Firm specific Industry average Industry average (No overlap) Peer firm simple average
N Mean SD Median Mean SD Median Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
Log(Sales) 37745 6.69 1.78 6.60 5.78 1.13 5.62 5.81 1.87 5.95 7.07 0.94 7.12
Market to book 37745 1.67 1.26 1.27 1.60 0.66 1.44 1.49 0.81 1.37 1.82 0.75 1.65
Profitability 37745 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.15
Tangibility 37745 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.16 0.26
∆ Log(Sales) 37745 0.10 0.22 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.11
∆Market to book 37745 -0.06 0.82 -0.01 -0.07 0.40 -0.05 -0.08 0.43 -0.02 -0.08 0.46 -0.02
∆ Profitability 37745 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
∆ Tangibility 37745 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Peer firm weigthed average Indirect peer firm simple average
Full sample Within industry Across industry
Log(Sales) 37745 7.24 1.04 7.26 6.20 2.81 6.90 7.06 1.65 7.32 7.15 0.52 7.18
Market to book 37745 1.85 0.82 1.66 1.59 1.16 1.40 1.72 0.79 1.60 1.83 0.57 1.71
Profitability 37745 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.14
Tangibility 37745 0.30 0.17 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.28 0.15 0.26 0.29 0.12 0.27
∆ Log(Sales) 37745 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.12
∆Market to book 37745 -0.08 0.48 -0.02 -0.07 0.55 0.00 -0.07 0.47 0.00 -0.08 0.38 -0.03
∆ Profitability 37745 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
∆ Tangibility 37745 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
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Table 1.2: Baseline Specification I. Peer Firms vs. Industry
The table presents the OLS estimated coefficients for the baseline regressions. The corporate policies of interest are
leverage and debt and equity issuances. The dependent variable is indicated at the top of columns. All the control
variables, but excluding Peer average and Industry average, are lagged one period. When the dependent variable is
∆Leverage all the control variables are also in first differences and we include year and industry fixed effect. The
remaining regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. For brevity we suppress the constant. See Appendix A for a complete
variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. In each column we estimate the regression:
yijt = α+ β1y
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Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage Leverage Net Debt I. Net Equity I. Gross Equity I.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Peer average .555 .372 .215 .316 .284
(.022)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗
Industry average .461 .253 .405 .286 .218 .166 .307 .215 .346 .262
(.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗
Own characteristics
Log(Sales) .029 .024 .035 .034 -.043 -.046 -.105 -.100 -.081 -.079
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Market-to-book .0008 .002 -.019 -.018 .013 .013 .066 .064 .072 .071
(.0005) (.0005)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Profitability -.033 -.026 -.298 -.297 .354 .347 -.147 -.155 .187 .180
(.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.047)∗∗∗ (.048)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗∗ (.045)∗∗∗ (.045)∗∗∗
Tangibility .095 .089 .071 .076 .313 .320 .085 .087 .051 .049
(.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.050)∗∗∗ (.050)∗∗∗ (.046)∗ (.046)∗ (.049) (.049)
Peer characteristics
Log(Sales) .015 -.009 .004 .005 .013
(.008)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.007) (.006) (.006)∗∗
Market-to-book -.004 .006 -.0001 -.005 -.019
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.007) (.007) (.007)∗∗∗
Profitability -.044 .081 -.00004 .143 .013
(.028) (.037)∗∗ (.105) (.095) (.095)
Tangibility .043 -.061 -.097 .008 .037
(.045) (.025)∗∗ (.064) (.052) (.055)
Industry characteristics
Log(Sales) -.006 -.011 -.009 -.008 -.005 -.003 .002 .0008 -.008 -.008
(.007) (.007) (.005) (.005) (.013) (.013) (.009) (.009) (.012) (.012)
Market-to-book -.006 -.003 -.004 -.006 .008 .008 .006 .0004 .003 .006
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002) (.003) (.003)∗ (.009) (.010) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009)
Profitability .055 .053 .149 .124 .098 .054 .040 .029 -.073 -.096
(.021)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.030)∗∗∗ (.082) (.086) (.071) (.074) (.079) (.083)
Tanigibility -.062 -.059 .010 .006 -.088 -.054 .054 .024 .061 .041
(.038) (.039) (.043) (.043) (.104) (.105) (.080) (.080) (.093) (.093)
Obs. 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745
R2 .149 .176 .778 .783 .241 .243 .392 .398 .458 .463
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Table 1.3: Baseline Specification II. Within vs. Across Industry
The table presents the OLS estimated coefficients for the baseline regressions. Moreover, we split the peer average
corporate policy and control variables in two depending on the three digit industry classification of peer firms. We
calculate the weighted average of corporate policies and control variables for peer firms that are in the same industry
classification (within industry) and for peer firms that are in a different industry classification (across industry).The
corporate policies of interest are leverage and debt and equity issuances. The dependent variable is indicated at the
top of columns. All the control variables, but excluding Peer average and Industry average, are lagged one period.
When the dependent variable is ∆Leverage all the control variables are also in first differences and we include year
and industry fixed effect. The remaining regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. For brevity we suppress the constant.
See Appendix A for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted
by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. In each column we estimate the regression:
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′
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′
vt+ijt
Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage Leverage Net Debt I. Net Equity I. Gross Equity I.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Peer average (within industry) .221 .145 .060 .072 .082
(.014)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
Peer average (across industry) .277 .149 .084 .162 .139
(.018)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Industry average .265 .291 .166 .231 .260
(.018)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗
Peer characteristics (within industry)
Log(Sales) .017 -.006 -.001 -.002 .003
(.005)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.003) (.002) (.003)
Market-to-book -.004 -.0001 -.002 .0008 -.006
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002) (.005) (.005) (.006)
Profitability -.027 .026 .054 -.044 -.088
(.020) (.026) (.078) (.071) (.076)
Tangibility .035 -.027 -.044 .043 -.028
(.030) (.019) (.047) (.038) (.043)
Peer characteristics (across industry)
Log(Sales) .007 -.003 .0003 .0004 -.001
(.006) (.001)∗∗ (.004) (.003) (.003)
Market-to-book .0002 .002 .003 -.013 -.021
(.001) (.002) (.005) (.005)∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
Profitability -.024 .044 -.077 .204 .153
(.024) (.031) (.090) (.085)∗∗ (.085)∗
Tangibility .044 -.033 -.043 -.022 .014
(.039) (.018)∗ (.048) (.038) (.039)
Own characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745
R2 .169 .781 .242 .396 .461
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Table 1.4: Reduced Form using Equity Shock
The table presents the OLS estimated coefficients for the reduced for regression using a modified version of Leary
and Roberts (2014) equity shock. The corporate policies of interest are leverage and debt and equity issuances. The
dependent variable is indicated at the top of columns. All the control variables and the equity shock instruments
are lagged one period. When the dependent variable is ∆Leverage all the control variables, except the equity shock
instruments, are also in first differences and we include year and industry fixed effect. The remaining regressions
include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentile. For brevity we suppress the constant. See Appendix A for a complete variable definitions.
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in
parenthesis. In each column we estimate the regression:
yijt = α0+α1Eq.Shock
ACN
−it−1+α2Eq.Shock
IND
−ijt−1+α3Eq.Shockijt−1+γ
′
1X
ACN
−it−1+γ
′
2X
IND
−ijt−1+γ
′
3Xijt−1+δ
′
ui+φ
′
vt+ijt
Dependent variable: ∆Leverage Leverage Net Debt I. Net Equity I. Gross Equity I.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Peer Equity Shock -.027 -.025 -.029 .059 .077
(.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.023) (.019)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗
Industry Equity Shock -.004 -.015 .009 .008 .028
(.004) (.004)∗∗∗ (.018) (.013) (.014)∗
Own Equity Shock -.006 -.016 -.011 .058 .071
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
Own characteristics
Log(Sales) .028 .035 -.045 -.097 -.075
(.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Market-to-book .003 -.017 .014 .059 .065
(.0006)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Profitability -.027 -.295 .360 -.165 .158
(.010)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.048)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗∗ (.045)∗∗∗
Tangibility .086 .059 .312 .111 .075
(.014)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗ (.051)∗∗∗ (.046)∗∗ (.049)
Peer characteristics
Log(Sales) .047 -.003 .007 -.011 .002
(.008)∗∗∗ (.003) (.007) (.006)∗ (.006)
Market-to-book -.004 -.009 -.00009 .016 .004
(.002)∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.007) (.007)∗∗ (.007)
Profitability -.075 -.063 .071 -.012 .007
(.029)∗∗∗ (.038)∗ (.106) (.094) (.096)
Tangibility .143 .025 -.059 .021 .012
(.047)∗∗∗ (.024) (.063) (.052) (.055)
Industry characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745
R2 .118 .771 .238 .393 .459
40
Table 1.5: Reduced Form. Equity Issuance and Equity Repurchase
The table presents the OLS estimated coefficients for the reduced form using a modified version of Leary and Roberts (2014) equity shock as instrument. The corporate financial
policies of interest are equity repurchases and issuances. In columns (1)-(3), (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) the dependent variables are Net Equity Issuance Indicator, Equity Repurchase
Indicator and Gross Equity issuance Indicator, respectively. All the control variables and the equity shock instruments are lagged one period. All variables are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentile. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. For brevity we suppress the constant. See Appendix
A for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Dependent Variable: Net Equity Issuance Equity Repurchase Gross Equity Issuance
(1%) (3%) (5%) (1%) (3%) (5%) (1%) (3%) (5%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Peer Equity Shock .059 .055 .041 .040 .027 .019 .077 .053 .046
(.019)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗ (.017) (.015) (.020)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Industry Equity Shock .008 .008 .012 .006 .008 .020 .028 .013 .009
(.013) (.010) (.009) (.015) (.013) (.011)∗ (.014)∗ (.011) (.010)
Own characteristics
Equity Shock .058 .045 .039 .001 -.0003 -.0005 .071 .052 .044
(.005)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.005) (.004) (.003) (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Log(Sales) -.097 -.081 -.068 .057 .045 .035 -.075 -.077 -.069
(.008)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗
Market-to-book .059 .054 .042 -.004 .012 .019 .065 .064 .048
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004) (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Profitability -.165 -.292 -.286 .629 .562 .454 .158 -.169 -.231
(.044)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗ (.046)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗ (.045)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.041)∗∗∗
Tangibility .111 .165 .170 -.219 -.118 -.086 .075 .154 .171
(.046)∗∗ (.037)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗ (.051)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗ (.049) (.040)∗∗∗ (.035)∗∗∗
Peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745
R2 .393 .351 .323 .426 .395 .377 .459 .377 .328
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Table 1.6: Structural Regression using Equity Shock
The table presents the 2SLS estimated coefficients for the structural regression using a modified version of Leary
and Roberts (2014) equity shock as instrument. The endogenous variable is the peer firm weighted average of the
dependent variable. The corporate financial policies of interest are leverage and equity issuances. The dependent
variable is indicated at the top of columns. All the control variables and the equity shock instrument, but excluding
Industry average, are lagged one period. When the dependent variable is ∆Leverage all the control variables, except
the equity shock, are also in first differences and we include year and industry fixed effect. The remaining regressions
include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentile. For brevity we suppress the constant. See Appendix A for a complete variable definitions.
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are
in parenthesis. We report the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald, Cragg-Donald and Anderson-Rubin F-statistics for the weak
identification tests.
Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage Leverage Net Equity I. Gross Equity I.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First stage :
Peer Equity Shock -.013 -.015 .079 .105
(.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Instrumented peer average 1.785 1.575 .695 .699
(.429)∗∗∗ (.477)∗∗∗ (.228)∗∗∗ (.180)∗∗∗
Industry average -.199 -.090 .108 .134
(.158) (.149) (.068) (.058)∗∗
Own characteristics
Equity Shock -.005 -.015 .058 .070
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
Log(Sales) .019 .028 -.090 -.068
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Market-to-book .003 -.018 .057 .064
(.0007)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Profitability -.010 -.295 -.183 .152
(.011) (.019)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.043)∗∗∗
Tangibility .077 .097 .100 .063
(.015)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗ (.046)
Peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 37745 37745 37745 37745
Kleibergen-Paap F-value 48.186 27.013 128.238 172.549
Cragg-Donald F-value 83.952 45.873 264.594 341.505
Anderson-Rubin F-value 21.638 16.309 9.683 15.954
Anderson-Rubin P-value 3.39e-06 .00005 .002 .00007
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Table 1.7: Robustness Test
The table presents the OLS estimated coefficients for the reduced form using a modified version of Leary and Roberts
(2014) equity shock as instrument. The corporate financial policies of interest are leverage and equity issuances. We
include as control variables own and reference group characteristics. All the control variables and the equity shock
instruments are lagged one period. When the dependent variable is ∆Leverage all the control variables, except the
equity shock, are also in first differences and we include year and industry fixed effect. The remaining regressions
include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Panel A, B and C presents the
estimated coefficients of the reduced form using the three reference groups independently. Specifically, in Panel A,
the coefficients are estimated using as peers all the firms in the same industry as firm i, but they are not in the
analysts network of the firm i . In Panel B (C) the coefficients are estimated using as peers all the firms in the same
industry (different industries) as firm i , and they are in the network of firm i . Finally, Panel D presents the estimated
coefficients of the OLS regressions using the three reference groups all together, industry peers, direct peers within
industry and across industries. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. For brevity we suppress
the constant. See Appendix A for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Peer Equity Shock ( Industry=Yes, ACN=NO)
Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage Leverage Net Equity I. Gross Equity I.
Peer Equity Shock -.003 -.009 .012 .025
(.003) (.003)∗∗∗ (.010) (.011)∗∗
R2 .114 .77 .392 .458
Panel B: Peer Equity Shock ( Industry=Yes, ACN=YES)
Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage Leverage Net Equity I. Gross Equity I.
Peer Equity Shock -.005 -.006 .009 .019
(.003)∗ (.003)∗ (.010) (.011)∗
R2 .116 .77 .392 .458
Panel C: Peer Equity Shock (Industry=NO, ACN=YES)
Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage Leverage Net Equity I. Gross Equity I.
Peer Equity Shock -.014 -.016 .050 .069
(.004)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
R2 .115 .769 .392 .458
Panel D: Peer Equity Shock (All together).
Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage Leverage Net Equity I. Gross Equity I.
Peer (Industry=Yes, ACN=NO) -.004 -.009 .012 .024
(.003) (.003)∗∗∗ (.010) (.011)∗∗
Peer (Industry=YES, ACN=YES) -.005 -.006 .008 .017
(.003)∗ (.003)∗ (.010) (.011)
Peer (Industry=NO, ACN=YES) -.016 -.017 .051 .070
(.004)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
R2 .118 .771 .393 .459
Obs. 37745 37745 37745 37745
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Table 1.8: Placebo Test
The table presents the OLS estimated coefficients for our placebo test using the reduced form specification and a
modified version of the Leary and Roberts (2014) equity shock as instrument. We use industry peers of firms in the
network of firm i, but we do NOT include firms in the same industry of firm i. The exogenous variable is the Pseudo-
peer Equity Shock . The corporate financial policies of interest are leverage and equity issuances. The dependent
variable is indicated at the top of columns. All the control variables and the equity shock instrument are lagged one
period. When the dependent variable is ∆Leverage all the control variables, except the equity shock, are also in
first differences and we include year and industry fixed effect. The remaining regressions include firm and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
For brevity we suppress the constant. See Appendix A for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage Leverage Net Equity I. Gross Equity I.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pseudo-peer Equity Shock -.003 -.013 .002 .021
(.011) (.013) (.037) (.040)
Own characteristics (incl. Equity Shock) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 37745 37745 37745 37745
R2 .114 .769 .392 .458
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Table 1.9: Leaders vs. Followers
The table presents the OLS estimated coefficients for the reduced form. The corporate financial policies of interest are leverage and equity issuances. The dependent variable
is indicated at the top of columns. We classify leader and followers based on their within industry-year ranking associated to market share, EPS growth, profitability and stock
return. A firm is classified as industry leader if it belongs to the top quarter in each industry-year subsample for the case of EPS, Profitability and stock return (only for
leverage) and a firm is classified as leader when its market share and stock return (only for equity issuances) is above the median. All the control variables and the equity shock
instruments are lagged one period. The exogenous variable is the weighted average Equity Shock of peer leader (follower) firms. Panel A(B) shows the effects of leader (follower)
firms on individual follower’s (leader’s) corporate policy decisions. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects
and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. For brevity we suppress the constant. See Appendix A for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Panel A: Leaders affect Followers
Follower Firm Dependent Variable: Leverage Net Equity Issuance (1%) Gross Equity Issuance (1%)
Market
Share
EPS
growth
Profitability Return Market
Share
EPS
growth
Profitability Return Market
Share
EPS
growth
Profitability Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Peer Equity Shock (Leaders) -.022 -.010 -.016 -.008 .061 .020 .032 .039 .062 .013 .034 .021
(.009)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗ (.028)∗∗ (.010)∗∗ (.014)∗∗ (.019)∗∗ (.029)∗∗ (.010) (.014)∗∗ (.020)
Own characteristics (incl. Eq. Shock) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry characteristics (incl. Eq. Shock) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 14150 29938 28586 29710 14150 29938 28586 19360 14150 29938 28586 19360
R2 .801 .782 .781 .788 .457 .405 .42 .433 .493 .482 .46 .493
Panel B: Followers affect Leaders
Leader Firm Dependent Variable: Leverage Net Equity Issuance (1%) Gross Equity Issuance (1%)
Market
Share
EPS
growth
Profitability Return Market
Share
EPS
growth
Profitability Return Market
Share
EPS
growth
Profitability Return
Peer Equity Shock (Followers) -.006 -.013 -.011 -.012 .015 .011 .013 .014 .002 .066 .050 .047
(.004) (.019) (.008) (.017) (.013) (.061) (.040) (.031) (.013) (.063) (.039) (.032)
Own characteristics (incl. Eq. Shock) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry characteristics (incl. Eq. Shock) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 23595 7807 9159 8035 23595 7807 9159 18005 23595 7807 9159 18005
R2 .782 .846 .832 .851 .395 .616 .516 .501 .48 .639 .587 .548
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Table 1.10: All-Star Brokerage Houses and Analyst Experience
The table presents the OLS estimated coefficients for the baseline regression (BR) and reduced form (RF) using a modified version of the Leary and Roberts (2014) equity shock
as instrument. The corporate financial policies of interest are leverage and equity issuances. The dependent variable is indicated at the top of columns. We classify analysts
with larger experience if within a year the number of years that they appear on IBES is above the median. For the case of all-star brokerage houses, we classify them according
to the number of all-star analysts that they employ (at least two all-star analysts, which is approximately the top decile of the distribution). We calculate the weighted averages
of the Equity Shock , outcome and control variables for peer firms that share at least one analysts with larger experience (all-star brokerage houses) and for peer firms that do
not share any analysts with larger experience (brokerage houses). Panel A display the results with respect to all-star brokerage houses and Panel B shows the results using
analyst experience. All the control variables and the equity shock instruments, but excluding Peer and Industry average, are lagged one period. When the dependent variable
is ∆Leverage all the control variables, except the equity shock, are also in first differences and we include year and industry fixed effect. The remaining regressions include
firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. For brevity we suppress the constant.
See Appendix A for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.
Panel A: All-Star Brokerage Houses (All-Star vs. No All-Star)
Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage Leverage Net Equity I. Gross Equity I.
BR RF BR RF BR RF BR RF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Peer average (All-Star) .512 .354 .251 .237
(.019)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗
Peer average (No All-Star) .225 .126 .138 .126
(.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Peer Equity Shock (All-Star) -.019 -.024 .060 .059
(.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗
Peer Equity Shock (No All-Star) -.014 -.009 .003 .031
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗ (.014) (.015)∗∗
(All-Star)-(No All-Star) 0.287 -0.006 0.228 -.015 0.114 0.057 0.111 0.027
P-value 0.000 0.364 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.262
Industry average (No overlap) Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Industry Equity Shock No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Own characteristics (incl. Equity
Shock)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer characteristics (All-Star) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer characteristics (No All-Star) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745
R2 .169 .118 .78 .771 .4 .394 .465 .459
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Panel B: Analyst Experience (Larger vs Smaller)
Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage Leverage Net Equity I. Gross Equity I.
BR RF BR RF BR RF BR RF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Peer average (Larger) .570 .401 .293 .282
(.020)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗
Peer average (Smaller) .132 .062 .073 .058
(.014)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
Peer Equity Shock (Larger) -.027 -.027 .042 .067
(.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗
Peer Equity Shock (Smaller) -.004 -.005 .014 .019
(.003) (.003) (.011) (.012)
(Larger)-(Smaller) 0.438 -0.023 0.339 -0.022 0.219 0.028 0.224 0.048
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.036
Industry average (No overlap) Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Industry Equity Shock No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Own characteristics (incl. Equity Shock) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer characteristics (Larger) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer characteristics (Smaller) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745 37745
R2 .168 .118 .78 .772 .401 .394 .465 .459
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Table 1.11: Indirect Peer Firms and Structural Regression
The table presents the 2SLS estimated coefficients for the structural regression using indirect peer
firms equity shock as instrument. In addition, we employ a modified version of the Leary and Roberts
(2014) equity shock. The endogenous variable is the peer firm simple average of the dependent
variable. The corporate financial policies of interest are leverage and equity issuances. The dependent
variable is indicated at the top of columns All the control variables and instruments, but excluding
Industry average (no overlap), are lagged one period. When the dependent variable is ∆Leverage
all the control variables, except the equity shock and peer average stock return, are also in first
differences and we include year and industry fixed effect. The remaining regressions include firm
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. For brevity we supress the
constant. See Appendix A for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
We report, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic, Cragg-Donald F statistic and Anderson-Rubin
F-statistic for the weak identification tests.
∆Leverage Leverage Net Equity I. Gross Equity I.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Stage: Indirect peers’
Equity Shock -.034 -.048 .106 .161
(.004)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗
Instrumented peer average
.462 .704 .770 1.287
(.349) (.305)∗∗ (.459)∗ (.324)∗∗∗
Industry average (No overlap) .119 .033 .038 .025
(.046)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗ (.020)∗ (.015)
Peer average stock return .0003 -.008 .007 -.030
(.007) (.006) (.040) (.030)
Own characteristics (incl. Equity Shock) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 37745 37745 37745 37745
Kleibergen-Paap F-value 57.042 45.865 44.978 75.613
Cragg-Donald F-value 92.994 69.487 77.211 129.445
Anderson-Rubin F-value 1.647 5.252 2.883 17.988
Anderson-Rubin P-value .199 .022 .09 .00002
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Chapter 2
Analyst Coverage Network and Stock Return Comovement
in Emerging Markets
2.1 Introduction
Stock return comovements and stock market linkages in emerging markets have been a
source of great interest for researchers, policy makers and investors (Bekaert and Harvey
(2003), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Rigobon (2002)). When portfolio managers and retail
investors decide on an asset allocation strategy they consider the potential advantages of
portfolio diversification within and across countries. For that reason, many researchers are
interested in the level of correlation among financial markets and their main determinants
(Lahrech and Sylwester (2011), Chen et al. (2002) and Bekaert et al. (2005)). Financial
crises in developed and emerging countries, changes in investor regulation, financial integra-
tion and cross-sectional characteristics of countries have been exploited to test changes in
excess comovement of stock returns and synchronicity (Morck et al. (2000), Jin and Myers
(2006), Bae et al. (2012) and Balli et al. (2015a)). In this paper we want to introduce a
new source of excess comovement between pairs of stocks across Latin American countries.
Specifically, we are interested in the effects of information produced and disseminated by
analysts following simultaneously a pair of firms i and j on stock return comovement and
excess comovement.
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Using panel data at firm-pair level we depart from the traditional literature in inter-
national finance that looks at changes in excess comovement among equity or industry
indexes. We provide evidence about the informational importance of analyst coverage net-
works, specifically common coverage, in explaining the excess of correlation between pairs of
stocks with shared coverage. We show that if investors trade based on information provided
by analysts the stock return pairwise correlation between firm i and j is positively associ-
ated with the number of analysts they have in common. That is because analysts produce
and disseminate common information (useful) for firm i and j. Muslu et al. (2014) called
this the coverage-specific information spillover hypothesis. In addition, the authors argue
that analysts face a trade-off between the type of information that they produce and the
cost of producing it. For that reason, analysts produce a mix of three type of information.
On one side, firm-specific information which is highly rewarded by investors, however it
requires more time and effort. On the other side, market-wide (broad) information which
has lower production costs, but it has less impact on investors, given that other analysts
can produce the same information. In the middle, though, the coverage-specific information
which is relevant information for the pool of firms that an analysts is following. Analysts,
in order to reduce production costs, provide information that emphasizes commonalities
among stocks in their coverage.
In addition, if an analyst uses the same model, inputs or methodology to make earnings
forecasts for the pool of firms that she follows the error term contained in the signal will be
correlated which increases stock commonalities (Israelsen (2014)). In other words, under
rational Bayesian updating investors cannot completely differentiate the error component
from the signals and cannot identify the correlation in forecast errors. Hence, investors
will update their beliefs and trade based on those signal increasing the return correlation
between pair of firms if the error terms of the earnings forecast are positively correlated.
Following Muslu et al. (2014) and Israelsen (2014) we create two measures of common
coverage and provide evidence that comovement and excess comovement between pairs of
stocks within and across countries in emerging markets can be explained by the network
created by analysts. Specifically, the common information generated by analysts influences
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the investor demand affecting the commonality in returns.
Sell-side analysts are important intermediaries in financial markets. They play a key
role in acquiring, analyzing, producing and disseminating useful information for investors
and managers’ decisions (Frankel et al. (2006)). Moreover, analysts provide different types
of information such as firm-specific, industry-wide and coverage-specific information (Yu
(2008), Kadan et al. (2012), Muslu et al. (2014), Chan and Hameed (2006) and Piotroski
and Roulstone (2004)). Hence, analysts, as information intermediaries, connect the firms
that they cover through the information channel. In addition, analysts are an important
source of external monitoring; they serve as substitutes for internal monitoring in firms with
weak corporate governance (Chen et al. (2015)). And, there is a vast literature providing
evidence of the effects of analysts on corporate policies, corporate governance, financial
reporting quality, cost of capital, firm opacity and M&A terminations (Becher et al. (2015)
Derrien and Kecske´s (2013a), Chen et al. (2015), Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012), Irani and
Oesch (2013) and Gomes et al. (2015)).
The role of analysts has been studied assuming that analyst coverage has only isolated
effects on firms that they follow. However, a growing literature shows that analyst coverage
is an important determinant in how firms interact and affect each other. Analysts tend to
follow firms with similar characteristics and choose a pool of firms according to their skills
and preferences to produce the most useful information possible. But they also produce
common information and monitor the firms in a similar manner. Moreover, analysts influ-
ence investor demand through their recommendations and earnings forecast. If investors
trade based on analyst information and recommendations, analysts implicitly perform a
relative valuation of firms that they follow, which in turns affects investor demand. Kaustia
and Rantala (2015) use firms connected by analysts in common as the direct peers rather
than industry peers to show how social interactions affect stock split decisions. Gomes
et al. (2015) work with direct and indirect peer firms (friends’ friends approach) according
to analyst networks to provide evidence of peer effects on corporate financial policies. In
addition, the paper is directly related to Israelsen (2014) and Muslu et al. (2014). They
study analyst networks and provide evidence of comovement and excess comovement for
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pairs of firms with analysts in common for the US market. They also find stock returns
comovement between pairs of firms that share common analysts, and they argue that the
comovement is likely due to the fact that the information produced by common analysts is
available to all firms in their coverage universe (coverage-specific information).
In this paper we are interested in analyst coverage networks in Latin America as an
important channel (information) in which shared coverage affects stock return comovement
for pairs of stocks across and within countries. We construct the analyst coverage networks
for Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru
to address the research question: Do firms with higher shared analyst coverage have more
stock return comovement and excess comovement as compared to firms which do not have
common analysts? The motivation of this paper is to show that analysts are important in
explaining contagion among financial markets and pairs of stocks.
The effect of analysts on emerging markets has been widely studied focusing on the
role of analysts as financial intermediaries who reduce asymmetric information between
investors and firm and improve the information environment for investors’ sake. Chan
and Hammed (2006) and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) document the effect of analysts
on stock return synchronicity and market-wide information. They show that analysts in
emerging markets provide market-wide information rather than firm specific information.
On the contrary, Bae et al. (2006) show that analyst coverage increases after stock mar-
ket liberalizations and its contribution to the information environment after openness is
more important. Moshirian et al. (2009) examine abnormal returns associated with post-
recommendation buy and hold in emerging markets. They find stock returns react strongly
to stock analyst recommendations and revisions. Lai and Teo (2008) and Bae et al. (2008)
study the difference between local and foreign analysts. For instance, domestic analysts
are more optimistic and have more accuracy than foreign analysts. Moreover, David and
Simonovska (2015) show how the role of correlated beliefs on the part of investors (using
earnings forecast as the proxy variable) are strongly related to excess return correlations in
developed and emerging markets.
We follow Israelsen (2014) and Muslu et al. (2014) and create two variables for shared
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coverage. Also, we test our hypothesis using raw returns in local currency and US dollars. To
calculate the excess comovement we obtain the idiosyncratic returns using the augmented
market model regression. We use four different specifications which consider local index
market returns, local industry returns, US market returns and MSCI Latin American index
returns.
Our final sample comes from four sources. We use I/B/E/S (non-US file) to obtain
information about the analyst coverage for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and
Mexico. From Worldscope we collect financial information and from Datastream we ob-
tain daily and weekly stock return information. We acquire the MSCI Latin American
constituents using Bloomberg. Our sample spans the period 2000-2014 having 27,833 and
50,221 firm-pair-year observations within and across countries, respectively.
In terms of the research question, our results show that pairs of stocks that are connected
by analysts in common have greater raw return correlation and excess comovement as com-
pared to firms that do not share any analysts. Also, we provide different cross-sectional tests
to support the hypothesis that investors find useful the information provided by analysts.
In terms of economic significance, one standard deviation increase in the shared coverage
rises by 1.5% the pairwise correlation of weekly return (comovement) denominated in local
currency when we consider the full sample. Moreover, using weekly returns denominated in
US dollars the correlation increases by 1%. Regarding the excess comovement, one standard
deviation increase in the shared coverage rises on average by 2% the excess comovement
when we consider the full sample.
We perform additional cross-sectional tests finding that the effect of analyst coverage
networks is larger for pairs of stocks that belong to the MSCI Latin American Index.
These results suggest that when investors face fewer trade restrictions the information is
better reflected in prices inducing a higher level of excess comovement. Moreover, we
test the effect of domestic and international analysts on commonalities of stocks across
and within countries. We provide evidence that international analysts are the source of
excess comovement on pairs of firms across countries, but within countries domestic and
international analysts have similar effects.
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A valid concern regarding these results is that the formation of the ACN is endoge-
nous. Analysts choose the pool of firms to follow based on unobserved analysts and/or firm
characteristics. Also, analysts tend to choose firms with similar characteristics or with the
same risk exposure. Hence, the cross-sectional results might capture unobserved common
risk or characteristics between the pairs of firms. In order to alleviate these concerns we
exploit the changes in the MSCI Latin American Index composition. Being added to the
MSCI index represents a positive shock for Latin American firms. Every June and Decem-
ber the index changes its constituents according to their market capitalization and insider
ownership (free float). When firms are incorporated to the index the investor demand for
those firms grows and also investors tend to demand more information, which increases the
number of analysts following those firms. We identify all the firms that are incorporated
in the index and calculate the change in their coverage. We find that firms incorporated in
the index show an increase in the number of analysts covering the stock. More importantly,
the number of analysts in common between those firms and their peer firms (connected by
shared coverage) is also increased. Then, we provide evidence that increases in the shared
coverage affect positively the cross-sectional relation between changes in common analyst
coverage and changes in excess comovement.
Moreover, we test whether brokerage house connections rather than analyst connections
are more important. Calculating the brokerage coverage network within and across coun-
tries we find that there is a positive relation between common coverage and stock return
commonalities, but the results are not as strong as for the analyst coverage network. We
depart from the stock return comovement framework by looking at the stock price syn-
chronicity. Specifically, we test whether stock returns of peer firms, connected by shared
coverage in different countries, explain individual firm returns. We find that peer firms
across countries have a positive effect on stock return synchronicity. These results support
our hypothesis that the coverage-specific information propagated to the network matters.
Finally, the contribution of this study is twofold. First, we show that common coverage
is an important determinant in explaining stock return commonalities in emerging markets
through the information channel. In addition, we go further by showing that comovement
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and excess comovement at pair of firms level. Previous studies use, mainly, indexes and
aggregated data. Moreover, the information role of analysts is the keystone in this study.
Hence, the paper contributes to the current literature associated with the role of analysts
as financial intermediaries between investors and firms. However, this paper is focused on
the coverage-specific information rather than firm-specific or market-wide information. The
second contribution of this paper is related to the role of networks in explaining financial
contagion, commonalities and corporate policies in emerging markets. Specifically, our
network based on common coverage is an important dimension in which firms are connected.
For that reason, this paper helps to understand better how connections between firms make
them affect each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related literature
and the hypothesis. Section 2.3 explains our data and empirical methodology. Section 2.4
provides the summary statistics, section 2.5 discusses the empirical evidence and section
2.6 concludes. Definitions of empirical variables are in Appendix B.
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
This paper is related to three streams of literature. The first is with respect to contagion
and stock comovement across financial markets. The second is the role of analysts in
developed and emerging financial markets as information intermediaries between investors
and firms, and the third explores the effect of social networks on corporate policies and stock
return comovement. Thus, this study contributes to the literature by showing that shared
coverage is an important determinant that explains comovement and excess comovement
between pairs of stocks in the same (within) and different (across) countries.
The first stream of literature is the stock return correlations in emerging markets. Stock
return comovements and stock market linkages in emerging markets have been a source of
great interest among researchers, policy makers and investors (Bekaert and Harvey (2003),
Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Rigobon (2002)). When portfolio managers and retail investors
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decide the asset allocation strategy they consider the potential advantages of portfolio di-
versification within and across countries. For that reason many researchers are interested in
the level of correlation among financial markets and their main determinants (Lahrech and
Sylwester (2011), Chen et al. (2002) and Bekaert et al. (2005)). Financial crises in developed
and emerging countries (Aloui et al. (2011), Guo et al. (2011) and Baur (2012)), changes in
investor regulation (Phylaktis and Ravazzolo (2005)), financial integration, cross-sectional
characteristics of countries and bilateral links between countries (Balli et al. (2015b)) have
been exploited to test changes in stock return comovement and synchronicity (Morck et al.
(2000), Jin and Myers (2006)) and transmission of market shocks. Recently studies have
addressed how news around the world affect stock return commonalities (Dang et al. (2015))
and how foreign investors help to facilitate information transmission in emerging markets
(Bae et al. (2012)). Moreover, firms that are cross-listed and/or are members of MSCI
indexes face higher demand of international investors which increases the stock return co-
movement between stock due changes in inflows/outflows of foreign investors (Raddatz and
Schmukler (2012), Raddatz et al. (2015) and Bartram et al. (2015)).
Regarding to studies with a focus on Latin American countries. Chen et al. (2002) in-
vestigate the dynamic interdependence of the major stock markets indexes in Latin America
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela). Lahrech and Sylwester (2011)
examine to what extent the Latin American equity markets have become more integrated
with the US equity market. In the same line Hunter (2006) analyze how Latin American
markets become more integrated in the post-liberalization period. Diamandis (2009) ex-
amines long-run relationships between Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico stock markets
and the US market. Additionally, recent papers study the effect of major Latin Ameri-
can financial crisis and recent subprime crisis on stock markets’ volatility spillovers and
co-integration (Aloui (2011), Barba and Ceretta (2010)).
The second stream is related to the role of analysts in the financial markets as in-
formation intermediaries between investors and firms. They play a key role in acquiring,
analyzing, producing and disseminating useful information for investor and manager de-
cisions (Frankel et al. (2006)). Moreover, analysts provide different types of information
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such as firm-specific, industry-wide and coverage-specific information (Kadan et al. (2012);
Chang et al. (2006); Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); Muslu et al. (2014)). Also, through
monitoring they reduce the asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders and
also between informed and uninformed investors. Firms become more transparent and
firm-specific information increases when firms have more analysts covering them (Yu (2008)
and Crawford et al. (2012))
At the same time, analysts affect corporate financial policies. Degeorge et al. (2013)
and Derrien and Kecske´s (2013b) provide evidence that analyst coverage and preferences
have important effects on corporate policy decisions. Becher et al. (2015) show that recom-
mendation revisions can reduce (increase) the propensity to complete M&A when analysts
make downwards (upwards) revisions after the announcement of the M&A. Chang et al.
(2006) show that firms with lower analyst coverage prefer to issue more debt as compared
to equity issuance, because firms with lower coverage face more information asymmetry
between insiders and outsiders. Moreover, in better market conditions, firms with lower
coverage (higher information asymmetry) tend to issue more equity, supporting the market
timing theory. Fracassi et al. (2014) show how analyst subjectivity affects credit ratings
and corporate debt pricing. Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) identify an exogenous source
of variation in analyst coverage and they provide evidence that a decrease in the analyst
coverage reduces the competition in the analysts’ market. This reduction exacerbates the
analysts’ optimism bias and thus the quality of the information they produce. Kelly and
Ljungqvist (2012) use the same quasi-experiment that Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) use, but
they incorporate brokerage closures and provide evidence that a reduction in the number
of analysts increases the asymmetric information of the firm between insiders and outsiders
(shareholders and managers).
The effect of analysts on emerging markets has been widely studied with a focus on
how analyst information affects market efficiency. Chan and Hammed (2006) document
the effect of analysts on stock return synchronicity. They show that analysts in emerging
markets provide market-wide information rather than firm specific information. In the same
line, Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) show that firms from emerging markets face a higher
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coverage when they cross-list their shares in the U.S. However, more analyst following in-
creases the market-wide information instead of increasing the specific-firm information. On
the contrary, Bae et al. (2006) show that analyst coverage increases after stock market
liberalizations and its contribution to the information environment after openness is more
important. However, the authors suggest that openness and the increase in analyst coverage
improve the information environment increasing the firm-specific information. Regarding
the impact on prices of the information produced by analysts. Moshirian et al. (2009) exam-
ine abnormal returns after buy and hold recommendations in emerging markets. They find
stock prices react strongly to stock analyst recommendations and revisions. In addition,
other authors study the difference between domestic and international analysts. For in-
stance, Lai and Teo (200) compare local versus foreign analysts showing a home bias effect.
Domestic analysts are more optimistic and local analyst upgrades underperform foreign
analyst upgrades, while local analyst downgrades outperform foreign analyst downgrades.
Moreover, using analysts’ earnings forecast data of 32 developed and emerging countries,
Bae et al. (2008) show that local analysts have more accuracy than than foreign analysts
making earnings forecast. Finally, this study is highly connected to the evidence provided
by David and Simonovska (2015). They show how the role of correlated beliefs on the part
of investors (using earnings forecast as the proxy variable) are strongly related to excess
return correlations in developed and emerging markets.
This paper is closely related to the growing literature that uses social interaction to
explain return commonalities. Intermediaries can affect the correlation between pairs of
firms due to the information that they provide or the investment decisions that they make.
Grullon et al. (2014) use investment bank networks to provide evidence about stock return
comovement of firms that share the same investment bank. The hypothesis is that market
segmentation can lead to the formation of networks. These networks emerge because clients
of investment banks (investor) concentrate their holdings and trading patterns in a defined
pool of securities induced by the advice and information provided by the banks. Anton and
Polk (2014) use mutual funds to create networks based on the ownership of different active
mutual funds on the same stocks. They show show that the degree of shared ownership
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forecasts cross-sectional variation in return correlation. In terms of theoretical models,
Caccioli et al. (2014) develop a model to understand better the amplification of financial
contagion due to the combination of overlapping portfolios and leverage. The authors create
a network based on common asset holding between investors (banks). Moreover, other
important networks are used to explain and determinant the extent of financial contagion.
Banks, international trade and mutual funds are used to create networks (Summer (2013),
Glasserman and Young (2015b) and Glasserman and Young (2015a)).
The following two papers provided the theoretical background for our empirical evidence.
First, Muslu et al. (2014) find stock returns comovement between pairs of firms that share
analysts and provide evidence of stock return synchronicity for stock portfolios with the
same analyst coverage. They argue that analysts provide coverage-specific information,
which is common information for the pool of firms that each analyst follows. Firms can
have common factors, such as common risk, common inputs or their business models are
related in some dimension. Hence, when a analyst produces information for one firm that
information might also be useful for other firms that the analyst follows. The coverage-
specific information concept is a middle point between firm-specific information and market-
wide (broad) information.
Israelsen (2014) works with analyst coverage networks to provide evidence of excess
comovement for pairs of stocks with analysts in common for the US market. The author
argues that if an analyst uses the same model, inputs or methodology to make an earnings
forecast, the error term contained in the signals (earnings forecast for firm i and j) for
both firms will be positively correlated. This connection increases the stock return pairwise
correlation because investors will trade based on the new information without completely
identifying the error component in the forecasts. In other words, under rational Bayesian
updating investors cannot completely differentiate the error component from the signal and
cannot fully identify the correlation in the forecast errors. Hence, investors will update
their beliefs and trade based on those signal increasing the return correlation between pair
of firms if the error terms of the earnings forecast (signals informative about the means)
are positively correlated. We based our research question on Israelsen (2014) and Muslu
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et al. (2014) to provide evidence that stock return comovement and excess comovement
between pairs of stocks within and across countries can be explained by the analyst coverage
network. Specifically, the common information generated by analysts influences the investor
demand.
2.3 Data and Empirical Methodology
We construct a comprehensive sample at the intersection of Worldscope, Datastream,
Bloomberg and I/B/E/S databases.1 We obtain analyst coverage information for the six
countries mentioned above from I/B/E/S. The stock price information is obtained from
Datastream and the financial information and insider ownership from Worldscope. Also,
the MSCI Latin American index and its members are obtained from Bloomberg.
We exclude financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and and government
companies (SIC codes greater than or equal to 9000). Our final sample contains 256 Latin
American firms and spans the period 2000-2014.2 Our Worldscope-Datastream-I/B/E/S-
Bloomberg data set contains 27,833 and 50,221 firm-pair-year observations within and across
countries, respectively.
We identify an analyst as following a firm in a fiscal year if she makes at least one
earnings forecast during the year and the forecast is made no more than six months before
the end of the fiscal period and at least three months after the end of the fiscal period.3
Then we create the analyst coverage network calculating the number of analysts in common
(Np) for each pair (p) of firms i and j.
Since our main dependent variable is the comovement between pairs of firms, we will
run the pair model regression. The pair model uses each pair of companies in the sample
1Worldscope contains the SEDOLs and I/B/E/S unique identifier (TICKER). Thus, we first merge World-
scope with I/B/E/S using the TICKERs. Then, we merge Worldscope-I/B/E/S dataset with Datastream
and Bloomberg using SEDOLs.
2Number of firms per country: Argentina(18), Brazil(118), Chile(48), Colombia (10), Mexico (52) and
Peru (10).
3Usually in Latin American firms the fiscal year is the same as the calendar year (fiscal year ends in
December).
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as the unit basis of analysis (Fracassi (2016)).
yp,t = α+ β1 ∗ACNp,t + γ ∗Xp,t + λpkt + δpct + ept (2.1)
Where p refers to the pair of firms i and j. Also, the subscripts t, c and k refer to
year, country and industry, respectively. The dependent variable, yp,t, measures either
comovement or excess comovement between firm i and j in the calendar year t (we explain
the measures below). ACNp,t is our variable of interest which is the analyst coverage
network. We use two definitions for ACNp,t. Muslu et al. (2014) use the number of
analysts in common (Np) between pair of firms (p) i and j divided by the total number
of analysts covering either stock in the pair; we call this measure NumAp,t. Moreover,
Israelsen (2014) considers the number of analysts in common between pairs of firms and
also the total analyst coverage of each firm independently. The measure is defined as follows:
RhoAp,t =
Np√
NiNj
Where Ni and Nj represent the total number of analysts following firms i and j, re-
spectively. According to Israelsen (2014), RhoAp,t is a proxy for the correlated earnings
forecasts errors (signals) between pair of firms that share analysts in common. In our re-
gression analysis, we calculate the pairwise stock correlation for all the pairs of firms with
analyst coverage Ni, Nj > 0 even though they do not share any analysts at all (Np=0).
4
Hence, in our final sample the two measures fall in the interval [0, 1].
In the matrix Xp,t we control for a battery of firm-specific characteristics that are likely
to be correlated with the stock return comovement (See Appendix B for more details about
the variables definition). Regarding firm financial-accounting characteristics we control for
Log(Sales), Market-to-Book ratio, ROA, ROE, Leverage, Log(MKTCAP), Stock Price and
EPS.5 Also, we use three variables to control for stock characteristics that might affect infor-
4We consider all the pair combinations for firms that have at least one common analysts following them.
In other words, we use only firms that appears in the I/B/E/S data set with valid annual earnings forecasts.
5All the financial-accounting variables are in US dollars.
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mation transmission and stock return comovement. PADR (PMSCI) is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if the pair of firms i and j are cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange
(belong to the MSCI Latin American Index) in the same fiscal year. PADR and PMSCI are
important variables to control for correlation induced by the international investors demand.
When firms are cross-listed and/or are members of MSCI indexes the demand of interna-
tional investors is higher, which increases the stock return comovement between stocks due
to changes in inflows/outflows of foreign investors (Raddatz and Schmukler (2012) and Bar-
tram et al. (2015)). In addition, we control for insider ownership (CHO), which is a variable
that measures the proportion of a firm’s shares that are closely held (CHO) by insiders and
controlling shareholders (Dang et al. (2015)). CHO is also a proxy for the degree of acces-
sibility of foreign investors to emerging stock markets. Bae et al. (2012) show that greater
investability reduces price delay to global market information. When the fraction of shares
closely held by insiders and controlling shareholders is larger it becomes more difficult for
foreign investors to trade based on global information affecting market efficiency.
We include additional variables related to stock characteristics such as Annual Return
(AnnRet) and daily stock price volatility (Volatility). Also, following Bekaert et al (2007)
and Bartram et al. (2015), we incorporate two liquidity measures. We use the percentage
of zero return (PZR) and the number of days that the stock was traded (NDays). Since
we are using the pair model for each pair of companies i and j, we follow the procedure
explained by ? and we control for the the absolute difference of the measures explained
above (except for the dummy variables). Also we control for country-pair-year fixed effects
(δpct) and industry-pair-year fixed effects (λpkt) using two digit-SIC code. The former helps
us to control for differences in country characteristics in each year and the latter controls
for difference in industry characteristics in each year. It is important to highlight that when
we run the model for only pairs of firms within countries the country-pair-year fixed effects
(δpct) are just equivalent to country-year fixed effects. In addition, all the control variables
used in the regression analysis are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Regarding the dependent variable (yp,t), we use weekly returns in local currency and US
dollars to calculate the pairwise correlation of raw returns and the correlation of idiosyn-
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cratic returns to calculate comovement and excess comovement, receptively. To calculate
the latter, we run an augmented market model regression using two different specifications:
Model 1: Rit = α+ β1Rmt + β2Rind,t + β3RMSCI,t + β4RUS,t + eit
Model 2: Rit = α+ β1Rmt + β2RMSCI,t + β3RUS,t + eit
Where Ri,t and Rm,t are the weekly return of the individual stock and the local mar-
ket index (Argentina: MERVAL, Brazil: IBOVESPA, Chile: IPSA, Colombia: COLCAP,
Mexico: MexIPC, Peru: IGBVL). Rind,t is the weekly industry return according to the
One-Digit SIC code. RMSCI,t is the weekly MSCI Latin American Index return. RUS,t is
the weekly SP-500 Index return. We run the model regression using MSCI Latin American
Index and SP-500 Index return to control for systematic shocks associated with the region
(MSCI Latin American) and systematic shocks affected by the most important financial
market associated with Latin America (SP-500). According to Chan and Hameed (2006)
including industry returns as an additional factor is problematic because in some financial
markets the economy is dominated by a few industries making it difficult to separate in-
dustry from market effects. For that reason, we test our hypothesis using the augmented
market with and without the industry portfolio returns.
It is important to highlight that the literature uses the market model to obtain the stock
return synchronicity (R2) of a stock using the returns of a market, industry or external
markets ((Morck,Yeung, and Yu (2000, Jin and Myers (2006), Dang et al. (2015) and
Chan and Hameed (2006)). In this paper we are interested in error term (ˆei,t = Rit −
Rˆit) to calculate the stock return excess comovement. We calculate eˆi,t using the weekly
returns denominated in local currency and US dollars. Mink (2015) shows that calculating
the correlation in US dollars might bias the results in cases where emerging countries are
affected by the same external shocks (financial crisis, commodities shock, etc.) increasing
the exchange rates correlation. Then, using returns denominated in US dollars might not
accurately reflect price fluctuations in fundamentals since returns converted into a common
currency also reflect fluctuations in the exchange rate.
In addition, the objective of using idiosyncratic returns is that excess correlation gen-
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erated by the analyst coverage network should be reflected in the error term of the above
regression. Following Israelsen (2014), our main measure for excess comovement is:
yp.t =
∑N
t=1 eˆi,teˆj,t√∑N
t=1(eˆi,t)
2
∑N
t=1(eˆj,t)
2
We require that each firm must have at least 24 valid weekly return observations in
a given year to calculate the correlation based on idiosyncratic returns. Since, we use
two models and the weekly returns are denominated in local currency and US dollars, we
have four measures. Finally, the comovement (pairwise correlation) is calculated using raw
returns in the domestic currency and US dollars.
2.4 Summary Statistics
Our final sample contains 256 Latin Americans firms from the period 2000-2014. Specifically,
we only consider firms with analysts following them. Thus, our study has 27,833 (50,221)
firm-pair-year observations within (across) countries.
Panel A of Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the ACN. Considering the
across-country sample, approximately only 2,555 pair firms share at least one analyst (5%
with respect to the subsample). However, for the pairs of firms with analysts in common
the number of analysts is 1.58 on average. The main variables of our study NumA and
RhoA are on average close to zero in the entire sample. But, conditional on having analysts
in common those numbers jump to 0.1 for the case of NumA and 0.22 when we consider
the RhoA statistics.
When we consider the firm-pair-year observations within countries the network is more
dense. On average firms share 0.65 analysts considering the overall subsample. However,
conditional on sharing at least one analyst, pairs of firms have on average 2.48 analysts in
common. Also, the statistics for NumA and RhoA are much larger. When we consider the
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full sample, 9,871 pairs of firms have at least one analyst in common and the distribution
is concentrated in the top quartile.
We also calculate the brokerage house coverage network for our sample. We identify
pairs of stocks connected by one brokerage house when analysts working for that brokerage
house make at least one earnings forecast during the year and the forecast is made at most
six months before the end of the fiscal period and at least three months after the end of
the fiscal period. The brokerage house network is more dense as compared to the analyst
network. Within (across) countries a pair of stocks is connected by 2.7 (0.86) brokerage
houses on average.
Panel B of Table 2.1 shows the summary statistic for the outcome variables (correlation
based on raw returns and idiosyncratic returns). The raw correlations on average are larger
than idiosyncratic correlations for both within- and across-country subsamples (also in the
full sample). Those results are not surprising since idiosyncratic returns only capture firm-
specific information without considering market-wide or industry information. Also, the
market model helps us to tease out the systematic risks that affect each country, industry
and the entire region. Moreover, the correlation based on idiosyncratic returns across
countries is, on average, close to zero. Which is smaller as compared to the correlation
within countries (2%-5%).
The raw correlations based on returns denominated in local currency and US dollars
confirm the results of Mink (2015). Exchange rates can influence the results when currencies
are highly correlated at certain period of times. The correlation based on weekly returns in
local currencies (25% and 16% for the within- and across-country subsamples, respectively)
are smaller as compared to correlation in US dollars (45% and 30% for the within- and
across-country subsamples, respectively). The statistics considering the full sample present
similar results as explained above.
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2.5 Empirical Results
In this section we discuss our empirical results. The discussion is divided into five subsec-
tions. First, we provide evidence of stock return comovement within and across countries.
In the next subsection we show the results regarding excess comovement and additional
cross sectional tests. Then, we exploit the changes in MSCI Latin American index con-
stituents to reduce the concern about the endogeneity problems of the network formation.
In the following subsection, we display the results using the brokerage house coverage net-
work. Finally, we show the importance of common coverage by calculating the stock return
synchronicity among firms that are connected across countries.
2.5.1 Stock Return Comovement
In Table 2.2, we provide the results of estimating equation (3) using the full sample, pairs
of stocks in the same country (within) and pairs of stocks in different countries (across).
The dependent variable is pairwise correlation between firm i and j using weekly returns
(raw) denominated in local currency and US dollars. Regarding our variables of interest,
NumA and RhoA are positive and statistically different from zero for the the three cases
(full sample, within and across countries). Moreover, the coefficient associated with NumA
is consistently larger than RhoA. In terms of economic magnitudes, when NumA(RhoA)
increases one standard deviation, the weekly return correlation (using local currency) rises
by 1.54% (1.43%) when we consider the full sample (Columns (1)-(4)).6 Moreover, us-
ing weekly returns denominated in US dollars the correlation increases by 1.15% (1.05%).
According to Muslu et. al (2014) these results suggest the presence of significant coverage-
specific spillovers throughout the year, given that the average raw pairwise correlation for
the sample within countries using returns denominated in local currency (US dollars) is
19% (35%).
6 NumA (1.54%= 0.257 Ö0.06 ). RhoA (1.43%= 0.119 Ö0.12 ).
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In columns (5)-(6) we display the within-country results.7 The coefficients associated
with NumA and RhoA are significant and statistically different from zero in the two
columns. In terms of economic magnitudes an increase in one standard deviation in the
value of NumA (RhoA) rises by 1.54% (1.56%) the stock return comovement.8
In columns (7)-(8) we show the effect of the analyst coverage network on pairs of stocks
across countries. The coefficient associated with NumA and RhoA are positive and statis-
tical different from zero as in previous results. The economic magnitude is 0.27% (0.25%)
using weekly returns in US dollars, when the variable NumA(RhoA) increases in one stan-
dard deviation. These results suggest that the analyst coverage network has a positive
economic impact on comovement between pairs of stocks.
Finally, the control variables that affect the information flow between pairs of stocks such
as ADR, MSCI, Number of Days traded and PZDR are statistically different from zero. For
the case of ADR(MSCI) the results suggest that the raw correlation between a pair of stocks
is higher when both firms are cross listed in an US stock exchange (members of the MSCI
Latin American Index). Moreover, when pairs of firms have larger differences in liquidity
(PZDR) or numbers of days traded the stock return correlation is lower. Regarding the
variable (CHO), difference in the fraction of shares closely held by insiders and controlling
shareholders do not affect the raw pairwise correlation in the within-country subsample,
but it is an important determinant for the across-country subsample. Pairs of stocks across
countries face more comovements when the difference in insider ownership is low.
2.5.2 Excess Comovement
In this subsection we display the results regarding excess comovement (pairwise correlation
based on weekly idiosyncratic returns). As we explained in the methodology section we
7For brevity we display the results using weekly returns in local currency; the results are similar using
US dollars.
8 NumA (1.54%= (0.192 Ö0.08 ) ). RhoA (1.56%= 0.087 Ö0.18 ).
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calculate the Model 1 and Model 2 using weekly returns denominated in local currency
and US dollars. Table 2.3 Panel A reports the coefficients estimated from equation (3)
using the full sample. The coefficients associated with NumA and RhoA are positive and
statistically significant. In fact, they are larger than the coefficients found for the stock
return comovement. In addition, the results show that the coefficients are robust to different
specifications in the way that we calculate excess comovement.
Regarding the economic magnitude, an increase in one standard deviation in the variable
NumA(RhoA) causes the excess comovement to rise by 1.75%= 0.292 Ö0.06 (1.64%= 0.137
Ö0.12). If we consider that the average excess comovement is 2% (using Model 1 and weekly
returns in US dollars) the economic impact of analyst coverage network is important. These
results suggest that the analyst coverage network affects the excess comovement more than
comovement between a pair of firms.
Focusing on the within-country results in Panel B. Columns (1)-(4) provide similar
coefficients as in Panel A (full sample). However, depending on the variable of interest
(NumA or RhoA) and the specification of the excess comovement the economic magnitude
is on average 2%, which is slightly higher as compared to the full sample.
In panel C we can see that the effect of across-country shared coverage is also positive
and significant (although for the model 1 the results are significant at a p-value of 10%). In
terms of economic magnitude, one standard deviation increase in the variableNumA(RhoA)
raises the excess comovement between pairs of stocks across countries by 0.17% (0.16%).
Even though the magnitude seems to be small the average excess comovement for pairs of
stocks across countries is only 1% (using Model 1 and weekly returns in US dollars), then
relative to the sample the impact of the analyst coverage is large.
Surprisingly, the coefficients associated with the dummy variables pair ADR and pair
MSCI lose statistical significance for the cases of the full sample and within-country con-
nections. Moreover, the coefficients have negative signs, contrary to the results regarding
comovement in Table 2.2. However, for the case of across-country subsample, only the coeffi-
cients associated with pair MSCI are still positive and significant suggesting that the excess
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comovement is affected systematically for the MSCI Latin American Index membership.
Using the last results associated with the MSCI Latin American Index we perform ad-
ditional cross-sectional tests exploiting the interaction between the dummy variable pair
MSCI and our variables of interests (NumA or RhoA). In the previous table we showed
that excess comovement is higher if investors trade based on public (coverage-specific infor-
mation) provided by shared coverage. Thus, we expect that the excess comovement should
be higher for pairs of stocks with less friction to trade, because prices should reflect better
the information available. In emerging financial markets the liquidity and foreign investa-
bility have important effects on market efficiency (Bae et al. (2012)). Then, we would like
to test whether pairs of firms with less frictions to trade, more liquidity and higher level of
foreign investability, face more excess comovement when they have analysts in common. To
do so, we focus on firms with higher investability, which are the constituents of the MSCI
Latin American Index. For being part of the index stocks have to be more liquid and with
higher level of foreign investability. Combining the analyst coverage network and the abil-
ity to trade based on analyst information generated we expect that the excess comovement
would be higher in cases where a pair of stocks, both firm i and j, are members of the MSCI
Latin American Index.
In Table 2.4 we display the results for the across-country sample using the interaction
terms NumA X MSCI and RhoA X MSCI. In columns (1)-(4) we can see the coefficients
associated with the variable NumA X MSCI. In the four columns the coefficient are
positive and statistically different from zero suggesting that firms that are easier to be traded
have higher excess comovement when they have more analysts in common. The coefficients
range from 0.150 to 0.224 depending on the specification used to calculate idiosyncratic
weekly returns. When the variable is RhoA X MSCI the results are similar; the coefficients
range from 0.146 to 0.217. These results confirm our hypothesis that investor can increase
excess comovement for pairs of stocks across countries when they have analysts in common
and the stocks are easy to trade.
Our next cross sectional test is related to the analyst heterogeneity. If the excess co-
movement associated with analyst coverage is driven by information, then differences in
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analyst characteristics such as quality, size of brokerage house, or domestic versus interna-
tional status of analysts should receive different attention from investors (domestic versus
foreign investors). In Table 2.5 we try to differentiate the effect of analyst coverage between
international and domestic analysts. To do so, we create a proxy variable exploiting the
asymmetry in coverage between analysts from developed markets (Wall Street) and emerg-
ing markets (Latin America). It is very unusual that analysts from Latin America follow
firms in developed markets because they have access to reports from analysts in developed
countries and usually Latin American brokerage houses or investment funds are clients of
larger financial institutions in advanced markets. Hence, Latin American analysts and in-
vestors usually outsource the production of information about firms in developed countries.
However, the opposite is not usually the case. Larger investment banks such as JP Morgan
and Goldman Sachs hire analysts to follow firms in emerging countries in addition to firms
in developed markets in order to provide information for their investors (foreign).
We exploit that asymmetry and we classify as domestic those analysts that only follow
Latin American firms. On the other hand, we classify as international analysts those who
follow Latin American firms but who also follow firms in the US.9 Our proxy variable tries
to capture that international analysts provided information to foreign investors that are
more willing to trade stocks across countries, which increases excess comovement. Then, we
argue that domestic analysts affect excess comovement for pairs of stocks within countries
and international analysts affect the excess comovement of across-country pairs of stocks.
Our results in Table 2.5 partially support our hypothesis. Regarding pairs of stocks
within countries (Columns (1)-(4)), domestic analysts have a larger effect on excess co-
movement as compared to domestic analysts. However, in unreported tests we find that the
two coefficients are not statistically distinguishable. When we consider the across countries
sample we do find difference between domestic and international analysts. The coeffi-
cients associated with the latter are positive and statistically different from zero (NumA−
International and RhoA− International), but the coefficients of the former are not statis-
tically significant, although they are positive (NumA−Domestic and RhoA−Domestic).
9We combine the I/B/E/S US-file and I/B/E/S Non US-file to identify the analysts that are in both files.
70
Also, the coefficients associated with international analysts are larger than domestic ana-
lysts. These results suggest that our proxy variable helps us to differentiate the effect on
excess comovement depending on the type of analysts. The international ones affect pairs
of stocks across countries more than domestic analysts. It is important to highlight that in
unreported tests, we do not find that the coefficients of international analysts are statisti-
cally larger than domestic analysts (relative comparison). Although, we can say that the
effect of international analysts is statistically different from zero, but that is not the case for
domestic analysts. Hence, our results suggest that the major source of excess comovement
between across-country pairs of stocks are the connections created by international analysts.
2.5.3 Dealing with Endogeneity Concerns
The main concern about the analyst coverage network is the endogeneity problems gener-
ated by unobservable characteristics of analysts and/or firms that might drive the excess
comovement. For instance, analysts can choose a pool of firms in a particular industry or
multiple industries with similar exposure to systematic risk. Hence, excess comovement
between pairs of stocks in the analyst coverage could simply be capturing unmeasured sys-
tematic risk not accounted for by risk factors in the market model and control variables
(selection on observables fails). We follow the methodology provided by Israelsen (2014)
to show that additions to the MSCI Latin America Index have an impact on the shared
coverage and excess comovement .10
The index captures large and mid cap representation across five emerging-market coun-
tries in Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru). With 119 constituents,
the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization.11 In
10Israelsen (2014) uses monthly changes in the SP-500 constituents. Emerging market studies such as Kot
et al. (2015) and Wang et al. (2015) provide evidence of the effects of index reconstitution for the cases of
Seng and CSI 300 Indexes.
11 MSCI defines the free float of a stock as the proportion of shares outstanding that is available for
purchase by international investors. Moreover, after 2000 MSCI uses as main variable to be part of the
index the free float of the stocks adjusted by the market capitalization of each security using a factor
referred to as the foreign inclusion factor.
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June and December (first day of the month) of each year Morgan Stanley Capital Interna-
tional Inc. (MSCI) performs a rebalancing of the Latin American index fund. However, the
announcement date is two to three weeks before the effective date.12 Thus, the price reac-
tion (buyer/seller pressure) to the new composition is before June or December 1st. MSCI
can either change the weights of the index constituents or perform additions (deletions) of
Latin American firms. The criteria for being part of the index are public.13
We use additions to the MSCI index as an exogenous shock in the analyst coverage and
the ACN that affects excess comovement. Since the rebalancing in the MSCI index is driven
by the free float and foreign investability, firms are unable to manipulate their incorporation
to the index based on this variable (then firms can not attract analysts). Moreover, when
firms are incorporated to the index they suffer buying pressure from investment funds and
institutional investors. And new firms in the index become more attractive to investors
and they capture the attention of analysts, because more investors will demand information
about those firms. Also, previous literature shows that analysts follow stocks that are more
likely to reflect the information generated by them on prices (Bushman et al. (2005)). Thus,
firms that belong to the index are more liquid and easy to trade, which increases the interest
of analysts to start following them.
Below, we present anecdotal evidence from a news report regarding the buying pressure
reaction from passive funds when MSCI announced the addition of a Mexican firm to the
MSCI Colombia Index.
“Cemex Latam Holdings SA, a cement maker in Central and South America, rose the
most on record after MSCI Inc. included the company in a gauge tracked by investment
funds. The shares advanced 3.8 percent to 13,280 pesos at 11:41 a.m. in Bogota after
earlier gaining 5.3 percent, the biggest intraday increase since the company’s Monterrey,
Mexico-based parent, Cemex SAB, sold the shares in November in an initial public offering.
Bogota-based Cemex Latam was added to MSCI’s Colombia index as part of a rebalancing
12For instance, the announcement dates for the semi-annual index reviews in 2016 are May 12 and Novem-
ber 14. https://www.msci.com/eqb/pressreleases/archive/ir dates.pdf
13Hau et al. (2010) offer a detailed institutional background of the MSCI and its index maintenance.
72
announced yesterday, with changes due to take effect June 3. The addition was one of the
“biggest surprises,” Banco Santander SA analysts Stefano Rizzi and Jesus Gomez wrote in
an e-mailed report yesterday. Cemex Latam is one of three stocks for which “we expect the
largest buying pressure from passive funds,” they wrote. The rebalancing may create “buying
pressure” on Cemex Latam equivalent to 8.6 days of average trading volume, according to
the report. ” Bloomberg News. May 16, 2013
Another important characteristic of the MSCI rebalancing methodology is the semi-
annual reviews. Contrary to the S&P 500, which is reviewed infrequently and with no
explicit methodology for the index composition rebalancing, the MSCI Latin American
Index has only two review periods in each year.14 Hence, we can mitigate the concerns
associated with excess comovement due to buying/selling pressures caused by passive in-
vestment funds that try to replicate the index. Also, when we calculate the idiosyncratic
returns using the MSCI index returns as an additional risk factor (Model 1 and 2) we try
to mitigate (at least partially) the effect of investment funds demand for those firms added
to the index.
In Panel A of Table 2.6 we provide the results regarding changes in analyst coverage
and analyst coverage network before and after additions to the MSCI Latin America Index.
We identify additions to the MSCI Latin American Index for the sample period 2001-
2014 tracking the changes in the index constituents using Bloomberg. Through quarterly
observations and the I/B/E/S Summary File we perform a mean tests on the changes in the
number of analysts following firms added to the index. Our results show that there is an
increase in the number of analysts following a firm after it is added to the index. However,
the increase in coverage takes time, at least four quarters after the MSCI reviews. After
one year, there is at least one new analyst following the firms incorporated to the index.
In addition, our variables that measure the shared coverage (NumA and RhoA) show an
increase in the following two years after the index reviews. The difference in shared coverage
between the calendar year before and after is 0.0158 (0.297) for the variable NumA (RhoA),
14 Previous papers track the index reviews checking the index constituents on a monthly basis.
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also the mean test show that the differences are statistically distinguishable. Moreover,
we show that the average variable NumA (RhoA) is statistically larger after the MSCI
additions. These results are also consistent with those provided by Israelsen (2014).
We normalize our analysis using as t = 0 the calendar year in which the firm was
added to the index. We use the previous (t = −1) and the next calendar year (t = +1)
to calculate the changes in excess comovement due to the additions of firms into the MSCI
Latin American Index. Also, our subsample contains all the pairs of firms affected by the
addition to the index by at least one firm of the pair (i or j). And we keep only pairs of
firms that are not affected by any other MSCI review in the year after (t = +1). Finally,
we require that the pairs of firms have at least one analyst in common prior to the MCSI
reviews.
Panel B presents the results regarding the effect of changes in analyst coverage network
on excess comovement after the MSCI additions. Our variables of interest are ∆NumA (-1
vs.+1) and ∆RhoA (-1 vs.+1), which represent the changes in the ACN before and after the
MSCI reviews. We find that after the index rebalancing the pairs of stocks suffer an increase
in the excess comovement caused by an increase in the analysts in common between them.
The coefficient associated with ∆NumA (-1 vs.+1) and ∆RhoA (-1 vs.+1) range from 0.24 to
0.37 and 0.13 to 0.19, respectively. The results are robust to different specifications in terms
of weekly returns (local currency vs. US dollars) and the market model used to calculate the
idiosyncratic returns. Also, we control for country-pair and year fixed effects and changes
in the absolute difference of the control variables explained above. Overall, we show that
exogenous changes in the MSCI membership increase the analyst coverage of firms added
to the index affecting, at the same time, the number of analysts in common for pairs of
stocks. Thus, this change in the shared coverage increases the excess comovement between
pairs of stocks.
74
2.5.4 Brokerage Coverage Network: Comovement and Excess Comove-
ment
According to our summary statistics the analyst coverage network is sparse, especially for
the pairs of stocks in the across-country subsample. However, if we identify shared coverage
at brokerage level we can obtain a more dense network. Creating the brokerage coverage
network (BCN) is also important because if analysts work for the same brokerage house
they might have a similar methodology to acquire, process, generate and disseminate the
information. Hence, we expect that their forecast errors are also correlated. Additionally,
under the market segmentation hypothesis (Grullon et al. (2014)) investment banks and
their brokerage houses have a defined pool of clients who trade based on the information
that they provide. Hence, firms connected by brokerage house should also suffer return
comovement and excess comovement. However, under the hypothesis that analyst coverage
provides coverage-specific information useful for investors the effect of the analyst coverage
network should be higher than the brokerage coverage network on comovement and excess
comovement.
In addition, one advantage of using the common brokerage variables is that they also
provide additional power in explaining comovement and excess comovement. Since BCN
is more dense than the ACN we can reduce concerns about the explanatory power of the
analyst coverage network (sparse), especially for the across-country subsample. The second
advantage is related to the endogeneity issues in analyst network formation. Since brokerage
houses have analysts following a larger pool of firms rather than firms selected by individual
analysts any comovement and excess comovement explained by the common brokerage
house is more likely to be driven by the coverage-specific information hypothesis rather
than omitted variables associated with analysts’ characteristics that affect the decision to
cover a particular stock.
To test our hypothesis we run the regression of equation (3), replacing the analyst cov-
erage network variables (NumA and RhoA) with the brokerage coverage network measures
(NumB and RhoB). In Table 2.7 we display the results using the stock return comovement
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(raw correlation). The coefficients associated with NumB and RhoB are all positive and
significant, ranging from 0.018 to 0.089 depending on the sample used (full, within or across
countries). However, those coefficients are much smaller than those found in Table 2.2 with
respect to each sample. Finally, Table 2.8 reports the results using excess comovement as a
dependent variable. The coefficients are positive and statistically different from zero for the
full sample and the within-country subsample. Unfortunately, we do not find robust results
for the across-country subsample. Again, the coefficients are smaller than those found in
Table 2.3.
2.5.5 Across-Country Connections and Stock Return Synchronicity
We perform a final test to reduce concerns regarding across-country results. Following Muslu
et al. (2014) we calculate the increase in stock return synchronicity when an individual firm
is connected to other firms across countries by the same analysts. Under the coverage-specific
information hypothesis, if firms are connected the analyst information should be reflected
in stock return synchronicity. Peer firms’ returns should be able to explain individual firm’s
returns.
To test this, we generate a new independent and dependent variable. We calculate the
degree of individual firms with respect to the across-country connections (International−
Degree). In social network terminology the number of connections is called Degree, which
is one of the most important centrality measures.15 If analysts play an important role
connecting firms through the information channel we should expect that individual firms
with a larger number of connections (higher degree) should have higher stock return syn-
chronicity with respect to a portfolio return based on the firms to which an individual firm
is connected.
In order to construct our dependent variable we run the following two augmented market
model regressions using weekly returns denominated in US dollars to calculate the R2 for
15See Matthew (2010) for an overview about the centrality measures.
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firm i.
(S1): Rit = α+ β1Rmt + β2Rind,t + β3RMSCI,t + β4RUS,t + β5RACN−DOM,t + eit
(S2): Rit = α+ β1Rmt + β2Rind,t + β3RMSCI,t + β4RUS,t + β5RACN−DOM,t + β6RACN−INT,t + eit
S1 and S2 are based on Model 1 as explained in the methodology section, where
RACN−DOM,t is the returns of an equally-weighted portfolio of the stocks with shared cover-
age in the same country (domestic) as the firm i.16 Moreover, RACN−INT,t is the returns of
an equally-weighted portfolio of the stocks with shared coverage in different countries (In-
ternational) with respect to the firm i. After calculating the R2 for both regressions (R2S1
and R2S2 ) we calculate our dependent variable ∆SyncR
2 (Muslu et al. (2014), Piotroski
and Roulstone (2004) and Chan and Hameed (2006)).
∆SyncR2 = Log(
R2S2
1−R2S2
)− Log( R
2
S1
1−R2S1
)
Our measure ∆SyncR2 isolates the ability of the shared coverage portfolio to ex-
plain the variability of stock returns. Hence, we should expect that firms with larger
International Degree have greater stock return synchronicity with respect to peer firm
portfolio returns (across countries). Then the equation to regress is the following:
∆SyncR2it = α+ β1International Degreeit + γXit + δct + λk + it (2.2)
We include country-year F.E (δct) and industry F.E (λk) to control for time-varying
country characteristics and industry characteristics constant over the time, respectively.
Moreover, the matrix Xit has a battery of control variables.
Table 2.9 displays the results using Model 1 and Model 2 explained in the methodology
section plus the RACN−DOM,t and RACN−INT,t to calculate ∆SyncR2. Columns (1)-(2)
and (5)-(6) show the effect of Coverageit (number of analysts following the firm i) on our
dependent variable. The coefficients are positive and statistically significant. These results
16We also run the regression using the Model 2.
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are consistent with results provided by Muslu et al (2014), Piotroski and Roulstone (2004)
and Chan and Hameed (2006). Coverage intensive firms produce more public information
and have higher level of stock return synchronicity. However, the most important result
is that after controlling for our main independent variables, International Degreeit, the
coefficients associated with Coverageit lose explanatory power and most are no longer
statistically different from zero. In fact, International Degreeit variable becomes more
important with a positive and statistically significant effect on ∆SyncR2. These results are
consistent with the hypothesis that peer firms connected by common coverage are able to
explain stock return variability of an individual firms (the marginal increase in stock price
synchronicity (∆SyncR2)).
As in Muslu et al. (2014), this evidence suggests that the explanatory power of Coverageit
is subsumed by International Degreeit. More importantly, stock returns of firms in differ-
ent countries increase the stock return synchronicity of individual firms even after controlling
for domestic and international index returns, industry returns and domestic peer firm port-
folio returns. Overall, individual firm’s weekly returns comove more strongly with weekly
returns of other stocks connected by across-country shared coverage.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we test the Coverage-Specific Information Spillover Hypothesis for a sample
of Latin American firms. Using a comprehensive set of stocks between years 2000 and 2014,
we provide evidence that analyst coverage network is an additional source of comovement
and excess comovement for pairs of stocks within and across countries.
Using analysts as an important source of information, correlation between pairs of firms
reflects common information generated by shared coverage. As a result, the return co-
movement between stocks is higher and economically important. In addition, we provide
cross-sectional tests regarding the heterogeneity of analysts (international vs domestic) and
stock characteristics. Analysts who work in developed countries and follow firms in Latin
America are the source of excess comovement for the case of across-country pairs of stocks.
Also, firms that are easy to trade for domestic and foreign investors face more excess co-
movement.
Moreover, we provide robustness tests exploiting the MSCI Latin American Index re-
views of its constituents to reduce the concerns of the endogeneity issues in the network
formation. Also, we create the brokerage coverage network to test whether brokerage houses
have an effect on return correlations. We find, that brokerage houses also matter to explain
comovement and excess comovement in pairs of stocks.
Finally, this study contributes to the literature of emerging markets by providing evi-
dence about the information role of analysts and how they are key players in connecting
firms through their shared coverage (information channel). Moreover, we go further by
showing that comovement and excess comovement at pair of firms-level. Previous studies
use, mainly, indexes and aggregated data. Lastly, this paper contributes to the growing
literature of networks as an important determinant in explaining financial contagion, com-
monalities and corporate policies. Specifically, our network based on common coverage is
an important dimension in which firms are connected. For that reason, this paper helps to
understand how connections between them make firms affect each other.
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2.8 Appendix B : Variable Definitions
 ADR: Dummy that takes the value of one when a firm is cross-listed on a U.S.exchange.
Pair ADR dummy that takes the value of one when both firm i and j is cross-listed
on a U.S.exchange. (Worldscope)
 AnnRet: Annual stock returns. (Datastream)
 CHO: Closely held ownership. Fraction of shares closely held by insiders and con-
trolling shareholders. (Worldscope)
 EPS: Earnings per share. Net income divided by number of outstanding shares.
(Worldscope).
 International−Degree: Number of across-country connections that a firm has. We
defined connection based in common coverage.
 Leverage: Ratio of the sum of total long-term debt plus total debt in current liabilities
scaled by the market value of assets. (Worldscope)
 Log(MKTCAP ): Log of market capitalization. (Worldscope)
 Log(Sales): Natural logarithmic of sales. (Worldscope)
 MTB: Market to Book ratio. Ratio of the sum of the total book value of debt plus
market value of equity divided by book value of total assets. (Worldscope)
 MSCI: Dummy that takes the value of one when a firm is member of the MSCI Latin
American index. Pair MSCI dummy that takes the value of one when both firm i
and j are members of the MSCI Latin American index. (Bloomberg)
 NDays: Number of days that the stock has been traded. (Datastream)
 NumA(NumB): Number of analysts (brokerage houses) in common between pair of
firms i and j divided by the total number of analysts (brokerage houses) covering
either stocks in the pair (Muslu. et al, (2014)). (I/B/E/S)
 PZDR: Percentage of days that the stock had zero return. (Datastream)
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 RhoA(RhoB): RhoAp,t =
Np√
NiNj
.Number of analysts (brokerage houses) in common
between pair of firms i and j divided by squared root of the total number of analysts
(brokerage houses) covering either stocks in the pair (Israelsen (2014)).
 ROA: Return on Assets. Net income divided by total assets. (Worldscope)
 ROE: Return on Equity. Net income divided by total equity. (Worldscope)
 Stock Price: Stock price in U.S.dollars. (Worldscope)
 Tangibility: Ratio of the book value of Net Property Plant and Equipment divided
by book value of total assets. (Worldscope)
 V olatility: Daily stock return volatility (annually calculated). (Datastream)
85
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the analyst coverage network and the variables used in the regressions analysis. Panel
A shows the characteristics of analyst networks in terms of number of analysts in common between pairs of firms. Panel B and C show
the statistics for the outcome variables and control variables at firm-pair and individual firm level, respectively. All variables used in the
regression analysis are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Panel A: Pair Firms-Level
Full Sample Within-Country Across-Country
Analyst Coverage Network N Mean SD P25 Median P75 N Mean SD P25 Median P75 N Mean SD P25 Median P75
N Analysts in Common 78054 0.28 1.14 0 0 0 27833 0.65 1.76 0 0 1 50221 0.08 0.46 0 0 0
NumA 78054 0.02 0.06 0 0 0 27833 0.04 0.08 0 0 0.04 50221 0 0.03 0 0 0
RhoA 78054 0.04 0.12 0 0 0 27833 0.08 0.18 0 0 0.07 50221 0.01 0.06 0 0 0
N Analysts in Common>0 9871 2.25 2.44 1 1 2 7316 2.48 2.68 1 1 3 2555 1.58 1.32 1 1 2
NumA > 0 9871 0.13 0.1 0.06 0.09 0.17 7316 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.1 0.2 2555 0.1 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.12
RhoA > 0 9871 0.28 0.21 0.13 0.21 0.39 7316 0.31 0.22 0.13 0.24 0.43 2555 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.27
N Analysts in Common-Inter. 78054 0.09 0.49 0 0 0 27833 0.19 0.73 0 0 0 50221 0.04 0.27 0 0 0
N Analysts in Common-Dom. 78054 0.19 0.89 0 0 0 27833 0.46 1.39 0 0 0 50221 0.04 0.31 0 0 0
NumA− International 78054 0.02 0.11 0 0 0 27833 0.04 0.16 0 0 0 50221 0.01 0.06 0 0 0
NumA−Domestic 78054 0.04 0.18 0 0 0 27833 0.11 0.28 0 0 0 50221 0.01 0.07 0 0 0
RhoA− International 78054 0.01 0.06 0 0 0 27833 0.02 0.08 0 0 0 50221 0 0.03 0 0 0
RhoA−Domestic 78054 0.02 0.1 0 0 0 27833 0.06 0.14 0 0 0 50221 0.01 0.04 0 0 0
N Analysts in Common-Inter. >0 4321 1.66 1.32 1 1 2 2982 1.77 1.47 1 1 2 1339 1.41 0.87 1 1 1
N Analysts in Common-Dom.>0 7463 2.01 2.15 1 1 2 5943 2.16 2.32 1 1 2 1520 1.42 1.09 1 1 1
NumA− International > 0 4321 0.38 0.26 0.22 0.28 0.45 2982 0.41 0.28 0.22 0.29 0.49 1339 0.33 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.38
NumA−Domestic > 0 7463 0.46 0.39 0.23 0.32 0.52 5943 0.5 0.42 0.23 0.33 0.58 1520 0.35 0.2 0.22 0.27 0.41
RhoA− International > 0 4321 0.2 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.26 2982 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.28 1339 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.22
RhoA−Domestic > 0 7463 0.26 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.35 5943 0.27 0.2 0.12 0.2 0.38 1520 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.25
Brokerage Coverage Network
N Brokerages in Common 78054 1.51 2.2 0 1 2 27833 2.7 2.8 1 2 4 50221 0.86 1.42 0 0 1
N Brokerages in Common>0 42963 2.75 2.33 1 2 4 21466 3.5 2.71 1 3 5 21497 2.01 1.55 1 1 2
NumB 78054 0.09 0.11 0 0.07 0.17 27833 0.16 0.12 0.06 0.16 0.25 50221 0.06 0.08 0 0 0.11
RhoB 78054 0.21 0.23 0 0.17 0.37 27833 0.34 0.24 0.16 0.36 0.53 50221 0.13 0.17 0 0 0.25
NumB > 0 42963 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.3 21466 0.21 0.1 0.13 0.2 0.27 21497 0.14 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.17
RhoB > 0 42963 0.37 0.18 0.24 0.35 0.5 21466 0.45 0.18 0.31 0.44 0.57 21497 0.3 0.14 0.2 0.28 0.38
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.Panel B: Pair Firms-Level
Outcome Variables Full Sample Within-Country Across-Country
Comovement N Mean SD P25 Median P75 N Mean SD P25 Median P75 N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Raw Correlation (Local) 78054 0.19 0.18 0.07 0.19 0.31 27833 0.25 0.19 0.12 0.25 0.37 50221 0.16 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.28
Raw Correlation (USD) 78054 0.35 0.2 0.21 0.35 0.49 27833 0.45 0.18 0.33 0.46 0.57 50221 0.3 0.19 0.17 0.3 0.43
Excess Comovement
Model 1 Correlation (Local ) 78054 0.02 0.16 -0.09 0.02 0.13 27833 0.04 0.18 -0.08 0.04 0.16 50221 0.01 0.15 -0.1 0 0.11
Model 2 Correlation (Local ) 78054 0.01 0.16 -0.1 0.01 0.11 27833 0.02 0.17 -0.1 0.02 0.14 50221 0 0.15 -0.11 0 0.1
Model 1 Correlation (USD) 78054 0.02 0.17 -0.09 0.02 0.13 27833 0.05 0.18 -0.07 0.05 0.17 50221 0.01 0.16 -0.1 0.01 0.11
Model 2 Correlation (USD) 78054 0.01 0.16 -0.1 0.01 0.12 27833 0.03 0.17 -0.09 0.03 0.15 50221 0 0.15 -0.11 0 0.1
Control Variables
Pair ADR 78054 0.16 0.37 0 0 0 27833 0.16 0.36 0 0 0 50221 0.16 0.37 0 0 0
Pair MSCI 78054 0.22 0.41 0 0 0 27833 0.25 0.43 0 0 0 50221 0.2 0.4 0 0 0
Absolute difference
CHO 78054 0.26 0.19 0.1 0.22 0.38 27833 0.26 0.19 0.1 0.22 0.38 50221 0.26 0.2 0.1 0.22 0.39
Leverage 78054 0.23 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.33 27833 0.23 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.33 50221 0.23 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.33
Log(Sales) 78054 1.5 1.2 0.59 1.26 2.13 27833 1.53 1.21 0.61 1.29 2.16 50221 1.49 1.2 0.58 1.24 2.11
MTB 78054 0.82 1.05 0.2 0.49 0.99 27833 0.87 1.12 0.2 0.49 1.02 50221 0.8 1 0.2 0.49 0.97
Log(MKTCAP) 78054 1.55 1.18 0.63 1.3 2.24 27833 1.54 1.17 0.62 1.28 2.22 50221 1.56 1.18 0.63 1.31 2.25
ROE 78054 0.22 0.32 0.05 0.12 0.23 27833 0.23 0.33 0.05 0.12 0.25 50221 0.21 0.32 0.05 0.11 0.22
ROA 78054 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.1 27833 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.1 50221 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.1
EPS 78054 0.74 0.93 0.15 0.4 0.93 27833 0.85 1.03 0.17 0.47 1.1 50221 0.68 0.87 0.13 0.36 0.84
Stock Price 78054 7.68 9.64 1.75 4.51 9.96 27833 7.5 9.75 1.67 4.32 9.65 50221 7.77 9.57 1.79 4.63 10.13
AnnRet 78054 0.45 0.52 0.14 0.3 0.56 27833 0.44 0.52 0.13 0.29 0.53 50221 0.46 0.52 0.14 0.31 0.57
Volatility 78054 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 27833 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.01 50221 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01
Ndays 78054 16.34 35.31 0 5 11 27833 10.3 31.15 0 0 2 50221 19.69 36.99 5 6 12
PZDR 78054 0.11 0.16 0.02 0.05 0.12 27833 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.07 50221 0.13 0.17 0.03 0.07 0.14
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.Panel C: Firm-Level
N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Model 1: Aug . R2 2169 0.04 0.08 0 0.01 0.05
Model 2: Aug . R2 2169 0.04 0.08 0 0.01 0.05
InternationalDegree 2169 5.62 6.6 0 4 8
Coverage 2169 6.87 5.62 2 5 10
ADR 2169 0.41 0.49 0 0 1
MSCI 2169 0.46 0.5 0 0 1
Closely held ownership (CHO) 1398 0.53 0.23 0.38 0.56 0.7
Log(Sales) 2169 20.89 1.48 19.94 20.95 21.85
MTB 2169 1.54 0.96 0.99 1.26 1.77
Leverage 2169 0.31 0.22 0.13 0.27 0.45
Tangibility 2169 0.41 0.24 0.21 0.42 0.61
ROA 2169 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.08
ROE 2169 0.1 0.27 0.04 0.1 0.19
Volatility 2169 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
N days Traded (NDays) 2169 223.74 39.03 227 238 241
Percentage zero days return (PZDR) 2169 0.22 0.21 0.09 0.13 0.23
89
Table 2.2: ACN and Comovement
The table presents the results of the effect of ACN on stock return comovement (raw pairwise correlation). On
the top of each column appears the currency in which the returns are calculated. The variables NumA and RhoA
measure the shared coverage between firm i and j (Muslu et al. (2014) and Israelsen (2014)). The control variables
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All regressions include industry-pair-year and country-pair-year fixed
effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm-pair level. See Appendix B for a complete variable definitions.
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.
Full Sample Within Countries Across Countries
Local
Currency
US
Currency
Local
Currency
US
Currency
Local Currency US Currency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NumA .257 .192 .192 .089
(.019)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗
RhoA .119 .088 .087 .041
(.009)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
Pair ADR .015 .012 .015 .012 .017 .017 .014 .014
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Pair MSCI .026 .024 .026 .025 .032 .032 .023 .023
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. CHO -.007 -.009 -.007 -.009 -.010 -.010 -.009 -.009
(.003)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.007) (.007) (.004)∗∗ (.004)∗∗
Abs. Diff. Leverage .003 -.004 .003 -.004 -.008 -.008 .008 .008
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.008) (.008) (.004)∗ (.004)∗
Abs. Diff. Log(Sales) -.0005 -.001 -.0005 -.001 -.002 -.002 .0002 .0002
(.0006) (.0006)∗∗ (.0006) (.0006)∗∗ (.001) (.001) (.0007) (.0007)
Abs. Diff. MTB -.003 -.001 -.003 -.001 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗ (.001) (.001) (.0009)∗∗ (.0009)∗∗
Abs. Diff. Log(MKCAP) -.00004 .0008 -.0001 .0007 -.002 -.003 .002 .002
(.0007) (.0006) (.0007) (.0006) (.001)∗ (.001)∗ (.0008)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗
Abs. Diff. ROE .008 -.004 .008 -.004 .006 .006 .008 .008
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003) (.003)∗∗∗ (.003) (.006) (.006) (.004)∗∗ (.004)∗∗
Abs. Diff. ROA -.149 -.157 -.149 -.157 -.215 -.215 -.183 -.183
(.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. EPS -.00005 -.0007 -.00007 -.0007 -.0003 -.0003 -.003 -.003
(.001) (.0009) (.001) (.0009) (.002) (.002) (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗
Abs. Diff. Stock Price .0002 .0007 .0002 .0007 .0006 .0006 .0007 .0007
(.0001)∗∗∗ (.00008)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗∗ (.00008)∗∗∗ (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. AnnRet -.031 -.038 -.031 -.038 -.042 -.042 -.035 -.035
(.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. Volatility -.073 -.736 -.076 -.738 .262 .255 -.731 -.731
(.089) (.082)∗∗∗ (.089) (.082)∗∗∗ (.163) (.163) (.106)∗∗∗ (.106)∗∗∗
Number of Days -.0003 -.0003 -.0003 -.0003 -.0004 -.0004 -.0003 -.0003
(.00004)∗∗∗ (.00004)∗∗∗ (.00004)∗∗∗ (.00004)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗∗∗ (.00004)∗∗∗ (.00004)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. PZDR -.134 -.115 -.134 -.115 -.245 -.247 -.097 -.098
(.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Const. .222 .321 .222 .321 .443 .458 .236 .236
(.022)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Obs. 78054 78054 78054 78054 27833 27833 50221 50221
R2 .515 .675 .515 .675 .599 .599 .665 .665
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Table 2.3: ACN and Excess Comovement
The table presents the results of the effect of ACN on stock excess comovement (pairwise correlation based on
idiosyncratic returns). On the top of each column appears the currency in which the returns are calculated and
the model used to obtain the idiosyncratic returns. The variables NumA and RhoA measure the shared coverage
between firm i and j (Muslu et al. (2014) and Israelsen (2014)). The control variables are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentile. All regressions include industry-pair-year and country-pair-year fixed effects and standard errors are
clustered at the firm-pair level. See Appendix B for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Panel A: Full Sample
Local Currency US Currency Local Currency US Currency
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NumA .290 .276 .292 .280
(.023)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗
RhoA .135 .128 .137 .131
(.011)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗
Pair ADR -.002 .002 -.005 .0005 -.002 .002 -.005 .0007
(.002) (.002) (.002)∗∗ (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)∗∗ (.002)
Pair MSCI -.004 .0009 -.007 -.0003 -.003 .001 -.006 -.00009
(.002)∗ (.002) (.002)∗∗∗ (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)
Abs. Diff. CHO -.003 -.003 -.005 -.006 -.003 -.003 -.005 -.006
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Abs. Diff. Leverage .006 .004 .006 .003 .006 .003 .006 .003
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Abs. Diff. Log(Sales) -.004 -.003 -.005 -.004 -.004 -.003 -.006 -.004
(.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. MTB -.002 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.002 -.002 -.001 -.001
(.0009)∗ (.0009)∗ (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)∗ (.0009)∗ (.0009) (.0009)
Abs. Diff. Log(MKTCAP) -.005 -.003 -.004 -.002 -.005 -.003 -.004 -.002
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗
Abs. Diff. ROE -.012 -.009 -.016 -.012 -.012 -.009 -.015 -.012
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. ROA .052 .032 .048 .036 .053 .032 .048 .036
(.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗
Abs. Diff. EPS -.0009 -.001 -.0008 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.0008 -.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Abs. Diff. Stock Price .0001 .00006 .0002 .00007 .0001 .00006 .0002 .00007
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001)∗ (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)∗ (.0001)
Abs. Diff. AnnRet -.006 -.007 -.006 -.006 -.006 -.007 -.006 -.006
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. Volatility .010 -.066 -.087 -.163 .006 -.069 -.091 -.166
(.098) (.097) (.098) (.097)∗ (.098) (.097) (.098) (.097)∗
NDays -.00008 -.00006 -.0001 -.00004 -.00008 -.00006 -.0001 -.00004
(.00004)∗ (.00004) (.00004)∗∗ (.00004) (.00004)∗ (.00004) (.00004)∗∗ (.00004)
Abs. Diff. PZDR .022 .015 .034 .014 .022 .015 .034 .014
(.009)∗∗ (.009)∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009) (.009)∗∗ (.009) (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)
Const. .018 .035 .033 .036 .018 .035 .034 .036
(.018) (.019)∗ (.021) (.019)∗ (.018) (.019)∗ (.021) (.019)∗
Obs. 78054 78054 78054 78054 78054 78054 78054 78054
R2 .212 .184 .224 .19 .212 .183 .224 .19
91
Panel B: Within Countries
Local Currency
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NumA .239 .227
(.030)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗
RhoA .111 .104
(.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Pair ADR -.014 -.008 -.014 -.007
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005) (.005)∗∗ (.005)
Pair MSCI -.012 -.005 -.011 -.005
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004) (.004)∗∗ (.004)
Abs. Diff. CHO -.005 -.002 -.005 -.002
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Abs. Diff. Leverage -.014 -.014 -.014 -.014
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Abs. Diff. Log(Sales) -.005 -.004 -.005 -.004
(.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. MTB -.003 -.003 -.003 -.003
(.002) (.002)∗ (.002) (.002)∗
Abs. Diff. Log(MKTCAP) -.009 -.007 -.009 -.008
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. ROE -.008 -.007 -.007 -.007
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Abs. Diff. ROA .024 .005 .025 .005
(.032) (.032) (.032) (.032)
Abs. Diff. EPS -.002 -.003 -.002 -.003
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Abs. Diff. Stock Price .0003 .0002 .0003 .0002
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Abs. Diff. AnnRet -.011 -.013 -.011 -.013
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. Volatility -.181 -.157 -.189 -.165
(.182) (.180) (.181) (.180)
NDays -.0002 -.0001 -.0001 -.00009
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Abs. Diff. PZDR .035 .027 .034 .025
(.030) (.029) (.030) (.029)
Const. .032 .025 .038 .042
(.024) (.025) (.025) (.025)∗
Obs. 27833 27833 27833 27833
R2 .399 .36 .399 .359
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Panel C: Across Countries
Local Currency US Currency Local Currency US Currency
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NumA .059 .071 .055 .079
(.033)∗ (.033)∗∗ (.033)∗ (.033)∗∗
RhoA .029 .034 .027 .039
(.016)∗ (.015)∗∗ (.016)∗ (.016)∗∗
Pair ADR .004 .006 .003 .006 .004 .005 .003 .006
(.003) (.003)∗∗ (.003) (.003)∗∗ (.003) (.003)∗∗ (.003) (.003)∗∗
Pair MSCI .006 .009 .006 .010 .006 .009 .006 .010
(.003)∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. CHO -.0007 -.002 -.002 -.004 -.0007 -.002 -.002 -.004
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Abs. Diff. Leverage .014 .009 .017 .011 .014 .009 .017 .011
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005) (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.005) (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗
Abs. Diff. Log(Sales) -.003 -.002 -.003 -.002 -.003 -.002 -.003 -.002
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗
Abs. Diff. MTB -.001 -.0006 -.0006 -.00003 -.001 -.0006 -.0006 -.00003
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Abs. Diff. Log(MKTCAP) -.002 .0003 -.001 .002 -.002 .0003 -.001 .002
(.0009)∗ (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)∗ (.0009)∗ (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)∗
Abs. Diff. ROE -.005 -.006 -.004 -.006 -.005 -.006 -.004 -.006
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Abs. Diff. ROA .048 .036 .028 .025 .048 .036 .029 .025
(.019)∗∗ (.019)∗ (.019) (.019) (.019)∗∗ (.019)∗ (.019) (.019)
Abs. Diff. EPS .0006 .0004 -.0001 .0008 .0006 .0004 -.0001 .0008
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Abs. Diff. Stock Price -.0001 -.0001 -1.00e-
05
-.0002 -.0001 -.0001 -1.00e-
05
-.0002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Abs. Diff. AnnReturn -.002 -.002 -.001 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.001 -.002
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Abs. Diff. Volatility .126 .050 .116 -.004 .125 .050 .116 -.005
(.125) (.124) (.125) (.125) (.125) (.124) (.125) (.125)
NDays -.00006 -.00004 -.0001 -.00007 -.00006 -.00004 -.0001 -.00007
(.00005) (.00005) (.00005)∗∗ (.00005) (.00005) (.00005) (.00005)∗∗ (.00005)
Abs. Diff. PZDR .022 .015 .044 .021 .022 .015 .044 .021
(.010)∗∗ (.011) (.010)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗ (.010)∗∗ (.011) (.010)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗
Const. -.065 -.048 -.061 -.054 -.065 -.048 -.061 -.057
(.015)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗
Obs. 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221
R2 .226 .209 .23 .211 .226 .209 .23 .211
93
Table 2.4: ACN and MSCI Latin American Index
The table presents the results of the effect of ACN on excess comovement (pairwise correlation based on
idiosyncratic returns) and the MSCI Latin American Index membership. On the top of each column appears
the currency in which the returns are calculated and the model used to obtain the idiosyncratic returns.
The variables NumA and RhoA measure the shared coverage between firm i and j (Muslu et al. (2014) and
Israelsen (2014)). The control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All regressions include
industry-pair-year and country-pair-year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm-pair level.
See Appendix B for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is
denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Across Countries Local Currency US Currency Local Currency US Currency
Dependent Variable :
Excess Comovement
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NumA -.001 .022 -.018 .017
(.039) (.039) (.038) (.038)
RhoA .003 .013 -.004 .012
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.018)
NumA X MSCI .186 .150 .224 .191
(.062)∗∗∗ (.062)∗∗ (.062)∗∗∗ (.063)∗∗∗
RhoA X MSCI .180 .146 .217 .183
(.062)∗∗∗ (.061)∗∗ (.062)∗∗∗ (.063)∗∗∗
MSCI .005 .007 .004 .008 .005 .007 .004 .008
(.003)∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003) (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003) (.003)∗∗∗
ADR .004 .006 .003 .007 .004 .006 .003 .007
(.003) (.003)∗∗ (.003) (.003)∗∗ (.003) (.003)∗∗ (.003) (.003)∗∗
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Const. -.065 -.048 -.057 -.057 -.065 -.048 -.060 -.057
(.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗
Obs. 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221
R2 .226 .209 .23 .211 .226 .209 .23 .211
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Table 2.5: Domestic vs International Analysts
The table presents the results of the effect of ACN on excess comovement (pairwise correlation based on idiosyncratic returns) and the differences between domestic and
international analysts. On the top of each column appears the currency in which the returns are calculated and the model used to obtain the idiosyncratic returns. The variables
NumA and RhoA measure the shared coverage between firm i and j (Muslu et al. (2014) and Israelsen (2014)). The control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile. All regressions include industry-pair-year and country-pair-year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm-pair level. See Appendix B for a complete
variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Within Countries Across Countries
Local Currency Local Currency US Currency Local Currency US Currency
Dependent Variable :
Excess Comovement
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
NumA− International .051 .051 .032 .037 .036 .036
(.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗ (.015)∗∗ (.015)∗∗ (.016)∗∗
NumA−Domestic .065 .060 .018 .018 .012 .022
(.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.012) (.013) (.012) (.012)∗
RhoA− International .103 .103 .058 .061 .067 .067
(.024)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗ (.026)∗∗ (.027)∗∗ (.027)∗∗
RhoA−Domestic .115 .105 .012 .017 .003 .022
(.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Const. .047 .038 .022 .018 -.062 -.045 -.057 -.054 -.065 -.048 -.060 -.057
(.025)∗ (.025) (.025) (.025) (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗
Obs. 27833 27833 27833 27833 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221
R2 .4 .36 .399 .359 .226 .209 .23 .211 .226 .209 .23 .211
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Table 2.6: MSCI Latin American Index Inclusion
The table presents the results of the effect of MSCI reviews on analyst coverage and comovement. We set up
as t = 0 the quarter (year) in which a firm was added to the MSCI Latin American Index. Panel A displays
the changes in analyst coverage and shared coverage before and after the MSCI reviews. We calculate the
mean tests and report the p-values using one and two tails. Panel B reports the results about the effect of
ACN on excess comovement (pairwise correlation based on idiosyncratic returns). The variables NumA and
RhoA measure the shared coverage between firm i and j (Muslu et al. (2014) and Israelsen (2014)). Also, Coverage
refers to number of analysts following a firm at the end of each quarter. The control variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile. All regressions include country-pair and year fixed effects and standard
errors are clustered at the firm-pair level. See Appendix B for a complete variable definitions. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.
Panel A: Changes in Analyst Coverage and Network
Quarter Coverage Ha:Diff>0 Ha:Diff 6=0
Before After Before After Difference P-value P-value N
-4 4 6.06 7.43 1.371 0.0128 0.0255 194
-3 3 5.95 7.15 1.203 0.0222 0.0443 206
-2 2 6.20 6.77 0.565 0.1670 0.3339 216
-1 1 6.20 6.60 0.398 0.2423 0.4846 246
-1 4 6.35 7.44 1.086 0.0282 0.0564 232
-2 4 6.26 7.25 0.990 0.0466 0.0932 210
-3 4 5.97 7.34 1.372 0.0099 0.0198 204
Year NumA Ha:Diff>0 Ha:Diff 6=0
Before After Before After Difference P-value P-value N
-2 2 0.145 0.170 0.025 0.0000 0.0001 1010
-2 1 0.143 0.164 0.153 0.0001 0.0002 1244
-1 1 0.136 0.151 0.0158 0.0004 0.0007 1866
-1 2 0.148 0.170 0.0225 0.0000 0.0001 1340
Year RhoA Ha:Diff>0 Ha:Diff 6=0
Before After Before After Difference P-value P-value N
-2 2 0.309 0.357 0.047 0.0001 0.0002 1010
-2 1 0.304 0.343 0.039 0.0003 0.0007 1244
-1 1 0.290 0.320 0.297 0.0008 0.0015 1866
-1 2 0.313 0.356 0.043 0.0001 0.0002 1340
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Panel B: Changes in Excess Comovement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Idiosyncratic Returns in Local Currency
Model 1
∆ NumA (-1 vs.+1) .346 .366 ∆RhoA(-1 vs.+1) .173 .185
(.124)∗∗∗ (.132)∗∗∗ (.062)∗∗∗ (.064)∗∗∗
Control Variables No Yes Control Variables No Yes
Country-Pair FE No Yes Country-Pair FE No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Year FE Yes Yes
Obs. 810 722 Obs. 810 722
R2 .039 .099 R2 .058 .1
Model 2
∆ NumA (-1 vs.+1) .267 .302 ∆RhoA(-1 vs.+1) .144 .157
(.119)∗∗ (.131)∗∗ (.059)∗∗ (.064)∗∗
Control Variables No Yes Control Variables No Yes
Country-Pair FE No Yes Country-Pair FE No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Year FE Yes Yes
Obs. 810 722 Obs. 810 722
R2 .029 .081 R2 .03 .082
Idiosyncratic Returns in US Dollars
Model 1
∆ NumA (-1 vs.+1) .288 .294 ∆RhoA(-1 vs.+1) .151 .152
(.124)∗∗ (.129)∗∗ (.062)∗∗ (.063)∗∗
Control Variables No Yes Control Variables No Yes
Country-Pair FE No Yes Country-Pair FE No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Year FE Yes Yes
Obs. 810 722 Obs. 810 722
R2 .032 .1 R2 .033 .1
Model 2
∆ NumA (-1 vs.+1) .236 .284 ∆RhoA(-1 vs.+1) .129 .150
(.119)∗∗ (.129)∗∗ (.059)∗∗ (.064)∗∗
Control Variables No Yes Control Variables No Yes
Country-Pair FE No Yes Country-Pair FE No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Year FE Yes Yes
Obs. 810 722 Obs. 810 722
R2 .033 .09 R2 .034 .09
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Table 2.7: Brokerage Coverage Network (BCN) and Comovement
The table presents the results of the effect of ACN on return comovement (raw pairwise correlation). On the top
of each column appears in which currency the returns are calculated. The variables NumB and RhoB measure the
shared coverage at brokerage house level between firm i and j (Muslu et al. (2014) and Israelsen (2014)). The control
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All regressions include industry-pair-year and country-pair-
year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm-pair level. See Appendix B for a complete variable
definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard
errors are in parenthesis.
Full Sample Within-Country Across-Country
Local
Currency
US
Currency
Local
Currency
US
Currency
Local Currency US Currency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NumB .077 .079 .089 .045
(.008)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
RhoB .033 .034 .043 .018
(.004)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
Pair ADR .015 .012 .015 .012 .017 .017 .013 .013
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Pair MSCI .025 .023 .025 .023 .030 .030 .022 .023
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. CHO -.007 -.009 -.007 -.009 -.009 -.009 -.009 -.009
(.003)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.007) (.007) (.004)∗∗ (.004)∗∗
Abs. Diff. Leverage .004 -.004 .004 -.004 -.006 -.006 .009 .009
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.008) (.008) (.004)∗∗ (.004)∗∗
Abs. Diff. Log(Sales) -.0004 -.001 -.0004 -.001 -.002 -.002 .0002 .0002
(.0007) (.0006)∗∗ (.0007) (.0006)∗∗ (.001) (.001) (.0007) (.0007)
Abs. Diff. MTB -.003 -.001 -.003 -.001 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗ (.001) (.001) (.0009)∗∗ (.0009)∗∗
Abs. Diff. Log(MKCAP) -.00009 .0008 -.0002 .0007 -.002 -.002 .002 .002
(.0007) (.0006) (.0007) (.0006) (.001) (.001)∗ (.0008)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗
Abs. Diff. ROE .008 -.004 .008 -.004 .006 .007 .008 .008
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003) (.003)∗∗∗ (.003) (.006) (.006) (.004)∗∗ (.004)∗∗
Abs. Diff. ROA -.145 -.153 -.145 -.153 -.215 -.215 -.181 -.181
(.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. EPS -.0002 -.0008 -.0002 -.0008 .0001 .00009 -.003 -.003
(.001) (.0009) (.001) (.0009) (.002) (.002) (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗
Abs. Diff. Stock Price .0002 .0007 .0002 .0007 .0006 .0006 .0007 .0007
(.0001)∗∗ (.00008)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗∗ (.00008)∗∗∗ (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. AnnRet -.032 -.039 -.032 -.038 -.043 -.043 -.035 -.035
(.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. Volatility -.105 -.761 -.107 -.763 .225 .222 -.737 -.738
(.089) (.082)∗∗∗ (.089) (.082)∗∗∗ (.163) (.163) (.106)∗∗∗ (.106)∗∗∗
Number of Days -.0003 -.0003 -.0003 -.0003 -.0004 -.0004 -.0003 -.0003
(.00004)∗∗∗ (.00004)∗∗∗ (.00004)∗∗∗ (.00004)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗∗∗ (.00004)∗∗∗ (.00004)∗∗∗
Abs. Diff. PZDR -.131 -.111 -.132 -.112 -.241 -.243 -.095 -.095
(.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Const. .223 .320 .223 .321 .446 .425 .233 .229
(.022)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Obs. 78054 78054 78054 78054 27833 27833 50221 50221
R2 .513 .675 .513 .674 .598 .598 .665 .665
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Table 2.8: Brokerage Coverage Network (BCN) and Excess Comovement
The table presents the results of the effect of BCN on excess comovement (pairwise correlation based on idiosyncratic returns). On the top of each column appears the currency
in which the returns are calculated and the model used to obtain the idiosyncratic returns. The variables NumB and RhoB measure the shared coverage at brokerage house level
between firm i and j (Muslu et al. (2014) and Israelsen (2014)). The control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All regressions include industry-pair-year
and country-pair-year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm-pair level. See Appendix B for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Full Sample Within Countries Across Countries
US Currency Local Currency Local Currency Local Currency US Currency Local Currency US Currency
Model
1
Model
2
Model
1
Model
2
Model
1
Model
2
Model
1
Model
2
Model
1
Model
2
Model
1
Model
2
Model
1
Model
2
Model
1
Model
2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
NumB .022 .028 .025 .044 .003 .007 .008 .013
(.009)∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.015)∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012)
RhoB .008 .011 .012 .021 -.002 -.0005 -.00003 .003
(.004)∗ (.004)∗∗ (.007)∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Const. .039 .041 .039 .041 .045 .033 .038 .025 -.062 -.045 -.057 -.054 -.071 -.054 -.068 -.064
(.021)∗ (.019)∗∗ (.021)∗ (.019)∗∗ (.024)∗ (.024) (.025) (.025) (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗
Obs. 78054 78054 78054 78054 27833 27833 27833 27833 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221 50221
R2 .219 .185 .219 .185 .395 .356 .395 .356 .226 .209 .23 .211 .226 .209 .23 .211
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Table 2.9: Stock Price Synchronicity
The table presents the results of the effect of ACN on stock return synchronicity. International Degree measures the
number of across-country connections of a firm in each year. Also, Coverage refers to number of analysts following
a firm at the end of each calendar year The control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All
regressions include industry and country-year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. See
Appendix B for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *,
** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Dependent Variable : Model 1: ∆SyncR2 Model 2: ∆SyncR2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
International Degree .002 .001 .002 .001
(.0004)∗∗∗ (.0005)∗∗ (.0004)∗∗∗ (.0005)∗∗
Coverage .001 .001 .0004 .0008 .001 .002 .0002 .001
(.0005)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗ (.0005) (.0006) (.0005)∗∗∗ (.0005)∗∗∗ (.0005) (.0006)
ADR -.004 -.002 -.003 -.001 -.005 -.001 -.004 -.00009
(.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.005)
MSCI .009 .006 .008 .005 .007 .003 .007 .005
(.005)∗ (.006) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006)
CHO .026 .023 .021 .021
(.011)∗∗ (.011)∗∗ (.009)∗∗ (.009)∗∗
Log(Sales) -.001 -.0008 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.0001 -.003 -.003
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003)
MTB .005 .005 .004 .004 .004 .004 .001 .001
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004)
Leverage .007 .020 .008 .023 .004 .006 .005 .009
(.011) (.017) (.011) (.017) (.012) (.016) (.011) (.016)
Tangibility .004 -.001 .006 -.0003 .007 .002 .013 .0006
(.010) (.011) (.010) (.011) (.010) (.012) (.010) (.012)
ROA -.012 .045 -.012 .044 -.060 -.030 -.087 -.056
(.060) (.047) (.059) (.047) (.057) (.056) (.065) (.066)
ROE .002 -.0004 .004 .001 .016 .014 .019 .016
(.015) (.010) (.014) (.010) (.014) (.012) (.014) (.013)
Volatility .620 .529 .611 .509 .349 .235 .182 .222
(.319)∗ (.466) (.316)∗ (.466) (.327) (.410) (.314) (.438)
NDays .00003 -.00009 .00002 -.00007 -9.98e-06 -.00006 -.00008 -.00003
(.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.0003)
PZR .052 .035 .052 .040 .033 .028 .017 .041
(.029)∗ (.050) (.029)∗ (.050) (.031) (.056) (.031) (.058)
Const. .008 -.014 .015 -.014 .042 -.015 .067 .016
(.067) (.101) (.066) (.100) (.067) (.098) (.069) (.105)
Obs. 2169 1398 2169 1398 2169 1398 2088 1348
R2 .098 .14 .105 .143 .099 .139 .113 .147
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Chapter 3
Performance Pay, Catering Incentives and Functional
Background
3.1 Introduction
It is common knowledge that for firms to survive they must adapt dynamically to mar-
ket competition or technological changes. For that reason, firms choice different business
strategies over the time to be successful in the long run. They do so, by focusing their
effort on improving firm profitability or firm growth depending on the firm’s performance
in the short-term (Boumgarden et al. (2012) and Nickerson and Zenger (2002)). Previous
studies argue that in order to improve firm profitability or growth it is necessary change
the leadership of the firm. Specifically, bring a CEO who has a functional background (or
previous experience) associated with growth- or profit-oriented activities (Yen (2014) and
Elsaid et al. (2015)).1 However, the main drawback of the previous studies is the lack of
consideration of executive incentive plans as a potential tool to improve firm performance
with respect to one of these activities (or both).
The last financial crisis raised several questions regarding the compensation plans of
executives. Not only for the large size of their compensation, but also for the way that
1We also refer to growth-oriented activities as exploration activities and profit-oriented activities as
exploitation activities.
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those packages induced managers to engage in risky activities. However, before December
2006 firms were not required to disclose details of compensation packages (stocks, bonuses
or grants) tied to performance goals. Then, as a consequence of the subprime crisis, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued new rules to enforce the disclosure of
detailed information about the compensation contracts allowing researchers to collect new
and detailed information about managers’ incentive plans. Specifically, the fraction of the
total compensation tied to financial and non-financial goals.
De Angelis and Grinstein (2011, 2015) hand-collect the terms of the CEO compensation
contracts from each firm’s proxy statement after 2006, to study their characteristics and the
cross-sectional characteristics of the firms which employ them. Also, they look at the use of
relative performance evaluation in CEO compensation contracts. Moreover, Bennett et al.
(2015), provide evidence on the eight most common accounting metrics that firms employ
to tie compensation to performance goals for the 750 largest firms in the US. The most
frequent accounting metrics are sales and earnings growth, operating income, cash flows,
EBIT, EBITDA, ROE and EPS. Also, they show that linking executive compensation to
accounting goals has several costs in terms of manipulation of reported accounting metrics
to achieve compensation goals. Furthermore, Alok and Gopalan (2014) employ the new
detailed information about performance pay to explain the divisional manager compensation
design in multi-division firms. Our paper is closely related to this new stream of literature
that tries to understand the benefits and costs of designing executive compensation using
accounting performance goals.
Hence, the scope of this study is to understand how board of directors tie the com-
pensation of managers to several accounting metrics (pay for performance) and provide
empirical evidence regarding the combined effect of those incentives plans and the func-
tional background of CEOs on firm performance. Moreover, in the first part of the paper
we address the research question: How do firms decide which metrics to focus on when they
are designing compensation plans in order to encourage managers to pursue profit- and/or
growth-oriented activities? We propose that board of directors consider short-term mis-
pricing associated with the investor demand (Catering Incentives) to design the executive
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compensation according the stock market’s preferences for specific accounting metrics. Fol-
lowing the catering theory (Baker and Wurgler (2004a,b) and Polk and Sapienza (2009)),
we measure the market’s preference as the difference between the average market-to-book
ratio of firms in the top of the distribution and firms in the bottom according to their
accounting performance on those metrics. We call this measure Value Premium. We argue
that boards of directors cater to investor preferences (higher Value Premium) for firms with
better performance on certain accounting metrics.
The decision of which metrics to focus on might has consequences in the short- and long-
term performance. Designing a compensation plan based on investor demand for specific
accounting metrics might affect firm focus regarding exploration and exploitation activities
(growth- or profit oriented activities). If we classify sales growth as an output oriented
accounting metric and earnings growth, operating income, cash flows, EBIT, EBITDA,
ROE and EPS as accounting metrics associated with profit activities, we can argue that
firms can induce to focus to improve not only through CEO leadership succession, but also
through the CEO compensation plan.
Then, in the second part of the paper we address two questions related to the conse-
quences of compensation designs on firm performance conditional to the functional back-
ground of CEOs: Do awards based on performance goals affect firm performance after con-
trolling for the CEO functional background? CEO succession posits that functional back-
ground is a key component of the firm’s long-term success. However, we extend this idea
by arguing that pay for performance is also a key component in firm performance. Because
we are able to observe detailed data regarding performance pay, we provide evidence that
both CEO functional background and performance pay positively affect firm performance.
We show that they complement each other and, more interestingly, the compensation plans
are more important for recently appointed CEOs (less than two years).
The third question is related to the consequences of having performance pay aligned
with the CEO’s functional background: Do firms with aligned CEO incentives have better
performance? In the process of designing executive compensation with performance metrics
according to the Value Premium, firms can tie CEO compensation to performance metrics
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associated only with exploration, only with exploitation, or from both activities. However,
the functional background of the CEO may not be consistent with those incentives. For ex-
ample, a CEO has a functional background in sales and marketing, but she has an incentive
plan tied to profitability metrics such as EPS and EBITDA. Even though the incentives
seem to be focused on exploitation activities, they are not aligned with her functional back-
ground. A priori we expect that the first implication of compensation design is that firms
with aligned incentives have better performance in the short- and long-run.
We construct the sample from standard sources covering the sample period 2006-2012.
From CRSP-COMPUSTAT we obtain the accounting information of firms and stock prices
at the end of the fiscal year. The performance metrics on which firms base manager com-
pensation is obtained from Incentive Lab (IL).2 From ExeComp we collect the CEO and
executive compensation. Specifically, our main performance pay variable is the percentage
of the total compensation linked to specific accounting metrics. Finally, corporate gover-
nance data comes from Riskmetrics.
We divide the results in two parts. The first part is related to compensation design;
the second part is related to the implications of compensation design on firm performance.
Our results suggest a direct relationship between market preferences (Value Premium) for
performance accounting metrics and executive compensation. Boards of directors tie the
compensation of CEOs and top executives according to investor demand in the previous
year. In terms of economic magnitude, one standard deviation increase in the Value Pre-
mium increases on average 0.11%-0.18% (0.11%-0.15%) the performance pay of CEOs (top
executives). Considering that in our sample on average the performance pay of the eight
accounting metrics is 1%, the effect of the investors demand is economically significant.
Also, our results are robust even after controlling for firm-year fixed effects. In addition,
powerful CEOs are less willing to have compensation tied to accounting metrics when the
market’s preferences suggest that firms increase the performance pay.
The second part of the results is related to the effect of CEO compensation design
2We work with the same data set employed by Alok and Gopalan (2014) and Bennett, Bettis, Gopalan,
and Milbourn (2015).
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on firm performance. Functional background and performance pay are complementary
determinants of firm performance. However, the compensation plans affect mainly the short-
and medium-term firm performance while the functional background has a higher impact
over the long-run. In our results, when firms have a CEO with the functional background
consistent with either exploration or exploitation activities, they have on average 3.1%,
5.0% and 8% higher performance in the short-, medium- and long-run, respectively.
We also provide evidence that CEO tenure plays an important role on the effectiveness
of performance pay on firm performance. We find that the performance pay is important
only for recently appointed CEOs and it has a long lasting effect. In terms of economic
magnitudes, a one standard increase in the Performance Pay improves firm performance by
1.5%, 2.7% and 3.3% in the short-, medium- and long-run, respectively. When we consider
older CEOs, we do not find any effect of the compensation linked to accounting metrics on
firm performance. Furthermore, we provide evidence that firms with aligned incentives have
better performance in the short-, medium- and long-run. However, we only find a strong
and positive relation in the subsample of CEOs with less than two years of tenure. Overall,
firms that provide aligned incentives for their recently appointed CEOs outperform firms
with misaligned incentives by 6.4%, 11.3% and 11.2% in the short-, medium- and long-
run, respectively. Our result contributes to the literature of executive compensation and
CEO succession by showing that together, functional background and incentives plans, are
crucial to have successful firms in the long-run.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops our hypothesis.
Section 3.3 describes our empirical design and key variables. Section 3.4 discusses the
data and summary statistics. Section 3.5 presents the results of our empirical tests, while
conclusions are discussed in Section 3.6. Definitions of all variables are in Appendix C.
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3.2 Hypotheses Development
Our paper is related to two streams of literature. The first one is the catering theory. A
growing literature has shown that investors do not always trade based on the fundamental
values of firms and their demand for securities can deviate from fundamentals in the short-
term. Hence, managers rationally exploit these deviations and cater to investor demand
in order to maximize the firm’s value in the short-term. These actions can be changes
in corporate policies in order to attract investors who are demanding firms with certain
corporate policies (Catering Theory: Baker and Wurgler (2004)). On the other hand,
managers, in the short-term, can strategically choose the best time for using debt or equity
in order to exploit deviations in the market value of the firm from its fundamentals (Market
Timing: Baker and Wurgler (2002)). For instance, firms can issue equity when the stock
price is overvalued or repurchase shares when the stock is undervalued.
Baker and Wurgler (2004a) provide evidence that firms decide to start (stop) the pay-
ment of dividends when the investor demand for dividend paying firms is high (low). Man-
agers cater to investors by paying dividends when investors put a stock price premium on
payers, and by not paying when investors prefer non-payers. Li and Lie (2006) extend
the previous work considering changes in dividend pay. They show that the decision to
change the dividend and the magnitude of the change depend on stock market preferences
for higher dividend payers versus lower dividend payers. In the catering theory, the stock
market preferences are measured as the premium that investors pay for firms with certain
corporate policies which at that moment are attractive for investors. The typical measure
for the value premium is the difference in the market-to-book ratio of firms on the top of
the distribution with respect to a corporate policy of interest (dividend payout policy or
investment) versus firms that are on the bottom.
Polk and Sapienza (2009) test the catering theory on investment decisions. Using an-
other proxy for mispricing, abnormal accruals, they show that firms with higher abnormal
accruals tend to invest more as compared to firms with lower abnormal accruals. This
proxy for mispricing is used because periods of higher abnormal accruals are followed by
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periods of lower returns. Hence, managers tend to boost short-run share prices by catering
to current sentiment. One paper related to our study, which show that compensation plans
and investor preferences are connected is the empirical evidence provided by Geiler and
Renneboog (2016). They show that in the UK market CEO compensations plans directly
linked to payout policies and their effect is even stronger than investor preferences. In
this paper, we want to provide evidence that boards of directors cater to investor demands
for firms with better performance based on certain accounting metrics when they design
executive performance pay.
The second stream of literature is related to organizational vacillation. This literature
suggests that firms tend to change organizational design in order to achieve better long-
run performance and survive in a competitive industry. Nickerson and Zenger (2002) show
that firms switch their structure from centralization to decentralization in order to support
exploitation or exploration activities, respectively (Sequential Organizational Vacillation).
Yen (2014) provides empirical evidence about the vacillation theory. The author shows
that firms change their strategic business focus over time between output (growth) and
throughput (firm’s profitability) in order to achieve a successful performance in the long-
run. However, the sequential organizational vacillation is driven by the background of
CEOs. Hence, in order to induce a change in the business activity of firms, they have to
replace the CEO and bring in a new leader with the functional background consistent with
the business activity that firms want to implement. Elsaid et al. (2015) utilize a sample
of 832 successions to examine how boards of directors select and determine the functional
backgrounds of the incumbent CEOs. They find that outgoing CEO and firm characteristics
influence the choice of successor’s functional background. Also, in the same line that Yen
(2014), the authors find that firms are more likely to change the functional background of
the new CEO relative to the incumbent CEO when firms have poor performance.
Aghion and Stein (2008) provide an important theoretical model related to our work.
They develop a model in which a firm endogenously changes the business strategy from
sales growth to profit margin or vice versa depending on the current investor demand for
those strategies. When managers care about the current stock price, they tend to focus
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their efforts on increasing sales growth when there is a premium for growing firms. On the
other hand, in times when investors prefer firms which have higher levels of profitability,
managers tend to focus on reducing costs and improving efficiency. In addition, the model
develops a dynamic behavior in which a firm can switch the business strategy many times in
different periods. In this paper we propose that boards of directors cater to investor demand
for firms with better performance in certain accounting metrics. Boards of directors tie the
managers’ awards to those metrics in order to boost the stock price in the short-term. Thus,
the first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Firms decide the executive performance pay based on the Value Premium
associated with exploration and exploitation activities.
When the market prefers firms with metrics associated with exploration activities as
compared to exploitation activities, the board of directors will cater to investor demand
and will focus the CEO compensation on accounting metrics associated with exploration
activities. Conversely, if the market prefers more exploitation, the board of directors will
focus CEO compensation on metrics linked to the exploitation activity.
The last hypothesis is related to the performance pay and functional background. We
test whether functional background and CEO compensation work as substitutes or comple-
mentary factors that affect firm performance in the short- and long-term. Additionally, we
test whether firms that have compensation pay aligned with the CEO functional background
outperform firms with misaligned incentives.
Hypothesis 2a: Performance pay and CEO functional background together are impor-
tant determinants of firm performance.
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with aligned incentives outperform firms with misaligned incen-
tives.
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3.3 Empirical Design and Key Variables
We are interested in understanding how firms design executive compensation. Our first
hypothesis posits that firms consider investor preferences for exploration or exploitation
activities to design performance pay. Specifically, the board of directors rationally caters to
investor demand by tying the performance of executives to the accounting metrics associated
with growth- and profit-oriented activities. We create a variable called Value Premium
which measures the premium that investors pay for firms with better performance on the
accounting metrics of interest as compared to firms with worse performance. Notably, firms
can either tie the executive compensation to accounting metrics in level or in growth terms
(Bennett, Bettis, Gopalan, and Milbourn (2015)). However, using an accounting goal in
level terms implies a growth performance goal with respect to the previous year. Hence,
in this paper we calculate the Value Premium using the firm performance of the eight
accounting metrics in growth terms such as sales growth or EPS growth rather than the
sales or EPS level.
The variable V alue Premiumjkt is a vector that contains the natural logarithmic differ-
ence of the average market-to-book ratios between firms with higher accounting performance
(in the top of the distribution) versus firms with lower accounting performance (in the bot-
tom of the distribution). For each year and two-digit SIC code industry classification we
rank the firms based on their performance with respect to the eight accounting metrics
identified above. We use the percentiles p85 (p15), p80 (p20) and p75 (p25) as cutoffs to
define the top (bottom) of the distribution and calculate the log difference in the average
market-to-book ratios.
For instance, if we want to determine the value premium for sales growth we sort the
firms from highest growth rate in sales to firms with lowest growth rate in each year and by
the two-digit SIC code industry classification. Then, we calculate the average of market-
to-book ratio of the firms which are in the top (high growth) and bottom (low growth)
of the sales growth distribution and we perform the log difference in the average market-
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to-book ratio between those two groups.3 Hence, if we use as cutoffs the percentiles p80
(top quintile) and p20 (bottom quintile), we calculate the average market-to-book ratio for
the group of firm that are in the highest quintile (above p80) and the group of firms in
the lowest quintile (equal or below p20). We define the Market-to-Book ratio (MTB) as
the market value of assets (market value of common shares plus preferred stock liquidating
value plus short and long debt minus deferred taxes and investment tax credit) divided by
the total book asset value.4
V alue Premiumjkt = Ln(MTBHG)jkt − Ln(MTBLG)jkt
Where MTBHG and MTBLG are the average market-to-book ratio for the firms with
high growth and low growth in the industry j on the accounting metric k for the year t,
respectively. When the difference is positive investors prefer firms with higher growth rates
for a given performance metric. In other words, investor demand gives a premium to firms
with better performance on those metrics which interest investors. Hence, if a firm wants to
boost the current stock price, the board of directors should design CEO compensation that
is highly sensitive to the performance metrics consistent with investor demand. A priori, we
expect a positive coefficient associated with the V alue Premiumjkt variable. Additionally,
in order to reduce endogeneity concerns we use the first lag of the V alue Premiumjkt
variable. To test the first hypothesis, we estimate the following model:
Performance Payikt = α+β1V alue Premiumjkt−1+β2Peer Payjkt−1+β3Ind. Performancejkt+γZit+λi+µt+ikt
(3.1)
Where subscript i refers to the firm, subscript j refers to the two-digit SIC code industry
classification, and subscript t refers to time in years. In addition, subscript k refers to the
eight performance metrics linked to the executive compensation. The dependent variable
3We require at least ten industry-year observations to calculate the Value Premium for a given metric
4 Compustat items: (prcc f*csho+pstkl+dlc+dltt-txditc)/at
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Performance Payikt is a vector that contains the fraction of the total executive compensa-
tion (which is the sum of annual salary, bonus, present value of stock awards, present value
of stock option awards, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, and other
cash payouts) tied to the accounting metric goal k. According to Bennett, Bettis, Gopalan,
and Milbourn (2015). Firms mostly use (number of grants) EPS, Sales, Operating Income,
Earnings, EBITDA, EBT, EBIT and Cash flow from operations to tied compensation to
goals. However, in this paper we use ROE rather than EBT because the latter has tied,
on average, a lower fraction of the total compensation than the former. Hence, our main
accounting metrics are EPS, Sales, Operating Income, Earnings, EBITDA, Cash flow, ROE
and EBIT.5 Firms can tie awards to accounting metrics using either target goals in level
or growth terms and also for short and long time horizons. In this paper we sum the por-
tion of the compensation associated with level and/or growth for each accounting metric.
Thus, the Performance Payikt variable is the sum of the short- and long-term incentives
associated with the accounting goals defined in level and growth terms.
Moreover, the first accounting performance metric, sales growth, is associated with ex-
ploration activities. The remaining seven measures are related to exploitation activities.
These performance measures, performance pay measures and control variables are win-
sorized at 1% level to mitigate the effect of outliers. Also, we cluster the standard errors at
firm-year level.
In addition, the matrix Zit contains several controlling variables such as: stock return in
the current year, sales growth, the ratio cash-flows-to-total-assets, bid ask spread, and firm
size. Moreover, we include the variable Industry Performancejkt, which is the average
performance of the firm’s peers in the same industry (two-digit SIC code), with respect to
the eight metrics mentioned above in growth terms. And the variable Peer Payjkt−1, which
is a vector that contains executive compensation tied to the eight performance metrics of
peer firms in the same industry classification in the previous year. We expect that firms tend
to follow the CEO compensation of their peers in the same industry. We include corporate
governance measures such as Power Index (Morse et al. (2011)), which is a variable with a
5See Appendix C for a complete definition of the accounting metrics
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range from 1 to 3 depending on the number of titles that a CEO holds in the firm. If the
CEO is the president of the firm and also the chairman of the board the index is equal to 3.
If the CEO is only the chairman of the board the index is equal to 2. Finally, if the CEO
is not the chairman of the firm the index is equal to 1. Moreover, we include a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has an Entrenchment Index in the bottom 40%
of the distribution. Also, we include a independent directors dummy variable, which take
the value of 1 if a firm has a percentage of independent directors in the top 40% of the
distribution. Lastly, we control for firm- and year-fixed effects.
To test the second hypothesis, we need the functional background of the CEO. Leader-
ship vacillation argues that the CEO has to have a functional background consistent with
the business strategy (growth vs. profit oriented) that firms want to implement. Unfor-
tunately, classifying the functional background of managers is very difficult because the
classification itself is open to different interpretations. However, we follow the the same
methodology provided by Yen (2014). The author classifies the functional background into
ten categories: (1) consulting and strategic planning, (2) founder entrepreneur, (3) sales,
marketing, and merchandising, (4) product R&D and technology, (5) general management,
(6) process engineering, (7) finance and accounting, (8) production, manufacturing, and op-
eration, (9) law and general counsel, and (10) other functions, such as human resources and
industrial relations. Then, the first five categories (from 1 to 5) are classified as exploration
or growth oriented and the latter five categories (from 6 to 10) are classified as exploitation
or profit oriented.6
Since it is difficult to determine the functional background for all the CEOs in our
sample period, we focus our effort only for firms in the S&P-500. We carefully read the
curriculum vitae of each CEO from official sources. The most important sources to identify
the functional background are the biographies provided by Capital IQ and Equilar Atlas.
We track the previous job of managers before being appointed as CEO of the firm. We
follow closely the methodology used in Yen (2014). We read each biography and we classify
6Elsaid et al. (2015) classify the functional background in three groups: (1) Output: sales, marketing,
and merchandising. (2) Throughput: product R&D and technology, process engineering, production, manu-
facturing, and operation. (3) Peripheral: finance and accounting, production, manufacturing, and operation,
law and general counsel.
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a CEO with experience in one of the ten previous categories if she worked at least five
years in a job related to one of those categories. We are focus on work experience rather
than educational background because most CEOs have MBAs or certificates in business,
but they have bachelors degrees in a wide spectrum of fields. Hence, only considering the
educational background would lead us to a noisy variable. It is important to highlight that
a CEO can have functional backgrounds that are both growth and profit oriented.
We obtain the functional background of 480 CEOs, excluding financial firms (SIC codes
between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4949) firms). In our
sample, 173 CEOs are solely profit oriented, 256 are solely growth oriented and 51 CEOs
have both functional backgrounds. Our regression to test the second hypothesis is the
following:
Firm Performancet,t+∆tikt = α+β1Functional Backgroundikt+β2Performance Payikt+β3Ind. Performance
t,t+∆t
jkt +δit+it
(3.2)
We use three time horizons to calculate the firm performance for each accounting met-
rics k. Firm Performancet,tikt is the accounting metric growth k in the current fiscal
year (∆t = 0). Firm Performancet,t+1ikt is the average growth between the current year
and the next year (∆t = 1). And Firm Performancet,t+2ikt is the average growth be-
tween the current year, the next year and the year after (∆t = 2). The dummy variable
Functional Backgroundikt is the functional background of the CEO in the firm i. For
instance, if the CEO has a functional background that is sales oriented (growth oriented),
the variable Functional Backgroundikt will be equal to one in the accounting metric sales
growth and zero otherwise. In addition, if both performance pay and functional back-
ground are important determinants of firm performance, we should expect a positive sign
on the coefficient associated with β1 and β2. Lastly, we control for industry performance
(Ind. Performancet,t+∆tjkt ) for the same time horizon in which firm performance is calculated
and we employ firm-year fixed effects (δit).
The next part of the second hypothesis is to test whether firms that align incentives
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(performance pay) of the CEO with her functional background outperform firms with mis-
aligned incentives. In other words, we test whether firms with compensation incentives
associated with either exploration or exploitation activities have better performance when
those incentives are consistent with the functional background of the CEO. Specifically, we
say that a firm has growth (profit) incentives if the firm ties the CEO compensation to
sales (profitability measures) performance goals. In other words, a firm has growth (profit)
incentives when the Performance Payikt variable is greater than zero for the sales (prof-
itability) accounting metric. It is important to highlight that firms can simultaneously
provide growth and profit incentives. In fact, in our sample of 2,106 firm-year observations
(only SP&500 firms), we have 460 firm-year observations with both incentives and 78 (634)
firm-year observations with only growth (profit) incentives.
Then, we create a dummy variable that combines the functional background with the
focus sales (profit) incentives. Our variable of interest is Aligned Incentivesikt, that takes
the value of one if a firm provides focus incentives consistent with the functional background
of the CEO. Given that firms can provide simultaneously growth and profit focus incentives
and CEOs can have the two types of functional background, we have five cases in which firms
have aligned incentives with respect to exploration and/or exploitation activities. First,
firms only provide growth focus incentives and the CEO is output oriented (exploration
aligned incentives). Second, firms only provide profit focus incentives and the CEO is profit
oriented (exploitation aligned incentives). Third, firms provide growth and profit focus
incentives and the CEO is output oriented (exploration aligned incentives). Fourth, firms
provide growth and profit focus incentives and the CEO is profit oriented (exploitation
aligned incentives). Finally, firms provide growth and profit focus incentives and the CEO
has both functional backgrounds (exploitation and exploration aligned incentives). We run
the following regression to test the effect of aligned incentives on firm performance.7
Firm Performancet,t+∆tikt = α+β1Aligned Incentivesikt+β2Ind. Performance
t,t+∆t
jkt +γZit+λi+µt+ it (3.3)
7As robustness test we employ firm-year fixed effects (δit)
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We expect that β1 is positive. Firms with aligned incentives should have better perfor-
mance in the short- and long-term.
3.4 Data and Summary Statistics
The final sample for our paper comes from standard sources and covers the time period
2006 to 2009. From CRSP-COMPUSTAT, we obtain the financial variables of firms and
stock prices. From ExeComp we collect the top executives’ information for the 750 largest
US firms. Moreover, the accounting performance goals on which firms based managers’
compensation come from Incentive Lab (IL). Our data set starts in 2006 because data
available regarding the accounting goals was not disclosed until that year (SEC standardized
disclosure requirements for plan-based awards). Our final sample contains 4,460 CEO-year
observations and 4,414 top excutives-year observations for the average performance pay
compensation.
In Table 3.1, we provide the summary statistics for the main variables of our paper.
Specifically, in Panel A we provide information about the fraction of the total compensation
tied to eight accounting metrics. For instance, on average the performance pay tied to sales
growth is 2% for either CEOs and Top Executives. In addition, the performance pay linked
to earnings per share (EPS) is the most important variable in our sample; the fraction
linked to EPS is on average 4% of CEO total compensation. It is important to highlight
that the compensation linked to growth-oriented activities is lower as compared to profit-
oriented activities. The average of the seven metrics linked to profit activities (Total Profit
accounting metrics) is 10% and 8% for the CEO and Top Executives samples, respectively.
In panel B we show our proxy for investor demand (Value Premium) with respect to
the eight performance metrics. Consistent with our hypothesis, the Value Premium is
on average positive for all the accounting metrics and using the three cutoffs (percentile
p85(p15), p75(p25), p80(p20)). Sales growth is the accounting metric with higher Value
Premium, which is on average 0.5 when we use the percentiles p85(p15) and 0.46 when we
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use quartiles. Regarding the most important accounting metrics in our sample, EPS, we
find that the Value Premium is on average 0.21 for all the cutoffs.
Panels C and D show the summary statistics at firm level. On average, firms tie 1% of the
CEO and Top Executives total compensation to the eight accounting metrics. Considering
only sale and income metrics, the Performance Pay is on average 2% for CEOs and top
executives. These results are similar for only S&P-500 firms and peer firms in the same
industry. Regarding the Value Premium, the average of the eight accounting metrics is
29%, 28%, 27% when we use the percentiles p85(p15), quintiles and quartiles, respectively.
Finally, in 49% of the firm-metric-year observations the functional background is consistent
with the accounting metric of interest (i.e the functional background is output oriented and
the accounting metrics is sales growth) and firms only provide aligned incentives in 23% of
the firm-metric-year observations.
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 CEO Compensation Design
We begin our empirical analysis by testing hypothesis 1 and we present the results in Table
3.2 Panel A. According to hypothesis 1, we should expect a positive sign for the coefficient
associated with our main independent variable, Value Premium. Columns (1)-(3) show the
results for the CEO sample. We can see a positive coefficient on the variable Value Premium
in the three columns. Also, for all the cutoffs used (p85(p15), quintiles and quartiles), the
coefficients are statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficients increase monotonically
from 0.003 to 0.006. These results suggest that firms design CEO compensation following
investor demand in the previous period with respect to the two business strategies, growth
and profit. The results are also consistent using the average compensation of the top 5
executives in the firm (Columns (4)-(6)). However, the coefficients are smaller as compared
to the CEO results (quintile and quartile). In terms of economic magnitude, one standard
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deviation increase in the Value Premium increases on average 0.11%-0.18% (0.11%-0.15%)
the performance pay of CEOs (top executives). Considering that in our sample the perfor-
mance pay of the eight accounting metrics is on average 1%, the effect of investor demand
is economically significant.
Given that the sale and income goals represent the higher fraction of the total compen-
sation tied to those accounting metrics, In Panel B we show the results associated with the
Value Premium variables only considering the sale and income accounting metrics (Sales,
EPS, Operating Income and ROE). We use this subsample because those metrics are highly
employed by firms in terms of number of grants and as a percentage of the total compen-
sation. The results are consistent with Panel A. However, the coefficients associated with
our main variable are larger for both the CEO and top executive samples, 0.005-0.009 and
0.005-0.008, respectively. In terms of economic magnitude, one standard deviation increase
in the Value Premium increases on average 0.19%-0.28% (0.19%-0.25%) the performance
pay of CEOs (top executives). Again, considering that in our sample the performance pay
of sale and income metrics is on average 2%, the effect of investor demand is economi-
cally significant. Overall, our analysis shows that boards of directors tend to link executive
compensation to performance metrics according to investor demand, and they do so to en-
courage executives to focus their efforts on those metrics and increase the current market
value of the firm.
In addition, the positive and significant coefficient associated with the variable Peer
Pay, in all the columns of Panels A and B, suggests that peer compensation (in the same
industry) has a direct effect on the compensation of specific firms. Thus, these results shed
light on the influence of market preferences and the peers’ executive compensation on the
individual firm executive compensation design. Moreover, the coefficient of the variable
Stock Return is negative and significant. Firms tend to link executive compensation to
accounting performance metrics when stock price performance is poor.
Regarding corporate governance metrics, we find that the variables Power Index, Inde-
pendent Director Ratio and the Entrenchment Index are statistically significant and have
negative and positive signs, respectively. Powerful CEOs tend to have a lower fraction of
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their compensation tied to accounting metrics. CEOs with higher Performance Pay have
to work harder (more effort) to achieve the accounting goals. That is because the account-
ing goals are easy to verify, which induces CEOs to increase their efforts. On the other
hand, Independent Director Ratio and Entrenchment Index (both dummy variables) are
proxy variables that captures the shareholders’ rights.8 Hence, our results are consistent,
firms with higher (lower) Independent Director Ratio (Entrenchment Index) have a higher
fraction of the CEO compensation tied to accounting metrics.
We perform additional cross-sectional tests related to corporate governance character-
istics. Specifically we look at the interaction between our main variable, Value Premium,
and the Power Index and Entrenchment Index. Given that firms cater to investor demand,
higher Value Premium increase the Performance Pay. However, we expect that powerful
CEOs will avoid that situation having a Performance Pay less sensitive to investor de-
mand. As opposed to firm with stronger shareholders rights, where those can increase the
shareholders’ wealth when firms follow market preferences for certain accounting metrics.
Therefore , we expect that the coefficient associated with the interaction term Value Pre-
mium x Power Index (Value Premium x Independent Director Ratio and Value Premium x
Entrenchment Index) should be negative (positive).
Table 3.3 provides the results of the interaction between Value Premium and corporate
governance characteristics. We only find the expected results for the interaction term Value
Premium x Power Index, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant (Columns
(1)-(3)). Firms with powerful CEOs are less willing to cater to investor demand and increase
the Performance Pay according to market preferences.
Finally, for robustness we change the specification of the equation (5). Instead of using
firm characteristics contained in the vector Zit, we exploit the fact that we have an extra
dimension in our panel data, which is the accounting metric k, and we control for firm-year
fixed effects. In other words, in a given year we have more than one observation for each
firm, then we have more degrees of freedom (number of firms (F) × number of years (T) ×
number of accounting metrics (K)=F×T×K) than parameters if we incorporate firm-year
8Entrenchment Index is inversely related to the strength of shareholder rights
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fixed effects. Therefore, we can control for firm-year fixed effects and estimate the coefficient
associated with Value Premium. Doing so, we control for any time varying firm characteris-
tics. This specification is more demanding than just controlling for observed characteristics
(Zit). However, we can only estimate the parameters that have cross-sectional variation
within firm-year such as Value Premium, Peer Pay and Industry Performance. Addition-
ally, we cluster at firm level.
As we expected, in Table 3.4 we show that the explanatory power of the Value Premium
is lower as compared to the results in Table 3.2. With respect to the CEO subsample,
in column (1) we can see that the coefficient of Value Premium variable (employing the
percentiles p(85) and p(15) as cutoffs) is no longer statistically different from zero, when
we consider the eight and only sale and income metrics (Column (1) in Panels A and B).
In columns (2) and (5), for of case of the Value Premium using quintiles (cutoffs p80 and
p20), the coefficients are still statistically significant at 5%, but in Panel B we can see that
the effect is only statistically significant at 10% level when we only consider CEOs (Column
(2)). However, the Value Premium using quartiles is still statistically different from zero
at 1% level for both CEO and top executive subsamples and using the eight and only sale
and income accounting metrics (Columns (3) and (6)). Remarkably, all the coefficients are
larger than those found in Table 3.2, which also implies a higher economic magnitudes.
Focusing on quartiles, an increase in one standard deviation of the Value Premium rises the
Performance Pay by 0.24% (0.39%) for the eight metrics (sale and income metrics) sample.
Overall, our results are robust to different specifications and the strongest effect is found
using the Value Premium based on the percentiles p25 and p75 as cutoffs.
3.5.2 CEO Compensation and Functional Background
Table 3.5 presents the results that combine CEO Performance Pay and Functional Back-
ground as important determinants of firm performance (hypothesis 2). In panel A, we
use as control variables Market-to-Book ratio, Size and Ind. Performance and we can see
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that the coefficient associated with the Functional Background is positive and statistically
different from zero for the different horizons in which we measure firm performance (av-
erage performance for the next 1, 2 and 3 years). In addition, using the eight metrics
(columns (1)-(3)), we show that the Functional Background is more important in the long-
run (3 years) as compared to the short-run (1 year). In fact, firms whose CEOs possess the
Functional Background consistent with the accounting metrics associated with either explo-
ration or exploitation activities have on average 3.1%, 5.0% and 8% higher performance in
the short-, medium- and long-run, respectively. Moreover, when we only consider the five
most frequently employed metrics (EPS, Sales, Operating Income, Earnings and EBITDA),
the effect of Functional Background is stronger, firms have on average 3.7%, 6.0% and 9.6%
better performance. In addition, the effect of Functional Background are robust even after
controlling for firm-year fixed effects (Panel B). It is important to highlight that the average
performance is based on the eight accounting metrics used in this study. Unfortunately, we
are no able to isolate the performance associated with growth- or profit-oriented activities.
We only can show the average performance at firm level.
With respect to the Performance Pay measure, the results are in line with our hypothesis
(although the statistical significance is low). In Panel A, columns (4) and (5), we find a
positive effect of Performance Pay on firm performance and the effect is mainly concentrated
in the short-run and medium-run. Moreover, the coefficients associated with Performance
Pay are consistently larger than the coefficients of the Functional Background. However,
in unreported tests we find that the two coefficients are not statistically distinguishable.
However, the Performance Pay has low explanatory power (Panel A), we only find stronger
results in the medium-term and when we employ just the five common used metrics. In terms
of economic magnitude, an increase in the Performance Pay by 6% (one standard deviation)
improves the performance of firms by 1% in the medium-run. When we consider the eight
metrics the results work poorly. In fact, the effect of Performance Pay is just statistically
different from zero at 10% level and only in the short-term. In addition, In Panel B, when we
include firm-year fixed effect, the coefficients associated with Performance Pay become less
important in explaining firm performance. These surprising results shed light on the way
120
that CEOs respond to incentives and how CEO characteristics might affect the effectiveness
of linking compensation to accounting goals. For that reason, in the following test, we show
that the Performance Pay has a different impact on firm performance depending on the
tenure of the CEO.
In our sample the average annual compensation of CEOs is around 8 million dollars
which is almost twice the average annual compensation of other top executives. Hence,
executives who become CEOs suffer a large positive shock in their compensation. We
argue that the effect of performance pay on accounting goals should be higher for recently
appointed CEOs. The expected increase in compensation that is conditional on meeting the
targets exerts more influence on CEO effort. In contrast, CEO tenure is positively associated
with total compensation (Hill and Phan (1991)), for that reason the incentives associated
with performance goals for older CEOs are less appealing due to the wealth effect. The
percentage of the total compensation tied to accounting metrics becomes a small fraction
of the CEOs’ total wealth when they have held to the job for a long time. In addition, if
the forced turnover is more likely for CEOs with lower tenure, then new CEOs have more
incentives to meet the accounting goals to keep their job. In fact, Bennett, Bettis, Gopalan,
and Milbourn (2015) show that the probability of forced turnovers is higher when CEOs
miss the accounting targets and the tenure is negatively associated with forced turnovers.
Having said that, we look deeper into the effect Performance Pay on firm performance
and we split the sample in two, new and older CEOs (Yim (2013)). We define new CEOs
as executives who were appointed to the position within the last two years. And, we define
older CEOs as having tenure of more than two years.
Table 3.6 Panel A displays the results of new and older CEOs using the eight accounting
metrics. In columns (1) and (3), Performance Pay has a highly significant positive effect
on firm performance mainly for new CEOs in the short- and medium-run. But more impor-
tantly, the effect on firm performance considering older CEOs is not statistically significant
for the three time horizon (columns (2), (4) and (6)). However, the Functional Background
is still an important determinant of firm performance for the medium- and long-term in the
case of older CEOs and for the three horizons when we look at new CEOs.
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Panel B shows the results of new and older CEOs using the five most frequent accounting
metrics. As opposed to the previous evidence presented in Panel A, Performance Pay has
an important and positive effect on firm performance for recently appointed CEOs in the
short- and medium-run. In terms of economic magnitudes, a one standard increase (7%)
in the Performance Pay improves firm performance by 1.5%, 2.7% and 3.3% in the short-
, medium- and long-run, respectively. For the older CEOs subsample, Performance Pay
does not matter much in explaining firm performance. More importantly, our analysis
shows that Performance Pay has a long lasting effect on firm performance for new CEOs.
Overall, these result suggest that linking executive compensation to accounting goals help
to improve firms performance only when CEOs are new in their jobs.
3.5.3 Aligned Incentives
Table 3.7 displays the results regarding Aligned Incentives. We combine the functional
background of CEOs and their compensation structure to test whether firms that provide
a compensation package consistent with the functional background of the CEO outperform
firms with misaligned incentives. Thus, our main variable of interest is Aligned Incentives,
which takes the value of 1 in two cases. First, the CEO has an output-oriented functional
background and the firm ties her compensation to sales growth targets. The second case is
when the CEO has a profit-oriented functional background and her compensation package
is mainly determined by profitability goals.
When we consider the full sample, there is no effect of Aligned Incentives on firm per-
formance for the three time horizons. Given our previous results regarding new and older
CEOs we argue that the effect of Aligned Incentives should be stronger when we only con-
sider new CEOs. Thus, we follow the methodology of the previous table and split the
sample in two. Doing so, the results suggest that Aligned Incentives are more important
for recently appointed CEOs (less than two years). Using the eight accounting metrics
(Panel A), we find a positive relation between Aligned Incentives and firm performance in
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the short and long-run. In columns (2), (4) and (6), we show that firms with Aligned Incen-
tives outperform firms with misaligned incentives by 6.4%, 11.3% and 11.2% in the short-,
medium- and long-run, respectively. In addition, the coefficients of Aligned Incentives are
larger when we only consider the five most frequently employed accounting metrics to de-
fine performance goals. Firms with Aligned Incentives outperform firms with misaligned
incentives by 8.3%, 12.7% and 12.4% in the short-, medium- and long-run (Columns (2),
(4) and (6)), respectively.
Finally, in Table 3.8 we show that the effect of Aligned Incentives is robust to firm-year
fixed effects. Considering only new CEOs and the eight accounting metrics, we report that
the coefficient associated with Aligned Incentives is still positive and statistically different
from zero in the short-, medium and long-run. Remarkably, the coefficients are larger
as compared to those in Table 3.7; firms with Aligned Incentives outperform firms with
misaligned incentives by 10.9%, 14.4% and 13.1% in the short-, medium- and long-run,
respectively. Also the results are robust using only the five most frequently employed
metrics, expect for the long-run. In panel B, we show that economic impact of Aligned
Incentives is 11.6% and 14% in the short-, and medium-run, respectively. Overall, our
results suggest that Performance Pay makes a difference only in new CEOs, but more
importantly, firms can achieve a better performance when they bring in a new leader and
design a compensation plan consistent with the functional background of the incoming CEO.
The last result contributes to the literature of executive compensation and CEO succession
by showing that together, functional background and incentives plans, are crucial to have
successful firms in the long-run.
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3.6 Conclusion
We use a comprehensive dataset containing information on the accounting performance
goals employed by firms to provide evidence that firms design executive compensation to
cater to investor demand. We show that boards of directors tie the compensation of their
executives to accounting metrics preferred by investors. We create the Value Premium
variable, which is a proxy for investor demand, to show that investor preferences in the
previous year have a positive effect on the executive performance pay in the current year.
In addition, we show that both performance pay and functional background are impor-
tant determinants of firm performance in the short-, medium- and long-run. But the effect
of performance pay is mainly concentrated in new CEOs and the functional background
has a long-lasting effect on firm performance for both new and older CEOs. Moreover, for
recently appointed CEOs, we provide evidence that firms obtain better performance when
they design compensation plans consistent with the CEO’s functional background. Our
results provide evidence that the literature of executive compensation and CEO succes-
sion are highly related by showing that together, functional background of new leaders and
incentives plans, are crucial to have successful firms in the long-run.
Finally, after the new SEC rules in 2006 there are several open questions regarding exec-
utive contracts. This study contributes to the discussion of how firms design compensation
plans for their executives and how these designs impact firm performance.
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3.8 Appendix C: Variable definitions
 Aligned Incentives: Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a firm has CEO
performance pay focused on growth (profit) performance and the CEO functional
background is growth (profit) oriented, zero otherwise.
 Cash Flows: Operating Income minus Accruals (∆CA − ∆CashandEq. − ∆CL −
∆DebtinCL−DP ). Cash Flow/TA: Cash flows to total assets
 Earnings: net income.
 EBIT: Earnings before interest and taxes.
 EBITDA: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
 Entrenchment index is the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index.
 EPS: Earnings per share.
 Percentage of Independent Directors: fraction of independent directors on the firm’s
board.
 Industry Performance: Average performance (growth rates) of the firm’s peers in
the same industry (two-digit SIC code) with respect to the eight metrics (Sales
growth, Earnings growth, Operating income growth, Cash flows growth, EBIT growth,
EBITDA growth, ROE growth, and EPS growth).
 Market-to-Book: Market value of assets (market value of common shares plus pre-
ferred stock liquidating value plus short and long debt minus deferred taxes and
investment tax credit) divided by the total book asset value.
 Operating Income: Sales minus cost of goods sold and depreciation
 Peer Pay: peer executive compensation linked to the eight performance metrics in
the same three-digit SIC code industry classification.
 Performance Pay : Vector that contains the fraction of total compensation (which is
the sum of annual salary, bonus, present value of stock awards, present value of stock
option awards, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, and other
cash payouts) linked to the accounting performance metrics.
 Power Index (Morse et al. (2011)): Variable with a range from 1 to 3 depending on
the number of titles that a CEO holds in the firm. If the CEO is the president of
the firm and also the chairman of the board the index is equal to 3. If the CEO is
only the chairman of the board the index is equal to 2. Finally, if the CEO is not the
chairman of the firm the index is equal to 1.
 ROE: Return on Equity (Net income divided by common equity)
 Sales Growth: Change in sales between the previous year and the current year divided
by the sales of previous year
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 Size: Natural logarithm of Total assets.
 Spread: Average daily stock bid-ask spread.
 Stock Return: Annual stock return.
 Tenure is the tenure of the CEO.
 Value Premium: Natural logarithmic difference of the average market-to-book ratios
between firms with higher accounting performance (in the top of the distribution)
versus firms with lower accounting performance (in the bottom of the distribution).
For each year and two-digit SIC code industry classification we rank the firms based
on the firm performance with respect to the eight accounting metrics.
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3.9 Tables
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for the performance pay, the Value Premium variable, functional
background and firm characteristics. Panel A shows the summary statistics for the fraction of the total
compensation tied to accounting metrics. Panel B displays the statistics for Value Premium variable with
respect to the eight accounting metrics. Panel C and D provide the information regarding CEO character-
istics, peer performance pay and control variables at firm level. The eight accounting metrics are: EPS,
Sales, Operating Income, Earnings, EBITDA, Cash flow, ROE and EBIT and the five most frequently used
accounting metrics by firms are: EPS, Sales, Operating Income, Earnings, EBITDA. All variables used in
the regression analysis are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Panel A: Performance Pay. Fraction of total compensation tied to performance metrics
CEO Top Executives
N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max
Sales 4460 0.02 0.06 0 0.36 4414 0.02 0.05 0 0.31
Earnings 4460 0.01 0.04 0 0.25 4414 0.01 0.04 0 0.24
Operating Income 4460 0.02 0.07 0 0.41 4414 0.02 0.06 0 0.34
Cash Flow 4460 0.01 0.04 0 0.28 4414 0.01 0.03 0 0.21
EBIT 4460 0 0.02 0 0.14 4414 0 0.02 0 0.12
EBITDA 4460 0.01 0.04 0 0.31 4414 0.01 0.04 0 0.28
ROE 4460 0 0.02 0 0.15 4414 0 0.02 0 0.13
EPS 4460 0.04 0.1 0 0.51 4414 0.03 0.08 0 0.44
Profit (Total) 4460 0.10 0.13 0 0.8 4460 0.08 0.11 0 0.61
Panel B: Value Premium
Growth rate N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Sales p85 vs. p15 4366 0.5 0.4 0.26 0.52 0.77
Sales quintile 4366 0.49 0.34 0.28 0.48 0.72
Sales quartile 4366 0.46 0.32 0.26 0.45 0.65
Earnings p85 vs. p15 4366 0.29 0.32 0.08 0.28 0.52
Earnings quintile 4366 0.26 0.31 0.06 0.26 0.45
Earnings quartile 4366 0.25 0.28 0.06 0.23 0.44
Op. Income p85 vs. p15 4366 0.32 0.33 0.1 0.32 0.51
Op. Income quintile 4366 0.31 0.31 0.1 0.3 0.48
Op. Income quartile 4366 0.3 0.28 0.12 0.28 0.49
Cash Flow p85 vs. p15 3660 0.13 0.31 -0.05 0.14 0.3
Cash Flow quintile 3660 0.16 0.28 0.01 0.17 0.36
Cash Flow quartile 3660 0.16 0.25 0 0.14 0.29
EBIT p85 vs. p15 4366 0.31 0.33 0.11 0.3 0.52
EBIT quintile 4366 0.3 0.3 0.11 0.29 0.48
EBIT quartile 4366 0.29 0.29 0.12 0.28 0.46
EBITDA p85 vs. p15 4366 0.32 0.33 0.1 0.32 0.51
EBITDA quintile 4366 0.31 0.31 0.1 0.3 0.48
EBITDA quartile 4366 0.3 0.28 0.12 0.28 0.49
ROE p85 vs. p15 4366 0.21 0.34 0.03 0.21 0.39
ROE quintile 4366 0.21 0.31 0 0.23 0.39
ROE quartile 4366 0.2 0.29 0.01 0.2 0.36
EPS p85 vs. p15 4366 0.21 0.32 0.03 0.24 0.41
EPS quintile 4366 0.21 0.3 0.02 0.23 0.4
EPS quartile 4366 0.21 0.28 0.04 0.2 0.41
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.Panel C: Full Sample Eight Metrics Only Sale and Income Metrics
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Performance pay 22704 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 11352 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Performance pay (Top Executives) 22664 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 11332 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Peer pay 22704 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 11352 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02
Peer pay (Top Executives) 22704 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 11352 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02
Value premium-p85 vs. p15 22274 0.29 0.35 0.05 0.28 0.50 11184 0.30 0.37 0.06 0.31 0.54
Value premium-quintile 22274 0.28 0.32 0.07 0.27 0.48 11184 0.29 0.34 0.06 0.28 0.51
Value premium-quartile 22274 0.27 0.30 0.08 0.25 0.46 11184 0.28 0.31 0.06 0.26 0.48
Stock Return 22704 0.13 0.47 -0.16 0.09 0.33 11352 0.13 0.47 -0.16 0.09 0.33
Sales Growth 22704 0.08 0.20 -0.02 0.07 0.15 11352 0.08 0.20 -0.02 0.07 0.15
Cashflow/TA 21976 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.19 10988 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.19
Spread 22656 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11328 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Size 22704 8.52 1.32 7.64 8.40 9.32 11352 8.52 1.32 7.64 8.40 9.32
Market-to-Book 22704 1.53 1.00 0.85 1.25 1.87 11352 1.53 1.00 0.85 1.25 1.87
Industry Performance 22669 -0.02 0.84 -0.31 0.01 0.33 11352 -0.03 0.90 -0.35 0.06 0.39
Stock Ownership (CEO) 22424 1.37 3.48 0.03 0.32 1.21 11212 1.37 3.48 0.03 0.32 1.21
Tenure (CEO) 22368 7.45 6.26 3.21 5.75 9.58 11184 7.45 6.26 3.21 5.75 9.58
Age (CEO) 22416 55.42 6.37 51.00 56.00 60.00 11208 55.42 6.37 51.00 56.00 60.00
Power Index 22424 1.86 0.82 1.00 2.00 3.00 11212 1.86 0.82 1.00 2.00 3.00
Independent Director Ratio (Dummy) 22704 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 11352 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
Entrenchment Index (Dummy) 22704 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 11352 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Panel D: SP-500 Sample Eight Metrics Five Frequently Used Metrics
Performance pay 15736 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 9835 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
Aligned Incentives 15736 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 9835 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00
Background 15736 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 9835 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Size 15736 9.31 1.17 8.47 9.15 10.15 9835 9.31 1.17 8.47 9.15 10.15
Market-to-Book 15736 1.70 1.07 0.94 1.39 2.10 9835 1.70 1.07 0.94 1.39 2.10
Performance 1yrs. 15660 -0.01 0.28 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 9830 -0.01 0.34 -0.06 -0.02 0.02
Performance 2yrs. 13247 -0.05 0.49 -0.25 -0.09 0.05 8223 -0.05 0.54 -0.27 -0.12 0.05
Performance 3yrs. 8604 -0.03 0.59 -0.30 -0.09 0.08 5313 -0.04 0.61 -0.32 -0.13 0.09
Ind. Performance 1yr. 15736 -0.01 0.77 -0.24 0.02 0.31 9835 0.00 0.83 -0.25 0.04 0.37
Ind. Performance 2yr. 15181 -0.02 0.75 -0.37 -0.06 0.27 9488 -0.01 0.83 -0.42 -0.08 0.34
Ind. Performance 3yr. 13067 0.00 0.77 -0.39 0.01 0.33 8165 0.00 0.83 -0.45 0.02 0.36
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Table 3.2: Executive Compensation and Catering Incentives
The table presents the results of the effect of investor demand on executive compensation. The dependent variable
is Performance Pay, which is the faction of the total compensation tied to an specific accounting metric. Our main
independent variable is the Value Premium, which measures the market’s preferences for an specific accounting metric.
Moreover, we have two samples: (1) CEO and (2) Top executive compensation. Panel A shows the results using the
eight accounting metrics (EPS, Sales, Operating Income, Earnings, EBITDA, Cash flow, ROE and EBIT) and Panel
B considers only sale and income accounting metrics used by firms (Sales, EPS, Earnings and ROE). The control
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects and the
standard errors are clustered at firm-year level. The constant is not reported. See Appendix C for a complete variable
definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard
errors are in parenthesis.
Table A: Eight Metrics
CEO Top Executives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value Premium-p85(p15) .003 .003
(.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Value Premium-quintile .005 .004
(.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Value Premium-quartile .006 .005
(.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Peer pay .233 .232 .232 .207 .206 .205
(.020)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗
Stock Own. .00007 .00006 .00007
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Tenure .00007 .00007 .00007
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Power Index -.001 -.001 -.001 -.0008 -.0008 -.0009
(.0007)∗∗ (.0007)∗∗ (.0007)∗∗ (.0006) (.0006) (.0006)
Independent Director Ratio .002 .002 .002 .001 .001 .001
(.0008)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗ (.0006)∗ (.0006)∗ (.0006)∗
Entrenchment Index .003 .003 .003 .002 .002 .002
(.0009)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗ (.0007)∗∗ (.0007)∗∗
Stock return -.003 -.003 -.003 -.002 -.002 -.002
(.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗
Sales growth .0009 .0008 .0009 .002 .001 .002
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Cashflow/TA .002 .002 .002 .005 .005 .005
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Spread .930 .932 .925 .382 .384 .377
(.483)∗ (.483)∗ (.483)∗ (.328) (.328) (.328)
Size .001 .001 .001 .002 .002 .002
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)∗ (.001) (.001)
Industry Performance -.00007 -.0001 -.0001 -.0002 -.0003 -.0003
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
Market-to-Book .0007 .0007 .0008 .0006 .0006 .0007
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0006) (.0006) (.0006)
Obs. 21219 21219 21219 21227 21227 21227
R2 .098 .098 .098 .099 .099 .099
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Table B: Sale and income metrics
CEO Top Executives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value Premium–p85(p15) .005 .005
(.002)∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Value Premium-quintile .007 .006
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Value Premium-quartile .009 .008
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Peer pay .270 .270 .268 .235 .234 .233
(.027)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗
Stock Own. .0001 .0001 .0001
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
Tenure .0003 .0003 .0003
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
Power Index -.003 -.003 -.003 -.001 -.001 -.001
(.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)
Independent Director Ratio .002 .002 .002 .001 .001 .001
(.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001) (.001) (.001)
Entrenchment Index .004 .004 .004 .003 .003 .003
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗
Stock return -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002
(.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.0009)∗∗ (.0009)∗∗ (.0009)∗∗
Sales growth -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Cashflow/TA -.005 -.005 -.005 -.004 -.004 -.004
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Spread .712 .706 .688 .430 .426 .410
(.716) (.715) (.714) (.501) (.500) (.499)
Size .003 .003 .003 .003 .003 .003
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)∗ (.002)∗ (.002)∗
Market-to-Book .0002 .0002 .00005 .00009 .00009 -2.89e-06
(.0005) (.0005) (.0006) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005)
Industry Performance .0006 .0006 .0007 .0002 .0002 .0003
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Obs. 10632 10632 10632 10636 10636 10636
R2 .187 .187 .187 .185 .185 .186
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Table 3.3: Executive Compensation, Catering Incentives and Corporate Governance
The table presents the results of the effect of investor demand and corporate governance characteristics on CEO
compensation. The dependent variable is Performance Pay, which is the fraction of the total compensation tied to
an specific accounting metric. Our main independent variable is the Value Premium, which measures the market’s
preferences for an specific accounting metric. Panel A shows the results using the eight accounting metrics (Sales,
Earnings, Operating income, Cash flows, EBIT, EBITDA, ROE and EPS) and Panel B considers only sale and income
accounting metrics used by firms (Sales, EPS, Earnings and ROE). The control variables are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentile. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at firm-year
level. See Appendix C for a complete variable definitions. The constant is not reported. Statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table A: Eight Metrics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
P85(P15) Quintile Quartile P85(P15) Quintile Quartile P85(P15) Quintile Quartile
Value Premium (VP) .011 .014 .018 .004 .006 .007 .003 .005 .005
(.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002) (.002)∗∗ (.002)∗∗
VP x Power Index -.005 -.005 -.006
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
VP x Independent Directors -.002 -.002 -.002
(.003) (.003) (.003)
VP x Entrenchment Index .0002 .0003 .001
(.002) (.003) (.003)
Power Index -.00008 .00007 .0002 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0007)∗∗ (.0007)∗∗ (.0007)∗∗ (.0007)∗∗ (.0007)∗∗ (.0007)∗∗
Independent Directors .002 .001 .001 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002
(.0008)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗ (.0008)∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗ (.0008)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗ (.0008)∗∗
Entrenchment Index .003 .003 .003 .003 .003 .003 .002 .002 .002
(.0009)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 21219 21219 21219 21219 21219 21219 21219 21219 21219
R2 .098 .098 .099 .098 .098 .098 .098 .098 .098
Table B: Sale and Income accounting metrics
P85(P15) Quintile Quartile P85(P15) Quintile Quartile P85(P15) Quintile Quartile
Value Premium .018 .019 .022 .006 .007 .009 .005 .008 .010
(.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗ (.003)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
VP x Power Index -.007 -.006 -.007
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
VP x Independent Directors -.001 -.0006 -.0004
(.004) (.005) (.005)
VP x Entrenchment Index -.0007 -.0009 -.001
(.004) (.004) (.004)
Power Index -.0005 -.0007 -.0007 -.003 -.003 -.003 -.003 -.003 -.003
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗
Independent Directors .002 .002 .002 .003 .003 .003 .002 .002 .002
(.001)∗ (.001)∗ (.001)∗ (.002) (.002) (.002) (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.001)∗∗
Entrenchment Index .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗ (.002)∗∗ (.002)∗∗
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 10632 10632 10632 10632 10632 10632 10632 10632 10632
R2 .188 .188 .188 .187 .187 .187 .187 .187 .187
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Table 3.4: Executive Compensation and Catering Incentives: Robustness Test
The table presents the results of the effect of investor demand on executive compensation. The dependent variable
is Performance Pay, which is the fraction of the total compensation tied to an specific accounting metric. Our main
independent variable is the Value Premium, which measures the market’s preferences for an specific accounting metric.
Moreover, we have two samples: (1) CEO and (2) Top executive compensation. Panel A shows the results using the
eight accounting metrics (EPS, Sales, Operating Income, Earnings, EBITDA, Cash flow, ROE and EBIT) and Panel
B considers only sale and income accounting metrics used by firms (Sales, EPS, Earnings and ROE). The control
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All regressions include firm-year-fixed effects and the standard
errors are clustered at firm level. The constant is not reported. See Appendix C for a complete variable definitions.
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.
Table A: Eight Metrics
CEO Top Executives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P85(P15) Quintile Quartile P85(P15) Quintile Quartile
Value Premium .004 .006 .008 .004 .006 .008
(.003) (.003)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.002)∗ (.002)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Peer pay .242 .241 .240 .215 .214 .213
(.034)∗∗∗ (.034)∗∗∗ (.034)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗
Industry Performance .0007 .0007 .0006 .0004 .0004 .0003
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0006) (.0006) (.0006)
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 21219 21219 21219 21227 21227 21227
R2 .136 .136 .136 .137 .137 .137
Table B: Sale and Income metrics
CEO Top Executives
P85(P15) Quintile Quartile P85(P15) Quintile Quartile
Value Premium .007 .010 .013 .007 .009 .012
(.004) (.005)∗ (.005)∗∗ (.004)∗ (.004)∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
Peer pay .290 .290 .287 .252 .251 .248
(.050)∗∗∗ (.050)∗∗∗ (.050)∗∗∗ (.046)∗∗∗ (.046)∗∗∗ (.046)∗∗∗
Industry Performance -.0007 -.0005 -.0008 -.0004 -.0002 -.0004
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 10632 10632 10632 10636 10636 10636
R2 .264 .265 .265 .259 .259 .26
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Table 3.5: Performance Pay and Functional Background
The table presents the results of the effect of performance pay and functional background on firm performance. The
dependent variable is Firm Performance. We measure the performance of firms using three horizons: short-term (1
year), medium-term (2 years) and long-term (3 years). Firm Performancet,titk is the accounting metric growth k in
the current fiscal year (1 year). Firm Performancet,t+1itk is the average growth between the current year and the
next year (2 years). And Firm Performancet,t+2itk is the average growth between the current year, the next year and
the year after (3 years). Our two main independent variables are the Functional Background and Performance Pay.
The dummy variable Functional Backgroundikt is the functional background of the CEO. Performance Pay is the
fraction of the total compensation tied to an specific accounting metric. The five the most frequently used accounting
metrics by firms are: EPS, Sales, Operating Income, Earnings and EBITDA. The control variables are winsorized at
the 1st and 99th percentile. The control variable Ind. Performance is the performance of the industry (two-digit
SIC code) for the same time period that appears on the top of each column. Panel A reports the results using as
control variable firm characteristics and all regressions include firm fixed effects. In Panel B all regressions include
firm-year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. The constant is not reported. See Appendix
C for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and
***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Panel A Eight Metrics Five Frequently Employed Metric
Firm Performance 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Functional Background .031 .050 .079 .037 .060 .096
(.016)∗ (.024)∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗ (.027)∗∗ (.032)∗∗∗
Performance pay .076 .105 .078 .081 .165 .165
(.045)∗ (.074) (.097) (.049) (.083)∗∗ (.111)
Market-to-Book .034 .086 .051 .050 .101 .059
(.008)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.028)∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.034)∗
Size .054 -.032 -.197 .083 -.014 -.205
(.018)∗∗∗ (.063) (.099)∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.075) (.120)∗
Ind. Performance .116 .233 .249 .144 .251 .272
(.007)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗
Obs. 15660 13247 10799 9830 8223 6676
R2 .144 .242 .279 .2 .288 .336
Panel B Eight Metrics Five Frequently Employed Metric
Firm Performance 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
Functional Background .042 .066 .084 .044 .072 .096
(.021)∗∗ (.028)∗∗ (.034)∗∗ (.022)∗∗ (.030)∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗
Performance pay .083 .077 .026 .099 .143 .112
(.048)∗ (.070) (.093) (.057)∗ (.085)∗ (.116)
Ind. Performance .166 .230 .235 .222 .262 .284
(.011)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.030)∗∗∗ (.047)∗∗∗
Firm-Year F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 15660 13247 10799 9830 8223 6676
R2 .284 .505 .5 .376 .588 .592
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Table 3.6: Performance Pay and Functional Background: CEO Tenure
The table presents the results of the effect of performance pay and functional background on firm performance. The
dependent variable is Firm Performance. We measure the performance of firms using three horizons: short-term (1
year), medium-term (2 years) and long-term (3 years). Firm Performancet,titk is the accounting metric growth k in
the current fiscal year (1 year). Firm Performancet,t+1itk is the average growth between the current year and the
next year (2 years). And Firm Performancet,t+2itk is the average growth between the current year, the next year and
the year after (3 years). Our two main independent variables are the Functional Background and Performance Pay.
The dummy variable Functional Backgroundikt is the functional background of the CEO. Performance Pay is the
fraction of the total compensation tied to an specific accounting metric. We split the sample in two: (1) New CEOs
(tenure≤2 years) and (2) Older CEOs (tenure>2 years). Also, Panel A shows the results using the eight accounting
metrics (EPS, Sales, Operating Income, Earnings, EBITDA, Cash flow, ROE and EBIT) and Panel B considers the
five most frequently used accounting metrics by firms (EPS, Sales, Operating Income, Earnings and EBITDA). The
control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects and the
standard errors are clustered at firm level. The control variable Ind. Performance is the performance of the industry
(two-digit SIC code) for the same time period that appears on the top of each column. The constant is not reported.
See Appendix C for a complete variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted
by *, ** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Panel A: Firm Performance and recently appointed CEOs. Eight Metrics
Firm Performance 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year
New
CEO
Older
CEO
New
CEO
Older
CEO
New
CEO
Older
CEO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Functional Background .056 .041 .100 .063 .103 .086
(.033)∗ (.025) (.041)∗∗ (.034)∗ (.048)∗∗ (.040)∗∗
Performance pay .174 .050 .226 .019 .206 -.057
(.081)∗∗ (.050) (.115)∗∗ (.078) (.152) (.107)
Ind. Performance .133 .178 .188 .250 .195 .258
(.018)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 4311 10651 3685 8924 3007 7282
R2 .266 .295 .454 .534 .455 .527
Panel B: Firm Performance and recently appointed CEOs. Five frequently employed metrics
Firm Performance 1 Years 2 Years 3 Years
New
CEO
Older
CEO
New
CEO
Older
CEO
New
CEO
Older
CEO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Functional Background .057 .044 .100 .073 .108 .100
(.035)∗ (.026)∗ (.044)∗∗ (.035)∗∗ (.052)∗∗ (.041)∗∗
Performance pay .209 .055 .382 .058 .470 -.033
(.091)∗∗ (.062) (.132)∗∗∗ (.095) (.175)∗∗∗ (.136)
Ind. Performance .173 .238 .201 .282 .223 .307
(.029)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗∗ (.037)∗∗∗ (.052)∗∗∗ (.057)∗∗∗
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2710 6680 2294 5531 1863 4495
R2 .354 .387 .544 .615 .562 .617
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Table 3.7: Aligned Incentives and Firm Performance
The table presents the results of the effect of aligned incentives on firm performance. The dependent variable is Firm
Performance. We measure the performance of firms using three horizons: (1) Short-term (1 year), (2) Medium-term
(2 years) and (3) Long-term (3 years). Firm Performancet,titk is the accounting metric growth k in the current fiscal
year (1 year). Firm Performancet,t+1itk is the average growth between the current year and the next year (2 years).
And Firm Performancet,t+2itk is the average growth between the current year, the next year and the year after (3
years). Our main independent variables is Aligned Incentives, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
when a firm has CEO performance pay focused on growth (profit) performance and the CEO functional background is
growth (profit) oriented and zero otherwise. We split the sample in two: (1) New CEOs (tenure≤2 years) and (2) Older
CEOs (tenure>2 years). Panel A shows the results using the eight accounting metrics (EPS, Sales, Operating Income,
Earnings, EBITDA, Cash flow, ROE and EBIT) and Panel B considers the five most frequently used accounting
metrics by firms (EPS, Sales, Operating Income, Earnings and EBITDA). The control variables are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentile. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at firm
level. The control variable Ind. Performance is the performance of the industry (two-digit SIC code) for the same
time period that appears on the top of each column. The constant is not reported. See Appendix C for a complete
variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Panel A: Eight Metrics
Firm Performance 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
Full
Sample
New
CEO
Older
CEO
Full
Sample
New
CEO
Older
CEO
Full
Sample
New
CEO
Older
CEO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Aligned Incentives .016 .064 .011 .007 .113 -.003 .021 .112 .007
(.015) (.031)∗∗ (.021) (.027) (.044)∗∗∗ (.037) (.032) (.055)∗∗ (.047)
Market-to-Book .033 .042 .041 .086 .105 .104 .052 .104 .056
(.008)∗∗∗ (.035) (.007)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.055)∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.027)∗ (.054)∗ (.025)∗∗
Size .055 -.002 .079 -.031 -.043 -.025 -.198 -.398 -.224
(.018)∗∗∗ (.046) (.026)∗∗∗ (.063) (.136) (.078) (.099)∗∗ (.160)∗∗ (.123)∗
Ind. Performance .115 .096 .125 .233 .186 .257 .249 .198 .280
(.007)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.037)∗∗∗
Obs. 15660 4311 10651 13247 3685 8924 10799 3007 7282
R2 .143 .144 .17 .24 .316 .305 .277 .369 .333
Panel B: Five frequently employed metrics
Firm Performance 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
Full
Sample
New
CEO
Older
CEO
Full
Sample
New
CEO
Older
CEO
Full
Sample
New
CEO
Older
CEO
Aligned Incentives .023 .083 .010 .010 .127 -.014 .031 .124 .006
(.019) (.036)∗∗ (.024) (.031) (.051)∗∗ (.040) (.038) (.064)∗ (.053)
Market-to-Book .050 .067 .057 .101 .138 .117 .060 .119 .061
(.012)∗∗∗ (.046) (.010)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.066)∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗ (.034)∗ (.073) (.032)∗
Size .084 -.016 .118 -.013 -.056 .019 -.206 -.447 -.194
(.027)∗∗∗ (.067) (.038)∗∗∗ (.075) (.180) (.096) (.121)∗ (.220)∗∗ (.156)
Ind. Performance .143 .113 .156 .251 .190 .276 .271 .209 .310
(.009)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.035)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗ (.032)∗∗∗ (.043)∗∗∗
Obs. 9830 2710 6680 8223 2294 5531 6676 1863 4495
R2 .198 .202 .231 .285 .374 .357 .332 .435 .399
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Table 3.8: Aligned Incentives: Robustness Test
The table presents the results of the effect of aligned incentives on firm performance. The dependent variable is Firm
Performance. We measure the performance of firms using three horizons: (1) Short-term (1 year), (2) Medium-term
(2 years) and (3) Long-term (3 years). Firm Performancet,titk is the accounting metric growth k in the current fiscal
year (1 year). Firm Performancet,t+1itk is the average growth between the current year and the next year (2 years).
And Firm Performancet,t+2itk is the average growth between the current year, the next year and the year after (3
years). Our main independent variables is Aligned Incentives, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
when a firm has CEO performance pay focused on growth (profit) performance and the CEO functional background is
growth (profit) oriented and zero otherwise. We split the sample in two: (1) New CEOs (tenure≤2 years) and (2) Older
CEOs (tenure>2 years). Panel A shows the results using the eight accounting metrics (EPS, Sales, Operating Income,
Earnings, EBITDA, Cash flow, ROE and EBIT) and Panel B considers the five most frequently used accounting
metrics by firms (EPS, Sales, Operating Income, Earnings and EBITDA). The control variables are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentile. All regressions include firm-year fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at firm
level. The control variable Ind. Performance is the performance of the industry (two-digit SIC code) for the same
time period that appears on the top of each column. The constant is not reported. See Appendix C for a complete
variable definitions. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Panel A: Eight Metrics
Firm Performance 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
New
CEO
Older
CEO
New
CEO
Older
CEO
New
CEO
Older
CEO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aligned Incentives .109 .004 .144 -.021 .131 -.008
(.049)∗∗ (.039) (.063)∗∗ (.054) (.073)∗ (.065)
Ind. Performance .132 .178 .187 .250 .193 .258
(.018)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 4311 10651 3685 8924 3007 7282
R2 .268 .293 .453 .532 .454 .525
Panel B: Five frequently employed metrics
Firm Performance 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
New
CEO
Older
CEO
New
CEO
Older
CEO
New
CEO
Older
CEO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aligned Incentives .116 .003 .140 -.025 .128 -.009
(.052)∗∗ (.040) (.067)∗∗ (.058) (.080) (.069)
Ind. Performance .172 .237 .201 .283 .218 .307
(.029)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗∗ (.037)∗∗∗ (.053)∗∗∗ (.057)∗∗∗
Firm-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2710 6680 2294 5531 1863 4495
R2 .357 .385 .542 .612 .558 .614
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